

SFB 700



Governance

in areas of limited
statehood

Dysfunctional Institutions, Social Trust, and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse



SFB-GOVERNANCE WORKING PAPER SERIES • No. 67 • JULY 2015

DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700 Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des Regierens?

DFG Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?

SFB-Governance Working Paper Series

Edited by the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 “Governance In Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?”

The SFB-Governance Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors.

Copyright for this issue: Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse

Editorial assistance and production: Liisa Noack

All SFB-Governance Working Papers can be downloaded free of charge from www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen or ordered in print via e-mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.

Tanja A. Börzel/Thomas Risse 2015: Dysfunctional Institutions, Social Trust, and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 67, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, July 2015.

ISSN 1864-1024 (Internet)

ISSN 1863-6896 (Print)

This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

DFG Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700

Freie Universität Berlin

Alfried-Krupp-Haus Berlin

Binger Straße 40

14197 Berlin

Germany

Phone: +49-30-838 58502

Fax: +49-30-838 58540

E-mail: sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de

Web: www.sfb-governance.de/en

Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft

DFG

Dysfunctional Institutions, Social Trust, and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse

Abstract:

Areas of limited statehood where the state is absent or dysfunctional are rarely ungoverned or ungovernable spaces. The provision of rules and regulations as well as of public goods and services – governance – does not necessarily depend on the existence of functioning state institutions. How can this be explained? This article makes two claims. First, we identify functional equivalents to state institutions that fail to govern hierarchically. Second, we focus on informal institutions based on social trust that are endogenous to areas of limited statehood. Personalized social trust among community members enables actors to overcome collective action problems, enhancing the legitimacy of governance actors. The main challenge in areas of limited statehood, which are often characterized by social heterogeneity and deep social and cultural cleavages (particularly in post-conflict societies), is to move from personalized to generalized trust in “imagined communities” despite dysfunctional state institutions. We argue that generalized trust in areas of limited statehood crucially depends on inclusive social identities as an enabling condition for effective and legitimate governance.

Zusammenfassung:

Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit, in denen der Staat entweder abwesend oder dysfunktional ist, sind selten unregiert oder unregierbar. Die Bereitstellung von Regeln, öffentlichen Gütern und Dienstleistungen – Governance – hängt nicht notwendigerweise von funktionierenden staatlichen Institutionen ab. Wie kann dies erklärt werden? Der Aufsatz stellt zwei Argumente vor. Erstens identifizieren wir funktionale Äquivalente zu staatlichen Institutionen, die nicht mehr hierarchisch steuern können. Zweitens fokussieren wir auf informelle Institutionen, die auf sozialem Vertrauen beruhen und in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit vorfindbar sind. Personalisiertes soziales Vertrauen zwischen Mitgliedern einer Gemeinschaft ermöglicht Akteuren, Probleme kollektiven Handelns zu lösen. Außerdem stärkt es die Legitimität von Governance-Akteuren. Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit sind aber häufig durch soziale Heterogenität gekennzeichnet und sozial wie kulturell tief zerklüftet (vor allem in Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften). Deshalb besteht die zentrale Herausforderung darin, personalisiertes in generalisiertes Vertrauen in „imaginierten Gemeinschaften“ zu verwandeln trotz dysfunktionaler staatlicher Institutionen. Wir argumentieren, dass generalisiertes Vertrauen in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit von inklusiven sozialen Identitäten abhängt als einer Erfolgsbedingung für effektive und legitime Governance.

Table of Content

1. Introduction: Governance despite Dysfunctional States	5
2. External Statehood as a Functional Equivalent Compensating for Dysfunctional Institutions	6
3. Social Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood	8
3.1 Personalized Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood	9
3.2 Generalized Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood	11
4. Conclusion	15
References	17

1. Introduction: Governance despite Dysfunctional States

Dysfunctional state institutions are a common feature in the contemporary international system. In fact, most states are dysfunctional in a very basic Weberian sense.¹ Max Weber conceptualized statehood as an institutionalized structure with the ability to rule authoritatively and legitimately control the means of violence (Weber 1921/1980). In other words, the ideal typical state commands what Krasner calls “domestic sovereignty,” that is, “the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity” (Krasner 1999: 4). If ideal typical statehood is about the ability to rule authoritatively and implement and enforce decisions, this capacity is lacking for the majority of states in the current international system. In other words, dysfunctional statehood is the default in the international system and has been for a long time. There are a few completely “failed states,” such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or currently Syria. Most countries, however, exhibit “areas of limited statehood,” that is, parts of the territory or policy areas where central state institutions are unable to effectively implement and enforce decisions (Risse 2011a). Washington D.C., Berlin, Rio de Janeiro, and Nairobi have this in common. While state authorities can effectively enforce the law in some (or most) parts of these cities, other parts are beyond their reach.

