Transferable Control

In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control

Volatility and growth: credit constraints and productivity-enhancing investment

We examine how credit constraints affect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing investment and thereby volatility and growth. We first develop a simple growth model where firms engage in two types of investment: a short-term one and a long-term productivity-enhancing one. Because it takes longer to complete, long-term investment has a relatively less procyclical return but also a higher liquidity risk. Under complete financial markets, long-term investment is countercyclical, thus mitigating volatility. But when firms face tight credit constraints, long-term investment turns procyclical, thus amplifying volatility. Tighter credit therefore leads to both higher aggregate volatility and lower mean growth for a given total investment rate. We next confront the model with a panel of countries over the period 1960-2000 and find that a lower degree of financial development predicts a higher sensitivity of both the composition of investment and mean growth to exogenous shocks, as well as a stronger negative effect of volatility on growth

Nuclear emulsions for the detection of micrometric-scale fringe patterns: an application to positron interferometry

Nuclear emulsions are capable of very high position resolution in the detection of ionizing particles. This feature can be exploited to directly resolve the micrometric-scale fringe pattern produced by a matter-wave interferometer for low energy positrons (in the 10-20 keV range). We have tested the performance of emulsion films in this specific scenario. Exploiting silicon nitride diffraction gratings as absorption masks, we produced periodic patterns with features comparable to the expected interferometer signal. Test samples with periodicities of 6, 7 and 20 {\mu}m were exposed to the positron beam, and the patterns clearly reconstructed. Our results support the feasibility of matter-wave interferometry experiments with positrons.Comment: 15 pages, 10 figure

Anomalous diffusion in the citation time series of scientific publications

We analyze the citation time-series of manuscripts in three different fields of science; physics, social science and technology. The evolution of the time-series of the yearly number of citations, namely the citation trajectories, diffuse anomalously, their variance scales with time proportional to t (2H ), where H not equal 1/2. We provide detailed analysis of the various factors that lead to the anomalous behavior: non-stationarity, long-ranged correlations and a fat-tailed increment distribution. The papers exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity across the various fields, as the statistics of the highest cited papers is fundamentally different from that of the lower ones. The citation data is shown to be highly correlated and non-stationary; as all the papers except the small percentage of them with high number of citations, die out in time

Does the group leader matter? The impact of monitoring activities and social ties of group leaders on the repayment performance of groupbased lending Eritrea

This paper analyzes whether the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other group members on repayment performance of groups differ, using data from an extensive questionnaire held in Eritrea among participants of 102 groups. We hypothesize that the monitoring activities and social ties of the group leader have a stronger positive impact on the repayment performance of groups. The results show that social ties of the group leader do have a positive effect on repayment performance of groups, whereas this is not true for social ties of other group members. We do not find evidence for the hypothesis that monitoring activities of the group leader have a stronger positive impact on group repayment performance. All variables measuring monitoring activities, either of the group leader or the other group members, are found to be statistically insignificant.

THE COST STRUCTURE OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Microfinance institutions are important, particularly in developing countries, because they expand the frontier of financial intermediation by providing loans to those traditionally excluded from formal financial markets. This paper presents the first systematic statistical examination of the performance of MFIs operating in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. A cost function is estimated for MFIs in the region from 1999-2004. First, the presence of subsidies is found to be associated with higher MFI costs. When output is measured as the number of loans made, we find that MFIs become more efficient over time and that MFIs involved in the provision of group loans and loans to women have lower costs. However, when output is measured as volume of loans rather than their number, this last finding is reversed. This may be due to the fact that such loans are smaller in size; thus for a given volume more loans must be made.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40195/3/wp809.pd

A note on the stability properties of goodwin's predator-prey model

Goodwin's Predator-Prey model is structurally unstable. In its pure form, the model has an equilibrium that is neither stable nor unstable. Ploeg showed that relaxing the hypothesis of fixed proportion technology would stabilize the equilibrium. On the other hand, Goodwin showed that the equilibrium becomes unstable when endogenous productivity growth is considered. This paper studies the consequences of considering both effects, and concludes that the stabilizing effect of a flexible technology is much stronger than the destabilizing effect of endogenizing labor productivity

The Governance and Performance of Research Universities: Evidence from Europe and the U.S.

We investigate how university governance affects research output, measured by patenting and international university research rankings. For both European and U.S. universities, we generate several measures of autonomy, governance, and competition for research funding. We show that university autonomy and competition are positively correlated with university output, both among European countries and among U.S. public universities. We then identity a (political) source of exogenous shocks to funding of U.S. universities. We demonstrate that, when a state's universities receive a positive funding shock, they produce more patents if they are more autonomous and face more competition from private research universities. Finally, we show that during periods when merit-based competitions for federal research funding have been most prominent, universities produce more patents when they receive an exogenous funding shock, suggesting that routine participation in such competitions hones research skill.

Corporate Hierarchies and the Size of Nations: Theory and Evidence

Corporate organization varies within a country and across countries with country size. The paper starts by establishing some facts about corporate organization based on unique data of 660 Austrian and German corporations. The larger country (Germany) has larger firms with flatter more decentral corporate hierarchies compared to the smaller country (Austria). Firms in the larger country change their organization less fast than firms in the smaller country. Over time firms have been introducing less hierarchical organizations by delegating power to lower levels of the corporation. We develop a theory which explains these facts and which links these features to the trade environment that countries and firms face. We introduce firms with internal hierarchies in a Krugman (1980) model of trade. We show that international trade and the toughness of competition in international markets induce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to decentralized corporate hierarchies. We offer econometric evidence which is consistent with the models predictions