Identity politics, core State powers and regional Integration: Europe and beyond

This article concentrates on the path from the development of collective identities to the integration of core state powers. Firstly, we focus on the European experience. We argue that the identities of political, economic, and social elites have been crucial for the evolution of European integration. With regard to mass public opinion, European integration has been made possible by a consensus of EU citizens with inclusive national identities. Most recently, the politicization of EU affairs in many member states has been driven by populist forces mobilizing minorities with exclusive nationalist identities. Secondly, we discuss the extent to which insights from Europe have travelled to other regions of the world. Elites involved in region‐building almost always develop identity narratives linking their national experience to the respective regions. Moreover, there is evidence that the difference between inclusive and exclusive nationalist identifications has also travelled beyond Europe

fostering resilience in areas of limited statehood and contested orders

EU-LISTCO starts from the assumption that Europe’s internal and external environment is characterized by two risk factors, which represent challenges for the external action of the EU and its member states: - Areas of limited statehood (ALS), in which central government authorities and institutions are too weak to set and enforce rules and/or do not control the monopoly over the means of violence. Such areas of limited statehood are ubiquitous. They characterise large parts of the regions surrounding the EU in the East and in the South. However, areas of limited statehood are neither ungoverned nor ungovernable. Some ALS are reasonably well governed by a whole variety of actors – state and non-state, domestic/local and international, while others are not. The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster good governance in areas of limited statehood. - Contested orders (CO), in which state and non-state actors challenge the norms, principles, and rules according to which societies and political systems are or should be organised. At the global and regional level, powers such as Russia and – somewhat less aggressive – China call the liberal and law-based order into question. The Trump administration in the United States adds a new dimension to order contestations by appearing to turn away from the liberal international order which the U.S. itself was instrumental in creating. Finally, and domestically, Western and non-Western societies struggle with the rise of actors that question their current political and legal order from the inside as well as from the outside. The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster conditions in which order contestations remain peaceful and do not contribute to governance breakdowns in areas of limited statehood. Neither limited statehood nor contested orders will go away. They create vulnerabilities and pose risks, but they do not in themselves amount to threats to the EU. Only if and when areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into governance breakdowns and violent conflict, do the risks turn into threats to the security and stability of the EU, its member states, and citizens. The main research task of EU-LISTCO is to investigate the “tipping points” at which risks of limited statehood and contested orders turn into threats leading to governance breakdowns and violent conflict. Two factors are decisive in affecting such tipping points: - Global, diffuse, and regional risks, such as nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, economic crises, aggressive powers, cyber threats, and climate change, are likely to promote governance breakdowns and violent conflict in areas of limited statehood and contested orders. - Resilience is likely to help societies to sustain good and effective governance at the local/domestic as well as regional levels. We understand resilience as the “capacity of societies, communities and individuals to manage opportunities and risks in a peaceful and stable manner, and to build, maintain or restore livelihoods in the face of major pressures.” (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017, 3). In other words, the various risks, on the one hand, and resilience, on the other, affect tipping points in opposite ways. Whether or not risks turn into threats for European security then depends on the extent to which resilient societies can successfully contain these risks through effective and legitimate governance at the local, domestic, and regional levels. Last but not least, we use three indicators to measure degrees of resilience: - Social trust in societies and local communities; - Legitimacy (or social acceptance) of governance actors and institutions at the various levels; - Institutional design of local, domestic, and regional governance arrangements including what is left of central state institutions. Research in EU-LISTCO – particularly Work Packages 2, 3, and 4 – will focus on exploring the relationships between the various factors outlined above which affect the tipping points between risks and threats. The remainder of this paper introduces the various concepts used in the framework in more detail, namely areas of limited statehood, governance, contested orders, threats, resilience, as well as the three factors fostering the latter

the EU as a model of regional integration

The European Union (EU) perceives itself as a model for regional integration, which it seeks to diffuse by actively promoting the development of genuine (intra-) regional economic and political cooperation, the building of issue- related regimes, and the creation of joint institutions for consultation and decision-making in its neighbourhood and beyond as well as between the world regions and the EU. In this paper, we explore the extent to which EU has sought to promote regional integration beyond its borders. More specifically, we analyze what exactly the EU seeks to export and how it has used its external relations and foreign policy to foster the cooperation between regions (inter-regionalism), on the one hand, and regional cooperation among third countries, on the other. We proceed in three steps. The first part of the paper outlines the mechanisms and instruments through which the EU diffuses the idea of regional integration to other regions and fosters regional integration among third countries. In the second part, we take stock of the EU’s attempts to export regional integration focusing on the mechanisms it has drawn upon. We conclude with some considerations to what extent the promotion of regional integration constitutes a genuine EU agenda for global governance

the European Union and the diffusion of ideas

This paper sets out the research agenda of the Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The Transformative Power of Europe. The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas”. The diffusion of ideas has become a central research theme in political science, sociology, law, history, and economics. In this context, the Kolleg-Forschergruppe focuses on the theoretical and methodological challenges of identifying scope conditions for and interaction effects between the various causal mechanisms by which ideas are spread across time and space. We concentrate on the European Union (EU) as an almost ideal laboratory for investigating processes and outcomes of diffusion. First, European integration itself can be described as an effort to promote the diffusion of ideas across Europe and beyond. Second, European societies and polities emulate each other through mimetic processes. Third, Europe and the EU also serve as active promoters of diffusion processes toward the outside world. Last not least, European integration is embedded in and responds to larger global diffusion processes. The Kolleg-Forschergruppe will explore the diffusion of ideas in three thematic areas: “identity and the public sphere,” “compliance, conditionality, and beyond,” and “comparative regionalism and Europe’s external relations”

Explaining Crises and Comparing Regionalisms

This paper deals with two litmus tests for theories of European integration. The first part asks, how and to what extent various approaches can explain the contemporary crises of European integration. It thereby tackles the question whether European integration theories might have biased EU scholars towards ignoring evidence for (dis-)integration. While being more optimistic about the state of the Union than many EU scholars are, the paper argues for a more differentiated conceptualization of integration as a continuous variable that takes disintegration rather than stagnation or no integration as the opposite value of integration. The second part of the paper asks to what extent European integration theories are able to shed light on experiences with regionalism across the globe. It argues that they do provide plausible accounts for the emergence of regionalism around the world. Comparing regions points to important scope conditions under which European integration theories operate. When it comes to outcomes, however, they need to be complemented by explanations emphasizing diffusion to explain why and when states are more inclined to pool and delegate sovereignty in some regions than in others

Diffusing (inter-) regionalism: the EU as a model of regional integration

"The European Union (EU) perceives itself as a model for regional integration, which it seeks to diffuse by actively promoting the development of genuine (intra-) regional economic and political cooperation, the building of issue-related regimes, and the creation of joint institutions for consultation and decision-making in its neighbourhood and beyond as well as between the world regions and the EU. In this paper, we explore the extent to which EU has sought to promote regional integration beyond its borders. More specifically, we analyze what exactly the EU seeks to export and how it has used its external relations and foreign policy to foster the cooperation between regions (inter-regionalism), on the one hand, and regional cooperation among third countries, on the other. We proceed in three steps. The first part of the paper outlines the mechanisms and instruments through which the EU diffuses the idea of regional integration to other regions and fosters regional integration among third countries. In the second part, we take stock of the EU's attempts to export regional integration focusing on the mechanisms it has drawn upon. We conclude with some considerations to what extent the promotion of regional integration constitutes a genuine EU agenda for global governance." (author's abstract

Dysfunctional institutions, social trust, and governance in areas of limited statehood

Areas of limited statehood where the state is absent or dysfunctional are rarely ungoverned or ungovernable spaces. The provision of rules and regulations as well as of public goods and services - governance - does not necessarily depend on the existence of functioning state institutions. How can this be explained? This article makes two claims. First, we identify functional equivalents to state institutions that fail to govern hierarchically. Second, we focus on informal institutions based on social trust that are endogenous to areas of limited statehood. Personalized social trust among community members enables actors to overcome collective action problems, enhancing the legitimacy of governance actors. The main challenge in areas of limited statehood, which are often characterized by social heterogeneity and deep social and cultural cleavages (particularly in post-conflict societies), is to move from personalized to generalized trust in "imagined communities" despite dysfunctional state institutions. We argue that generalized trust in areas of limited statehood crucially depends on inclusive social identities as an enabling condition for effective and legitimate governance.Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit, in denen der Staat entweder abwesend oder dysfunktional ist, sind selten unregiert oder unregierbar. Die Bereitstellung von Regeln, öffentlichen Gütern und Dienstleistungen - Governance - hängt nicht notwendigerweise von funktionierenden staatlichen Institutionen ab. Wie kann dies erklärt werden? Der Aufsatz stellt zwei Argumente vor. Erstens identifizieren wir funktionale Äquivalente zu staatlichen Institutionen, die nicht mehr hierarchisch steuern können. Zweitens fokussieren wir auf informelle Institutionen, die auf sozialem Vertrauen beruhen und in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit vorfindbar sind. Personalisiertes soziales Vertrauen zwischen Mitgliedern einer Gemeinschaft ermöglicht Akteuren, Probleme kollektiven Handelns zu lösen. Außerdem stärkt es die Legitimität von Governance-Akteuren. Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit sind aber häufig durch soziale Heterogenität gekennzeichnet und sozial wie kulturell tief zerklüftet (vor allem in Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften). Deshalb besteht die zentrale Herausforderung darin, personalisiertes in generalisiertes Vertrauen in "imaginierten Gemeinschaften" zu verwandeln trotz dysfunktionaler staatlicher Institutionen. Wir argumentieren, dass generalisiertes Vertrauen in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit von inklusiven sozialen Identitäten abhängt als einer Erfolgsbedingung für effektive und legitime Governance

The transformative power of Europe: the European Union and the diffusion of ideas

This paper sets out the research agenda of the Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The Transformative Power of Europe. The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas”. The diffusion of ideas has become a central research theme in political science, sociology, law, history, and economics. In this context, the Kolleg-Forschergruppe focuses on the theoretical and methodological challenges of identifying scope conditions for and interaction effects between the various causal mechanisms by which ideas are spread across time and space. We concentrate on the European Union (EU) as an almost ideal laboratory for investigating processes and outcomes of diffusion. First, European integration itself can be described as an effort to promote the diffusion of ideas across Europe and beyond. Second, European societies and polities emulate each other through mimetic processes. Third, Europe and the EU also serve as active promoters of diffusion processes toward the outside world. Last not least, European integration is embedded in and responds to larger global diffusion processes. The Kolleg-Forschergruppe will explore the diffusion of ideas in three thematic areas: “identity and the public sphere,” “compliance, conditionality, and beyond,” and “comparative regionalism and Europe’s external relations”

A Litmus Test for European Integration Theories: Explaining Crises and Comparing Regionalisms

This paper deals with two litmus tests for theories of European integration. The first part asks, how and to what extent various approaches can explain the contemporary crises of European integration. It thereby tackles the question whether European integration theories might have biased EU scholars towards ignoring evidence for (dis-)integration. While being more optimistic about the state of the Union than many EU scholars are, the paper argues for a more differentiated conceptualization of integration as a continuous variable that takes disintegration rather than stagnation or no integration as the opposite value of integration. The second part of the paper asks to what extent European integration theories are able to shed light on experiences with regionalism across the globe. It argues that they do provide plausible accounts for the emergence of regionalism around the world. Comparing regions points to important scope conditions under which European integration theories operate. When it comes to outcomes, however, they need to be complemented by explanations emphasizing diffusion to explain why and when states are more inclined to pool and delegate sovereignty in some regions than in others