Can dual processing theory explain physics students' performance on the Force Concept Inventory?

According to dual processing theory there are two types, or modes, of thinking: system 1, which involves intuitive and nonreflective thinking, and system 2, which is more deliberate and requires conscious effort and thought. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a widely used and robust three item instrument that measures the tendency to override system 1 thinking and to engage in reflective, system 2 thinking. Each item on the CRT has an intuitive (but wrong) answer that must be rejected in order to answer the item correctly. We therefore hypothesized that performance on the CRT may give useful insights into the cognitive processes involved in learning physics, where success involves rejecting the common, intuitive ideas about the world (often called misconceptions) and instead carefully applying physical concepts. This paper presents initial results from an ongoing study examining the relationship between students’ CRT scores and their performance on the Force Concept Inventory (FCI), which tests students’ understanding of Newtonian mechanics. We find that a higher CRT score predicts a higher FCI score for both precourse and postcourse tests. However, we also find that the FCI normalized gain is independent of CRT score. The implications of these results are discussed

Evaluating the current state of evolution acceptance instruments: a research coordination network meeting report

Hundreds of studies have explored student evolution acceptance because evolution is a core concept of biology that many undergraduate biology students struggle to accept. However, this construct of “evolution acceptance” has been defined and measured in various ways, which has led to inconsistencies across studies and difficulties in comparing results from different studies. Many studies and essays have offered evaluations and perspectives of evolution acceptance instruments, but publications with a focus on consensus building across research teams is still needed. Further, little attention has been paid to how evolution acceptance instruments may be interpreted differently by students with varied religious backgrounds. Funded by a Research Coordination Network in Undergraduate Biology Education grant from the National Science Foundation, we gathered 16 experts from different disciplinary and religious backgrounds to review current evolution acceptance instruments and create a guide to the strengths and weaknesses of these instruments, including appropriate contexts for using these instruments and their potential weaknesses with different religious populations. Finally, in an attempt to move the field forward, we articulated a consensus definition of evolution acceptance that can be used to guide future instrument development

Death and Science: The Existential Underpinnings of Belief in Intelligent Design and Discomfort with Evolution

The present research examined the psychological motives underlying widespread support for intelligent design theory (IDT), a purportedly scientific theory that lacks any scientific evidence; and antagonism toward evolutionary theory (ET), a theory supported by a large body of scientific evidence. We tested whether these attitudes are influenced by IDT's provision of an explanation of life's origins that better addresses existential concerns than ET. In four studies, existential threat (induced via reminders of participants' own mortality) increased acceptance of IDT and/or rejection of ET, regardless of participants' religion, religiosity, educational background, or preexisting attitude toward evolution. Effects were reversed by teaching participants that naturalism can be a source of existential meaning (Study 4), and among natural-science students for whom ET may already provide existential meaning (Study 5). These reversals suggest that the effect of heightened mortality awareness on attitudes toward ET and IDT is due to a desire to find greater meaning and purpose in science when existential threats are activated

Inappropriate stereotypical inferences? An adversarial collaboration in experimental ordinary language philosophy

This paper trials new experimental methods for the analysis of natural language reasoning and the (re)development of critical ordinary language philosophy in the wake of J.L. Austin. Philosophical arguments and thought experiments are strongly shaped by default pragmatic inferences, including stereotypical inferences. Austin suggested that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are at the root of some philosophical paradoxes and problems, and that these can be resolved by exposing those verbal fallacies. This paper builds on recent efforts to empirically document inappropriate stereotypical inferences that may drive philosophical arguments. We demonstrate that previously employed questionnaire-based output measures do not suffice to exclude relevant confounds. We then report an experiment that combines reading time measurements with plausibility ratings. The study seeks to provide evidence of inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs that have been suggested to lie at the root of the influential ‘argument from illusion’. Our findings support a diagnostic reconstruction of this argument. They provide the missing component for proof of concept for an experimental implementation of critical ordinary language philosophy that is in line with the ambitions of current ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy