The Criminal Class Action

Over the past ten years, in a variety of high-profile corporate scandals, prosecutors have sought billions of dollars in restitution for crimes ranging from environmental dumping and consumer scams to financial fraud. In what we call “criminal class action” settlements, prosecutors distribute that money to groups of victims as in a civil class action while continuing to pursue the traditional criminal justice goals of retribution and deterrence. Unlike civil class actions, however, the emerging criminal class action lacks critical safeguards for victims entitled to compensation. While prosecutors are encouraged, and even required by statute, to seek victim restitution, they lack adequate rules requiring them to (1) coordinate with other civil lawsuits that seek the same relief for victims, (2) hear victims’ claims, (3) identify conflicts between different parties, and (4) divide the award among victims. We argue that prosecutors may continue to play a limited role in compensating victims for widespread harm. However, when prosecutors compensate multiple victims in a criminal class action, prosecutors should adopt rules similar to those that exist in private litigation to ensure that the victims receive fair and efficient compensation. We propose four solutions to give victims more voice in their own redress while preserving prosecutorial discretion: (1) that prosecutors and courts coordinate overlapping settlements before a single federal judge, (2) that prosecutors involve representative stakeholders in settlement discussions through a mediation-like process, (3) that courts subject prosecutors’ distribution plans to independent review to police potential conflicts of interest, and (4) that prosecutors adopt the distribution guidelines the American Law Institute developed for large-scale civil litigation to balance victims’ competing interests

The Criminal Class Action

Over the past ten years, in a variety of high-profile corporate scandals, prosecutors have sought billions of dollars in restitution for crimes ranging from environmental dumping and consumer scams to financial fraud. In what we call “criminal class action” settlements, prosecutors distribute that money to groups of victims as in a civil class action while continuing to pursue the traditional criminal justice goals of retribution and deterrence. Unlike civil class actions, however, the emerging criminal class action lacks critical safeguards for victims entitled to compensation. While prosecutors are encouraged, and even required by statute, to seek victim restitution, they lack adequate rules requiring them to (1) coordinate with other civil lawsuits that seek the same relief for victims, (2) hear victims’ claims, (3) identify conflicts between different parties, and (4) divide the award among victims. We argue that prosecutors may continue to play a limited role in compensating victims for widespread harm. However, when prosecutors compensate multiple victims in a criminal class action, prosecutors should adopt rules similar to those that exist in private litigation to ensure that the victims receive fair and efficient compensation. We propose four solutions to give victims more voice in their own redress while preserving prosecutorial discretion: (1) that prosecutors and courts coordinate overlapping settlements before a single federal judge, (2) that prosecutors involve representative stakeholders in settlement discussions through a mediation-like process, (3) that courts subject prosecutors’ distribution plans to independent review to police potential conflicts of interest, and (4) that prosecutors adopt the distribution guidelines the American Law Institute developed for large-scale civil litigation to balance victims’ competing interests

Judging Aggregate Settlement

While courts historically have taken a hands-off approach to settlement, judges across the legal spectrum have begun to intervene actively in “aggregate settlements”—repeated settlements between the same parties or institutions that resolve large groups of claims in a lockstep manner. In large-scale litigation, for example, courts have invented, without express authority, new “quasi-class action” doctrines to review the adequacy of massive settlements brokered by similar groups of attorneys. In recent and prominent agency settlements, including ones involving the SEC and EPA, courts have scrutinized the underlying merits to ensure settlements adequately reflect the interests of victims and the public at large. Even in criminal law, which has lagged behind other legal systems in acknowledging the primacy of negotiated outcomes, judges have taken additional steps to review iterant settlement decisions routinely made by criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors. Increasingly, courts intervene in settlements out of a fear commonly associated with class action negotiations—that the “aggregate” nature of the settlement process undermines the courts’ ability to promote legitimacy, loyalty, accuracy and the development of substantive law. Unfortunately, when courts step in to review the substance of settlements on their own, they may frustrate the parties’ interests, upset the separation of powers, or stretch the limits of their ability. The phenomenon of aggregate settlement thus challenges the judiciary’s duty to preserve the integrity of the civil, administrative, and criminal justice systems. This Article maps the new and critical role that courts must play in policing aggregate settlements. We argue that judicial review should exist to alert and press other institutions—private associations of attorneys, government lawyers, and the coordinate branches of government—to reform bureaucratic approaches to settling cases. Such review would not mean interfering with the final outcome of any given settlement. Rather, judicial review would instead mean demanding more information about the parties’ competing interests in settlement, more participation by outside stakeholders, and more reasoned explanations for the trade-offs made by counsel on behalf of similarly situated parties. In so doing, courts can provide an important failsafe that helps protect the procedural, substantive, and rule-of-law values threatened by aggregate settlements

