Cosmological distance indicators

We review three distance measurement techniques beyond the local universe: (1) gravitational lens time delays, (2) baryon acoustic oscillation (BAO), and (3) HI intensity mapping. We describe the principles and theory behind each method, the ingredients needed for measuring such distances, the current observational results, and future prospects. Time delays from strongly lensed quasars currently provide constraints on $H_0$ with < 4% uncertainty, and with 1% within reach from ongoing surveys and efforts. Recent exciting discoveries of strongly lensed supernovae hold great promise for time-delay cosmography. BAO features have been detected in redshift surveys up to z <~ 0.8 with galaxies and z ~ 2 with Ly-$\alpha$ forest, providing precise distance measurements and $H_0$ with < 2% uncertainty in flat $\Lambda$CDM. Future BAO surveys will probe the distance scale with percent-level precision. HI intensity mapping has great potential to map BAO distances at z ~ 0.8 and beyond with precisions of a few percent. The next years ahead will be exciting as various cosmological probes reach 1% uncertainty in determining $H_0$, to assess the current tension in $H_0$ measurements that could indicate new physics.Comment: Review article accepted for publication in Space Science Reviews (Springer), 45 pages, 10 figures. Chapter of a special collection resulting from the May 2016 ISSI-BJ workshop on Astronomical Distance Determination in the Space Ag

Metaphor and its unparalleled meaning and truth

This article arises indirectly out of the development of a particular approach, called ATT-Meta, to the understanding of some types of metaphorical utterance. However, the specifics of the approach are not the focus of the present article, which concentrates on some general issues that have informed, or arisen from, the development of the approach. The article connects those issues to the questions of metaphorical meaning and truth. A large part of the exploration of metaphor in fields such as Cognitive Linguistics and natural language Pragmatics takes metaphor to rest on complex mappings between a target subject matter and a source subject matter (see, e.g., Lakoff 1993, 2008). This is one main way in which some aspects of the source, generally including some structural aspects, can have parallels in the target. It is typical for much, and perhaps the whole, of the meaning of a metaphorical expression to be explained by means of these parallels. We will talk about “parallelism” rather than “isomorphism,” or even “analogy,” because “isomorphism” implies a strict one-to-one correspondence between items in the source scenario and items in the target scenario, and analogy theorists often hold that analogy rests on isomorphism. We wish not to prejudge the question of whether looser, messier forms of parallelism are sometimes needed. Also, we will talk about parallels rather than mappings, because our discussion will embrace the question of parallelism that may be discernible, albeit implicitly, in accounts of metaphor that are not presented as being based on mappings. Three main cases of such accounts are Relevance Theory (RT: e.g., Sperber & Wilson 2008, Wilson & Carston 2006), the categorization-based or "class-inclusion“ approach (Glucksberg 2008), and Ritchie’s (2006) CLST account (Context-Limited Simulation Theory). One main issue we will address is that of substantial non-parallelism that can exist between source and target subject-matters in metaphor: more precisely, the issue that there may be source aspects that are exploited by the utterance and have a deep effect on metaphorical interpretation but that do not themselves have a natural parallel in the target subject-matter (although we will point out that artificial parallels can generally be created). This is part of a broader point that the content of metaphorical discourse should often be seen as being derived in a rather holistic way from several metaphorical bits of the discourse, which conspire to describe some source-domain scenario, rather than being derived by putting together metaphorical meanings of each metaphorical bit (even if each bit could in principle be assigned its own separate metaphorical meaning). As a result, we suggest that it is misguided to think of the propositions making up the content (or, if you like, "meaning“) about the target scenario that is being described is a matter of metaphorical meaning of specific grammatical units such as sentences, clauses or other constituents that a traditional semantic theory would assign propositional meaning to. Rather, grammatical units (that are to be taken metaphorically) have meanings in source-domain terms; content in target-domain terms is derived from the source-domain scenario depicted by those units and fleshed out through inference; and the target-domain content is only (in general) fuzzily relatable to particular grammatical units. This view is on a spectrum at whose extreme point we could place Davidson’s (1984) view that metaphors only have literal (i.e., source-domain) meanings, with other effects on the understander not being a matter of propositional content. However, on our view it is proper to take metaphorical discourse as having non-literal meaning, couched as a collection of propositions, among other things possibly; it is just that the propositions are not to be thought of (in general) as meaning of specific sentences, clauses or other grammatical units rather than of a possibly only fuzzily delineated piece of discourse. A second main concern of the article is the question of how much, and what types of, inference are involved in the derivation of metaphorical meaning. While our own ATT-Meta approach accords with, amongst other accounts, Relevance Theory (RT) as to the centrality of inference in metaphor interpretation, we disagree with RT on its claim that metaphor interpretation is a matter of (a relatively high degree of) concept "broadening“ and (often) "narrowing“. We argue that almost all inference can in fact be theoretically re-described as concept broadening and/or narrowing, and what is left over should be included in the metaphor interpretation process anyway. Thus, the RT claim about broadening and narrowing really just says that inference, of unrestricted type, is involved in metaphor understanding, in accord with what ATT-Meta claims

Metaphorical reasoning with an economical set of mappings

This paper discusses the nature of the metaphorical transfer from the source domain to the target domain. More specifically, it explores the question as to how the mapping links between features of the source and the target are created. It is argued that, for many metaphors, it is incorrect to assume that all the elements of the source domain map to elements of the target domain, and that a much more economical set of mappings should be used instead