The Conditional Electoral Connection in the European Parliament

This paper introduces a model of the electoral connection in the European Parliament. Emphasizing the problem of common agency – wherein agents are beholden to multiple principals who cannot coordinate – it assumes that national parties, European party groups, and voters are “latent principals” that differentially constrain members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The model proposes that the degree to which each of these principals constrain MEPs depends upon signals that MEPs receive from the national political arena about their electoral vulnerability. Re-election seeking MEPs will in turn cultivate closer connections with the principal whose support is most important for reducing electoral vulnerability. Drawing on the second-order election model, signals about MEP vulnerability are measured as a national party‟s success in the most recent national election, given the party‟s average size, governing status, and time remaining until the European election. The model predicts three broad outcomes. First, MEPs from large or governing parties will generally be more vulnerable as their party label suffers in European elections. Expecting losses, they should cultivate closer connections to their constituents by emphasizing personal record rather than party affiliation. Second, MEPs from small or opposition parties will generally be less vulnerable as their party label is more successful in European elections. Expecting gains, these MEPs will seek to appeal to their party leaders in order to secure the safest (often only the top) place on the electoral list. Finally, the model predicts that systemic-level attributes such as voters‟ right to re-order the ballot should contribute to variation in the first two outcomes. The model‟s propositions are tested empirically with qualitative and quantitative evidence from 30 interviews with MEPs in 2008 and an original dataset of MEPs‟ non-roll-call position taking in plenary sessions during the 6th European Parliament term

Digging for Formational Clues in the Halos of Early-type Galaxies

Many of the fundamental properties of early-type galaxies (ellipticals and lenticulars) can only be accessed by venturing beyond their oft-studied centers into their large-radius halo regions. Advances in observations of kinematical tracers allow early-type halos to be increasingly well probed. This review focuses on recent findings on angular momentum and dark matter content, and discusses some possible implications for galaxy structure and formation.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures, to appear in "Hunting for the Dark: The Hidden Side of Galaxy Formation", Malta, 19-23 Oct. 2009, eds. V.P. Debattista & C.C. Popescu, AIP Conf. Ser., in pres

Agencies Obligation to Interpret the Statute

Conventionally, when a statute delegates authority to an agency, courts defer to agency interpretations of that statute. Most agencies and scholars view such deference as a grant of permission to the agency to adopt any reasonable interpretation. That is wrong, jurisprudentially and ethically. An agency that commands deference bears a duty to adopt what it believes to be the best interpretation of the relevant statute. Deference assigns to the agency, rather than to a court, power authoritatively to declare what the law is. That power carries with it a duty to give the statute the best reading the agency can. Notwithstanding substantial jurisprudential disagreement about what it means to give a statute its best interpretation, an agency does not abide its role when it seems to achieve anything less. An agency is legally and ethically obligated to privilege what it views as optimal statutory interpretation over what it considers to be optimal policy. If the two conflict, as they sometimes will, the agency must act consistently with the former to the detriment of the latter. To behave otherwise is to fail to adhere to principles of legislative supremacy and fidelity to law

Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy Note

Most state constitutions recognize a right to education, but courts have been hard pressed to respond to violations of that right. Some state courts have imposed financial and substantive reforms, only to see their implementation miscarry as educational deficiencies stubbornly persist. Other state courts, fearing such outcomes, instead treat education claims as nonjusticiable political questions; in these states, public education is a right with no remedy. This Note argues that courts should instead base remedies on state statutes that permit states to disestablish-i.e., to withdraw authority from-deficient school districts. Disestablishment, like other structural remedies, is largely self-implementing and avoids judicial entanglement in day-to-day administration. It is firmly rooted in statutory authority and legislativel)-defined standards. Most important, disestablishment creates incentives salutary to educational improvement. Intergovernmental, rather than market, competition over control of schools offers accountability while preserving a thoroughly public approach to educational governance

Black hole masses in active galaxies

This contribution reviews two topics of current interest in the study of black hole demographics in active galaxies: Can the stellar velocity dispersions of quasar host galaxies be measured? And can we constrain the black hole mass function below 10^6 M_⊙

Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy Note

Most state constitutions recognize a right to education, but courts have been hard pressed to respond to violations of that right. Some state courts have imposed financial and substantive reforms, only to see their implementation miscarry as educational deficiencies stubbornly persist. Other state courts, fearing such outcomes, instead treat education claims as nonjusticiable political questions; in these states, public education is a right with no remedy. This Note argues that courts should instead base remedies on state statutes that permit states to disestablish-i.e., to withdraw authority from-deficient school districts. Disestablishment, like other structural remedies, is largely self-implementing and avoids judicial entanglement in day-to-day administration. It is firmly rooted in statutory authority and legislativel)-defined standards. Most important, disestablishment creates incentives salutary to educational improvement. Intergovernmental, rather than market, competition over control of schools offers accountability while preserving a thoroughly public approach to educational governance

Health Care Rationing: What it Means

Examines issues related to rationing health care by applying its principles to radiology, and using examples from the budget limited British health system. Includes analysis of expenditures on life saving technology, and evaluation research