Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational Symmetry in the United States and Spain

In the Madisonian tradition of constitutional design, the foundation of a sustainable federalism is thought to be a scientifically precise balancing of national and subnational power. Experience shows, however, that national and subnational actors in highly diverse systems are capable of developing a rich array of extraconstitutional methods of mutual influence, so that the formal, constitutionalized balance of power rarely settles the question of the actual balance of power between levels of government. A more important factor in ensuring the long-term sustainability of a meaningfully federal system is the degree of symmetry across subnational units in their relation to the central state. A comparison of the U.S. and Spain suggests that federalism is most directly threatened when subnational units compete not collectively with the central state, thereby checking its power, but with each other, a condition that furnishes the central state with opportunities to exploit subnational rivalries in ways that risk genuine, long-term destabilization

Distinctive Identity Claims in Federal Systems: Judicial Policing of Subnational Variance

It is characteristic of federal states that the scope of subnational power and autonomy are subjects of frequent dispute, and that disagreements over the reach of national and subnational power may be contested in a wide and diverse array of settings. Subnational units determined to challenge nationally-imposed limits on their power typically have at their disposal many tools with which to press against formal boundaries. Federal systems, moreover, frequently display a surprising degree of tolerance for subnational obstruction, disobedience, and other behaviors intended to expand subnational authority and influence, even over national objection. This tolerance, however, has limits. In this paper, we examine a set of rulings by national constitutional courts invalidating formalized claims by subnational units to a distinctive subnational identity. The emphatically negative reactions of these courts contrast instructively with the tolerance often displayed by other state actors toward similar identity claims when they are asserted in political and sub-constitutional settings, suggesting that the legal formalization of distinctive identity claims is perceived by courts to pose an unusually acute threat to the state

Protecting the "Homo Digitalis"

This paper analyses from a legal and philosophical perspective the appearance of a new human species, the so-called Homo Digitalis, a Homo Sapiens permanently interconnected with others throughout I.T devices. Twenty-four hours a day. Three hundred and sixty-five days a year, living in a world of ones and zeros. We all are inexorably the new-born Homo Digitalis, or as some authors define it, post-humans, and there is no possible opposition to this Darwinist evolution, or between the Homo digitalis and other citizens. The first section deals with the relationship between technique (τεχνη), technology and humanity, a relation that is ancient as philosophy. The starting point is the pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, and it ends by analysing the relation of the three concepts in modernity and post-modernity (Weber, Heidegger and Marcuse). The second section deals with the definition of the Homo Digitalis from an evolution of Sartori's Homo Videns. The paper ends by exposing the latest judicial decisions, domestic and international legislation to protecting citizens (as new-born Homo Digitalis) from wrongful use of technology

Demos vs. Aristos: a trial of responsability before the contemporary Dikasteria

Després del fracàs de l’experiència islandesa de constitucionalisme popular (2009-2012), alguns membres de la comunitat jurídica del país, parlamentaris i responsables polítics van afirmar que l’esborrany de constitució proposat pel consell constitucional de 25 ciutadans i aprovat per unanimitat el 27 de juliol de 2011 era poc realista, inaplicable i atemptava contra la tradició jurídica i política del país nòrdic. Aquest article fa un primer comentari sobre el caràcter revolucionari i novedós de l’experiència constitucional de «crowdsourcing» des de Soló, Efialtes i Clístenes, que van establir les bases de l’Atenes democràtica, fins a les constitucions modernes que han estat creades per poques persones, independentment del sistema polític en què s’emmarca, i amb independència de si es tracta de democràcies liberals o estats autoritaris. El treball simulant un judici continua analitzant l’experiència islandesa des d’una perspectiva crítica per identificar els elements que van acabar amb la constitució de masses. L’últim segment de l’obra té com a objectiu obtenir diferents elements per millorar el desenvolupament de grups constitucionals a considerar en els futurs processos constituents a tot el món.Paraules clau: judici, Demos, Politeia, Derrida, participació democràtica.After the failed Icelandic experience of constitutional crowdsourcing (2009-2012), some of the country’s legal community, parliamentarians and policymakers affirmed that the constitutional draft proposed by the constitutional council of 25 citizens and approved unanimously on 27 July 2011, was unrealistic, unenforceable and against the legal and political tradition of the Nordic country. This paper first remarks on how revolutionary and innovative the constitutional crowdsourcing experience was. From Solon, Ephialtes and Cleisthenes that laid out the foundation of democratic Athens, to modern constitutions that have been penned by few people men, regardless of the political system in which it is framed, been liberal democracies or authoritarian states. The paper simulating a trial, follows analysing the Icelandic experience from a critical perspective to identify the elements that ended crowdsourced constitution. The final segment of the paper aims to obtain different elements to improve the constitutional crowdsourcing to be considered in future constituent processes around the world.Keywords: trial, Demos, Politeia, Derrida, democratic participation

