Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive

We examine the pervasive view that “equity is expensive,” which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also incorrect to translate higher taxes paid by banks to a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. Any desirable public subsidies to banks’ activities should be given directly and not in ways that encourage leverage. Finally, suggestions that high leverage serves a necessary disciplining role are based on inadequate theory lacking empirical support. We conclude that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially valuable functions, including lending, taking deposits and issuing money-like securities. To the contrary, better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is socially optimal, and, viewed from an ex ante perspective, high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks. Setting equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social costs. Approaches based on equity dominate alternatives, including contingent capital. To achieve better capitalization quickly and efficiently and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control equity payouts and issuance. If remaining challenges are addressed, capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy.capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, too big to fail, systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital, Basel.

Fallacies, irrelevant facts, and myths in the discussion of capital regulation: Why bank equity is not expensive

We examine the pervasive view that equity is expensive which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also incorrect to translate higher taxes paid by banks to a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. Any desirable public subsidies to banks' activities should be given directly and not in ways that encourage leverage. Finally, suggestions that high leverage serves a necessary disciplining role are based on inadequate theory lacking empirical support. We conclude that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially valuable functions, including lending, taking deposits and issuing money-like securities. To the contrary, better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is socially optimal, and, viewed from an ex ante perspective, high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks. Setting equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social costs. Approaches based on equity dominate alternatives, including contingent capital. To achieve better capitalization quickly and efficiently and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control equity payouts and issuance. If remaining challenges are addressed, capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy

Fallacies, irrelevant facts, and myths in the discussion of capital regulation: Why bank equity is not socially expensive

We examine the pervasive view that 'equity is expensive' which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly for society and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are fallacious, irrelevant to the policy debate by confusing private and social costs, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also incorrect to translate higher taxes paid by banks to a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. And while debt´s informational insensitivity may provide valuable liquidity, increased capital (and reduced leverage) can enhance this benefit. Finally, suggestions that high leverage serves a necessary disciplining role are based on inadequate theory lacking empirical support. We conclude that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage at the levels allowed, for example, by the Basel III agreement is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially valuable functions and likely makes banking inefficient. Better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is socially optimal. Except for government subsidies and viewed from an ex ante perspective, high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks. Setting equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social costs. Approaches based on equity dominate alternatives, including contingent capital. To achieve better capitalization quickly and efficiently and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control equity payouts and issuance. If remaining challenges are addressed, capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy

Debt overhang and capital regulation

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government subsidies of debt, but it is exacerbated by such subsidies. Our analysis is relevant to the debate on bank capital regulation, and complements Admati et al. (2010). In that paper we argued that subsidies that favor debt over equity are the key reason that banks funding costs would be lower if they economize on equity. Subsidies come from public funds, and reducing them does not represent a social cost. It is thus irrelevant for assessing regulation. Other arguments made to support claims that equity is expensive are flawed. Like reduction in subsidies, the effects of leverage reduction on bank managers or shareholders do not represent a social cost. In fact, we show that debt overhang creates inefficiency, since shareholders would resist recapitalization even when this would increase the combined value of the firm to shareholders and creditors. Moreover, debt overhang creates an addiction to leverage through a ratchet effect. In the presence of government guarantees, the inefficiencies of excessive leverage are not fully reflected in banks' borrowing costs. Since banks' high leverage is a source of systemic risks and imposes costs on the public, resistance to leverage reduction leads to social inefficiencies. The main beneficiaries from high leverage may be bank managers. The majority of the banks' shareholders, who hold diversified portfolios and who are part of the public, are likely to be net losers. Our analysis highlights the critical importance of effective capital regulation and high equity requirements, especially for large and systemic financial institutions. We analyze shareholders' preferences when choosing among various ways leverage can be reduced. We show that, with homogeneous assets, if the firm's security and asset trades have zero NPV, and the firm has a single class of debt outstanding, then shareholders find it equally undesirable to deleverage through asset sales, pure recapitalization, or asset expansion with new equity. When these conditions are not met, shareholders can have strong preferences for one approach over another. For example, if the firm can buy back junior debt, asset sales are the preferred way to reduce leverage. This preference for asset sales, or deleveraging can persist even if such sales are inefficient and reduce the total value of the firm

How Preussag became TUI : kissing too many toads can make you a toad

In the period 1997-2004, Preussag, a diversified German conglomerate of old economy businesses, changed itself into TUI, a company focused almost entirely on tourism and logistics. This paper analyzes how this strategy was executed and how it contributed to Preussag’s underperformance of the stock market. We collect 417 announcements of acquisitions, financial disclosures and other news and disentangle the impact of different parts of the company’s strategy. We find that only the divestitures created value, that the strategy to invest in tourism destroyed value, and that the acquisition premiums Preussag paid were mostly unjustified. Bad luck like the events of September 11, 2001 cannot account for the poor performance of the stock. Poor management resulted from poor governance, combining a state-owned bank as the largest shareholder, board interlocks, and insufficient managerial incentives. The case shows how divestiture programs increase the liquid resources available to management beyond free operating cash flows and casts doubt on the positive governance role of institutional blockholders

Rationale Marktübertreibungen im Zusammenhang der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise

Der Untersuchungsgegenstand der Arbeit ist die Darstellung der wichtigsten Anlegermotive bei Marktübertreibungen. Es wird dabei auf Konzepte der verhaltensorientierten Kapitalmarktforschung zurückgegriffen. Basierend auf den gewonnenen Erkenntnissen werden Lösungsansätze zur Vermeidung von Marktübertreibungen abgeleitet. Untersuchungen, beispielsweise durch Bikhchandani und Sharma (2000), haben gezeigt, dass Herdenverhalten eine wichtige Rolle bei der Erklärung von Preisübertreibungen spielt. Dabei kann es rational sein, sich konform zur Masse der Marktteilnehmer zu verhalten. Neben dem Konzept des Herdenverhaltens kann Konservatismus unter Marktteilnehmern zur Bestätigung vorherrschender Trends beitragen. Heuristiken werden angewandt, um komplexe Sachverhalte zu vereinfachen. Insbesondere die Repräsentativitätsheuristik kann zu einer Verstärkung bestehender Preisübertreibungen führen. Die Autoren sind der Ansicht, dass vor allem eine Verbesserung der Informationsbasis zur Reduzierung von Fehleinschätzungen durch Marktteilnehmer beitragen kann. Sowohl die Verfügbarkeit als auch die Qualität der Informationen spielen dabei eine Rolle. Ein weiterer Lösungsansatz betrifft die Risikoeinstellung und Kreditvergabe der Banken. In Boomphasen sollte das Risiko eines Crashs berücksichtigt werden.The paper deals with the motives of people to invest in overvalued markets. We resort to the concepts of behavioural finance to describe the most important factors. Based on these findings we deduct measures to avoid misjudgement of markets participants. As Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) show, the concept of herd behaviour plays a decisive role in explaining exuberance in markets. There are incentives for investors, money managers and analysts to imitate other's actions. Furthermore, conservatism as well as heuristics like representativeness may also lead to a confirmation of prevailing trends. Another driver of misjudgement is the usage of heuristics like representativeness. The authors consider that the provision of information may substantially contribute to the reduction of misjudgement and exuberance in markets. Both availability and quality of information are important. Another approach aims at the regulation of bank lending, which should be limited particularly during a booming economy