82 research outputs found
Cortex necessary for pain — but not in sense that matters
Certain cortical regions are necessary for pain in humans in the sense that, at particular times, they play a direct role in pain. However, it is not true that they are necessary in the more important sense that pain is never possible in humans without them. There are additional details from human lesion studies concerning functional plasticity that undermine Key’s (2016) interpretation. Moreover, no one has yet identified any specific behaviors that mammalian cortical pain regions make possible that are absent in fish
Minding mammals
Many traditional attempts to show that nonhuman animals are deserving of moral consideration have taken the form of an argument by analogy. However, arguments of this kind have had notable weaknesses and, in particular, have not been able to convince two kinds of skeptics. One of the most important weaknesses of these arguments is that they fail to provide theoretical justifications for why particular physiological similarities should be considered relevant. This paper examines recent empirical research on pain and, in particular, explores the implications of the dissociation between the sensory and the affective pain pathways. It is argued that these results show that the belief that nonhuman animals experience pain in a morally relevant way is reasonable, though not certain. It is further argued that the proposal to explore the relationship between consciousness and various forms of learning challenges the aforementioned skeptics to provide more physiological details for their claims that nonhuman mammals are probably not conscious. </p
Broadening the Focus
Over the past dozen or so years neuroethics has become a rich and dynamic field that has brought together individuals from a variety of disciplines and interests to consider issues that lie at the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. During this period there has been a significant amount of important empirical and philosophical work on a range of topics at this intersection; however, there has been comparatively little work on this intersection as it applies to nonhuman animals. In fact, it is fair to say that neuroethics has had a distinct and almost exclusive “humanistic focus.” Our hope with this special section is to broaden this focus and to provoke and encourage discussion of nonhuman animals within neuroethics.
There are a number of explanations for neuroethics’ humanistic focus
What's wrong with pain?
The experience of pain is something that most people are extremely familiar
with. However, once we begin to examine the subject from an ethical point of view, and
particularly when we examine so-called marginal cases such as nonhuman animals, we
are quickly confronted with difficult questions. This thesis, through an examination of a
particular feature of moral language and a description of recent research on pain,
provides an analysis of how pain fits into ethical theory.
It is argued that universalizability is an important feature of ethical systems and
provides a basis for claiming that an agent is acting inconsistently if he or she evaluates
similar situations differently. Though the additional features prescriptivity and
overridingness provide an important connection between moral judgment and action in
HareâÂÂs two-level utilitarianism, it is argued that they ultimately lead to claims
incompatible with lived moral experience. Arguments by Parfit and Sidgwick are
discussed which tie acting morally to acting consistently, and it is concluded that selfinterest
theory is not a tenable position.
After the features of moral judgment are discussed, the necessary features of a
moral subject are examined. It is concluded that sentience, or the ability to feel pleasure
or pain, is a sufficient condition for being a moral subject. Arguments are examined that
attempt to show which animals likely consciously experience pain. Difficulties for these arguments are discussed and an original argument is presented that at least partially
addresses these difficulties. It is concluded that from an ethical perspective our current
practices such as factory farming are probably not justified. It appears especially likely
that our treatment of other mammals is unethical, but the answers are not as clear with
other animals. However, all of the conclusions are tentative, as no doubt future scientific
investigation will shed more light on our knowledge
How Weak Mindreaders Inherited the Earth
Carruthers argues that an integrated faculty of metarepresentation evolved for mindreading and was later exapted for metacognition. A more consistent application of his approach would regard metarepresentation in mindreading with the same skeptical rigor, concluding that the faculty may have been entirely exapted. Given this result, the usefulness of Carruthers’ line-drawing exercise is called into question
Genetically Modifying Livestock for Improved Welfare: A Path Forward
In recent years, humans’ ability to selectively modify genes has increased dramatically as a result of the development of new, more efficient, and easier genetic modification technology. In this paper, we argue in favor of using this technology to improve the welfare of agricultural animals. We first argue that using animals genetically modified for improved welfare is preferable to the current status quo. Nevertheless, the strongest argument against pursuing gene editing for welfare is that there are alternative approaches to addressing some of the challenges of modern agriculture that may offer ethical advantages over genetic modification; namely, a dramatic shift towards plant-based diets or the development of in vitro meat. Nevertheless, we provide reasons for thinking that despite these possible comparative disadvantages there are important reasons for continuing the pursuit of welfare improvements via genetic modification
An exploratory investigation of proximity control in a large-group unstructured setting
Proximity control is a common component of many classroom management strategies and has been shown to reduce disruptive behavior as well as increase academic engagement among students. Much of the research on proximity control to date has been conducted in structured classroom settings or in combination with other behavioral management techniques. This applied study investigated the effect of proximity control on student behavior in a large, unstructured setting using an ABAB withdrawal design. Results indicate that staff proximity was effective at reducing inappropriate student behavior. The study also explored the acceptability of the treatment among staff participants. Staff reported lower levels of acceptability for the implementation of proximity control compared to pretreatment methods of monitoring. A discussion of these findings and implications is included
Neuroethics and Animals: Report and Recommendations From the University of Pennsylvania Animal Research Neuroethics Workshop
Growing awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience in the early years of the 21st century led to the emergence of the new academic field of “neuroethics,” which studies the ethical implications of developments in the neurosciences. However, despite the acceleration and evolution of neuroscience research on nonhuman animals, the unique ethical issues connected with neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals remain underdiscussed. This is a significant oversight given the central place of animal models in neuroscience. To respond to these concerns, the Center for Neuroscience and Society and the Center for the Interaction of Animals and Society at the University of Pennsylvania hosted a workshop on the “Neuroethics of Animal Research” in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the workshop, expert speakers and attendees discussed ethical issues arising from neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals, including the use of animal models in the study of pain and psychiatric conditions, animal brain-machine interfaces, animal–animal chimeras, cerebral organoids, and the relevance of neuroscience to debates about personhood. This paper highlights important emerging ethical issues based on the discussions at the workshop. This paper includes recommendations for research in the United States from the authors based on the discussions at the workshop, loosely following the format of the 2 Gray Matters reports on neuroethics published by the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues
A Belmont Report for Animals?
Human and animal research both operate within established standards. In the United States, criticism of the human research environment and recorded abuses of human research subjects served as the impetus for the establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and the resulting Belmont Report. The Belmont Report established key ethical principles to which human research should adhere: respect for autonomy, obligations to beneficence and justice, and special protections for vulnerable individuals and populations. While current guidelines appropriately aim to protect the individual interests of human participants in research, no similar, comprehensive, and principled effort has addressed the use of (nonhuman) animals in research. Although published policies regarding animal research provide relevant regulatory guidance, the lack of a fundamental effort to explore the ethical issues and principles that should guide decisions about the potential use of animals in research has led to unclear and disparate policies. Here, we explore how the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report could be applied consistently to animals. We describe how concepts such as respect for autonomy and obligations to beneficence and justice could be applied to animals, as well as how animals are entitled to special protections as a result of their vulnerability
Rabbits, stoats and the predator problem: Why a strong animal rights position need not call for human intervention to protect prey from predators
Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson
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