Cosmozoopolis: the case against Group-Differentiated Animal Rights

This paper claims that relational position and group-based distinctions are less important in determining the rights of animals than Zoopolis concludes. In particular, it argues that the theory of animal rights developed in Zoopolis is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theories which differentiate the rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. For example, in the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights have been criticised on a number of important grounds: for failing to extend to non-associates rights that ought to be so extended; for granting too much weight to the rights of associates over non-associates; for wrongly treating groups as homogenous entities; and for also assuming that these groups necessarily have value as they exist presently. This paper outlines how modified versions of these critiques can be levelled at the theory of animal rights defended in Zoopolis

Moral obligations to non-humans.

My PhD thesis provides an account of the moral obligations we have to non-humans. The project is divided into two sections: the theoretical and the applied. In the first section I examine the foundations of our moral obligations, answering two key questions: what types of thing have moral status, and how can we delineate our obligations to them. I maintain that those entities with the capacity for 'well-being' have moral status. I refute the claim made by some that all living organisms have well-being, and argue that only beings with 'phenomenal consciousness' (sentience) have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. At this point then, the thesis turns its focus towards sentient animals. Next I consider just how we should structure our moral obligations. I argue that a utilitarian or aggregative framework fails to individuate entities with moral status, treating them as mere 'receptacles' of value. I thus propose that an interest-based rights theory provides the appropriate means for delineating our obligations to non-human animals. The second part of the thesis involves teasing out the implications of this interest-based rights theory for the ways in which we treat animals. To this end, I evaluate four different contexts in which we use non-human animals: in experiments, in agriculture, in entertainment, and by cultural groups. During these considerations, I argue that animals' interests in avoiding pain and continued life ground prima facie animal rights not to be made to suffer and not to be killed. This renders many of the ways we currently use animals impermissible, particularly with regards to factory farming and experimentation. However, unlike other proponents of animal rights, I do not see the use of animals as impermissible in itself. This is because I claim that animals have no intrinsic interest in liberty, whether liberty is construed as the absence of interference or as the ability to govern one's own life. Since animals have no interest in liberty for its own sake, this means that they ordinarily have no right not to be used or interfered with by humans. Thus, the ultimate conclusion of my thesis is that the moral obligations we have to animals do not involve liberating them from zoos, farms and our homes. Rather, they necessitate putting an end to the suffering and death that animals endure at our hands

A case for the provision of assisted dying in prisons founded on the right to self-determination: creating equivalence between prisoners and non-prisoners?

This article makes the case for the provision of access to assisted death in prisons, founded on the right to self-determination under Article 8(1) ECHR, in order to create equivalence between prisoners and non-prisoners. It considers possible State justifications for interferences with the right under Article 8(2) and whether they would meet the Convention standards of legality and proportionality. In relation to proportionality, it is argued that the foundational basis for restrictions on assisted dying imposed on both the general and prison populations derives from the concept of human dignity, a concept which is also fundamental to prisoners’ rights. Under the banner of proportionality, from an initial presumption of equivalence of access to assisted dying, the article identifies certain conditions inherent in the prison situation that inevitably oppose human dignity and which provide a plausible basis for divergence. Ultimately, it is concluded that an absolute bar on provision of access to assisted dying in prisons cannot be justified, but that the factors that undermine dignity in prison could justify a degree of divergence from creation of equivalence between the prison and the non-prison populations in terms of such access

Can dredged canal sediments be used for flood defence as part of the Scottish circular economy?

Dredged sediments from maintenance work on Scotland’s network of four operational canals are an underutilised resource. This poster will present progress that has been made to investigate different remedial approaches to improving the geotechnical properties of dredged canal sediments while addressing any residual issues related to industrial impacts and residual contamination. Dredged sediments from maintenance work on Scotland’s network of four operational canals are an underutilised resource. It divides roughly into two groups with different challenges for reuse or recycling: In the Highlands, the Caledonian and Crinan Canals, immediate reuse of typically clean material is largely presented by remoteness and the associated challenges of dewatering for transport, materials separation and the infrequency of any receiving engineering works; In contrast, in the Lowland Forth and Clyde or Union Canals, the legacy of industrial activity requires detailed testing, dewatering and recycling methods to be developed and treatment technologies to extract secondary feedstocks suitable for use from a linearly dispersed source. Scottish Canals and the University of Strathclyde have joined a consortium of 7 key European academic and industrial partners as part of the EU-funded Interreg NWE SURICATES Project - Sediment Uses as Resources in Circular And Territorial Economies (http://www.nweurope.eu/projects/project-search/suricates-sediment-uses-as-resources-in-circular-and-territorial-economies/). Using a series of pilots and trials the SURICATES consortium will demonstrate the potential for safe and effective reuse options of this potential resource, including sediment nourishment, use in concrete, pozzolanic mixtures, or phyto-conditioning and bio-engineering of soil for restoration and reclamation

Can dredged canal sediments be used for flood defences as part of the Scottish circular economy?

The vision of a circular economy is to limit environmental damage through waste elimination. This is only possible through intensive recycling and the elimination of waste streams via beneficial reuse, with a corresponding reduction in the estimated 10.7 Mg CO2 emissions per capita in Scotland (Pratt, Lenaghan et al. 2016). Sediments dredged from Scotland’s four operating canals represent a waste stream that can be potentially utilized, providing its geotechnical properties can be optimised and any residual environmental concerns, such as sediment contamination, can be addressed. Scottish Canals currently remove around 4,000 tonnes of material per year to maintain canal depth and navigability through the canal network. Over 99% of EU marine sediment is dumped at sea, representing a lost opportunity to reuse or recycle materials for use in engineering works to prevent flood risk or erosion under climate change scenarios

Animal Ethics and the Political

Some of the most important contributions to animal ethics over the past decade or so have come from political, as opposed to moral, philosophers. As such, some have argued that there been a ‘political turn’ in the field. If there has been such a turn, it needs to be shown that there is something which unites these contributions, and which sets them apart from previous work. We find that some of the features which have been claimed to be shared commitments of the turn are contested by key theorists working in the field. We also find that the originality of the turn can be exaggerated, with many of their ideas found in more traditional animal ethics. Nonetheless, we identify one unifying and distinctive feature of these contributions: the focus on justice; and specifically, the exploration of how political institutions, structures and processes might be transformed so as to secure justice for both human and nonhuman animals

Rabbits, stoats and the predator problem: Why a strong animal rights position need not call for human intervention to protect prey from predators

Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson

Justice Through a Multispecies Lens

The bushfires in Australia during the Summer of 2019–2020, in the midst of which we were writing this exchange, violently heightened the urgency of the task of rethinking justice through a multispecies lens for all of the authors in this exchange, and no doubt many of its readers. As I finish this introduction, still in the middle of the Australian summer, more than 10 million hectares (100,000 km2 or 24.7 million acres) of bushland have been burned and over a billion individual animals killed. This says nothing of the others who will die because their habitat and the relationships on which they depend no longer exist. People all around the world are mourning these deaths and the destruction of unique ecosystems. As humans on this planet, and specifically as political theorists facing the prospect that such devastating events will only become more frequent, the question before us is whether we can rethink what it means to be in ethical relationships with beings other than humans and what justice requires, in ways that mark these deaths as absolute wrongs that obligate us to act, and not simply as unfortunate tragedies that leave us bereft