Demos vs. Aristos : un judici de responsabilitat davant la Dikasteria actual

Després del fracàs de l'experiència islandesa de constitucionalisme popular (2009-2012), alguns membres de la comunitat jurídica del país, parlamentaris i responsables polítics van afirmar que l'esborrany de constitució proposat pel consell constitucional de 25 ciutadans i aprovat per unanimitat el 27 de juliol de 2011 era poc realista, inaplicable i atemptava contra la tradició jurídica i política del país nòrdic. Aquest article fa un primer comentari sobre el caràcter revolucionari i novedós de l'experiència constitucional de «crowdsourcing» des de Soló, Efialtes i Clístenes, que van establir les bases de l'Atenes democràtica, fins a les constitucions modernes que han estat creades per poques persones, independentment del sistema polític en què s'emmarca, i amb independència de si es tracta de democràcies liberals o estats autoritaris. El treball simulant un judici continua analitzant l'experiència islandesa des d'una perspectiva crítica per identificar els elements que van acabar amb la constitució de masses. L'últim segment de l'obra té com a objectiu obtenir diferents elements per millorar el desenvolupament de grups constitucionals a considerar en els futurs processos constituents a tot el món.After the failed Icelandic experience of constitutional crowdsourcing (2009-2012), some of the country's legal community, parliamentarians and policymakers affirmed that the constitutional draft proposed by the constitutional council of 25 citizens and approved unanimously on 27 July 2011, was unrealistic, unenforceable and against the legal and political tradition of the Nordic country. This paper first remarks on how revolutionary and innovative the constitutional crowdsourcing experience was. From Solon, Ephialtes and Cleisthenes that laid out the foundation of democratic Athens, to modern constitutions that have been penned by few people men, regardless of the political system in which it is framed, been liberal democracies or authoritarian states. The paper simulating a trial, follows analysing the Icelandic experience from a critical perspective to identify the elements that ended crowdsourced constitution. The final segment of the paper aims to obtain different elements to improve the constitutional crowdsourcing to be considered in future constituent processes around the world

Territorial checking and balance : the change of the Spanish state territorial organization by subconstitutional rules

We are in the midst of a strong revival of interest in the Subnational units (Autonomous Communities) within the Autonomous Spanish State. Recent reforms of the Statute of Autonomy by certain autonomous regions have revealed new mechanisms and new ways of interaction and communication between policy-statutory subnational units-within the scope of the reforms of the Statute of Autonomy. This interaction is the assumption of a phenomenon called "horizontal autonomism". This concrete phenomenon has not only reopened, with still more force, the theoretical and practical debate about the nature of the territorial organization of the Spanish State, but also demonstrates that the notion of autonomy and the relations between national and sub-national units in Spain are permanently evolving. In addition, the recent statutory amends have initiated a new evolutive stage of the hybrid state model without reforming the Constitu- tion. The article focuses primarily on two elements of study. First, starting from a constitutional perspective the phe- nomenon of what is called "horizontal autonomism" as the basis of the recent reforms of the Statutes of Autonomy (subconstitutional rules). The second aspect is to analyze one of the main consequences and effects of this "horizontal autonomism" in relation to the development of the territorial nature of the Spanish state. Concretely, we focus on how the autonomous rules, are real sources of law for other autonomies, and, potentially, for the state

Constitutional crowdsourcing to reconcile Demos and Aristos

After the Icelandic experience of constitutional crowdsourcing (2009-2012), members of the state's legal community, parliamentarians and policymakers affirmed that the constitutional draft was unrealistic, unenforceable and against the legal and political tradition of the Nordic country. On the other hand, other legal expertise argued that the main institutions of the state, political parties and the economic and intellectual elite betrayed the will of the people and provoked the failure of the first constitutional crowdsourced experience. This paper analyses this constitutional experience, the reasons of its failure and whether can be a model to be followed by post-colonial constitutional experiences in Africa