Search for time-dependent B0s - B0s-bar oscillations using a vertex charge dipole technique

We report a search for B0s - B0s-bar oscillations using a sample of 400,000 hadronic Z0 decays collected by the SLD experiment. The analysis takes advantage of the electron beam polarization as well as information from the hemisphere opposite that of the reconstructed B decay to tag the B production flavor. The excellent resolution provided by the pixel CCD vertex detector is exploited to cleanly reconstruct both B and cascade D decay vertices, and tag the B decay flavor from the charge difference between them. We exclude the following values of the B0s - B0s-bar oscillation frequency: Delta m_s < 4.9 ps-1 and 7.9 < Delta m_s < 10.3 ps-1 at the 95% confidence level.Comment: 18 pages, 3 figures, replaced by version accepted for publication in Phys.Rev.D; results differ slightly from first versio

Measurement of the branching ratios of the Z0 into heavy quarks

We measure the hadronic branching ratios of the Z0 boson into heavy quarks: Rb=Gamma(Z0->bb)/Gamma(Z0->hadrons) and Rc=Gamma(Z0->cc/Gamma(Z0->hadrons) using a multi-tag technique. The measurement was performed using about 400,000 hadronic Z0 events recorded in the SLD experiment at SLAC between 1996 and 1998. The small and stable SLC beam spot and the CCD-based vertex detector were used to reconstruct bottom and charm hadron decay vertices with high efficiency and purity, which enables us to measure most efficiencies from data. We obtain, Rb=0.21604 +- 0.00098(stat.) +- 0.00073(syst.) -+ 0.00012(Rc) and, Rc= 0.1744 +- 0.0031(stat.) +- 0.0020(syst.) -+ 0.0006(Rb)Comment: 37 pages, 8 figures, to be submitted to Phys. Rev. D version 2: changed title to ratios, used common D production fractions for Rb and Rc and corrected Zgamma interference. Identical to PRD submissio

Direct Measurements of A_b and A_c using Vertex/Kaon Charge Tags at SLD

Exploiting the manipulation of the SLC electron-beam polarization, we present precise direct measurements of the parity violation parameters A_c and A_b in the Z boson - c quark and Z boson - b quark coupling. Quark/antiquark discrimination is accomplished via a unique algorithm that takes advantage of the precise SLD CCD vertex detector, employing the net charge of displaced vertices as well as the charge of kaons that emanate from those vertices. From the 1996-98 sample of 400,000 Z decays, produced with an average beam polarization of 73.4%, we find A_c = 0.673 +/- 0.029 (stat.) +/- 0.023 (syst.) and A_b = 0.919 +/- 0.018 (stat.) +/- 0.017 (syst.).Comment: 11 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, to be submitted to Physical Review Letters; version 2 reflects changes suggested by the refere

Dark sectors 2016 Workshop: community report

This report, based on the Dark Sectors workshop at SLAC in April 2016, summarizes the scientific importance of searches for dark sector dark matter and forces at masses beneath the weak-scale, the status of this broad international field, the important milestones motivating future exploration, and promising experimental opportunities to reach these milestones over the next 5-10 years

US Cosmic Visions: New Ideas in Dark Matter 2017: Community Report

This white paper summarizes the workshop "U.S. Cosmic Visions: New Ideas in Dark Matter" held at University of Maryland on March 23-25, 2017.Comment: 102 pages + reference