However, neither Washington nor Berlin, Rio, or Nairobi are ungoverned spaces just because the respective state authorities cannot rule parts of their territories. The literature on “failed statehood” (see e.g., Rotberg 2003, 2004 2004; Milliken & Krause 2002; Dorff 2005, Piazza 2008) tends to conflate governance and statehood. For instance, the “fragile states index”² which is widely used to determine states at risk, lumps together governance indicators (basic infrastructure, economic development, and the like), regime type, and state indicators. As a result, it becomes impossible to examine the relationship between statehood and (good) governance. Statehood is about the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions including maintaining a monopoly on the means of violence (see above). Governance refers to institutionalized modes of social coordination to solve collective action problems and provide binding rules and regulations, as well as public goods and services (Mayntz 2009; Benz 2004; Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997).

We argue in the following that areas of limited statehood where the state is absent or dysfunctional are rarely ungoverned or ungovernable spaces. The provision of rules and regulations as well as of public goods and services – governance – does not necessarily depend on the existence of functioning state institutions (for details and evidence see Krasner & Risse 2014). Quantitative studies have shown that there is no linear relationship between degrees of statehood and effective service provision (Lee *et al.* 2014). Qualitative studies confirm that there is huge variation in the degree to which effective governance can be provided under conditions

¹ This article is based on data and findings from the Collaborative Research Center 700 “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood,” funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). We thank the DFG for its continuous support.

² <http://ffp.statesindex.org> (accessed 16.09.2014).

of dysfunctional state institutions (for South Africa see e.g., Börzel & Thauer 2013; Hönke 2013; for Somalia see Schäferhoff 2014; Menkhaus 2006/2007; see also Beisheim *et al.* 2014; Risse 2011b; Krasner & Risse 2014; Scott 2009). Weak or limited statehood does not necessarily lead to weak governance.

But how can we explain the provision of governance despite dysfunctional state institutions? This article makes two claims. First, we identify functional equivalents to state institutions that fail to govern hierarchically. This part of our contribution summarizes our previous work (Börzel & Risse 2010).

Second, we focus on informal institutions based on social trust that are endogenous to areas of limited statehood. We discuss the conditions under which such institutions emerge and are likely to contribute to the provision of public goods rather than becoming a public bad that breeds clientelism, corruption, and violent conflict. Personalized social trust among community members enables actors to overcome collective action problems, enhancing the legitimacy of governance actors. Such a “shadow of the community” also holds state authorities and other “governors” (Avant *et al.* 2010) accountable.

The main challenge in areas of limited statehood, which are often characterized by social heterogeneity and deep social and cultural cleavages (particularly in post-conflict societies), is to move from personalized to generalized trust in “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) despite dysfunctional state institutions. We argue that generalized trust in areas of limited statehood crucially depends on inclusive social identities as an enabling condition for effective and legitimate governance.

2. External Statehood as a Functional Equivalent Compensating for Dysfunctional Institutions

Governance is about rule making and the provision of common goods for a collectivity. “Governance by the state” is usually provided through hierarchical steering by functioning state institutions. Yet, as argued above, state institutions in most parts of the world are dysfunctional in the sense that they lack the capacity to set and enforce collectively binding rules and provide common goods. Unfortunately, the governance literature is still wedded to consolidated statehood. While scholars have recently emphasized non-hierarchical modes of governance that also include non-state actors, most studies claim that governance requires at least a “shadow of hierarchy” provided by the state in order to be effective (e.g. Scharpf 1997; Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008). That is, self-governance and private regulations by non-state actors including companies are assumed effective only if the state can credibly threaten to legislate and enforce the rules if non-state governance fails.

If this were true, areas of limited statehood would be doomed twice. First, they exhibit dysfunctional state institutions that cannot provide public goods. Second, non-hierarchical

modes of governance including non-state actors would not be effective, either, since a shadow of hierarchy is lacking (Börzel 2010). However, there are plenty examples of effective and good governance under conditions of limited statehood. In a previous article (Börzel & Risse 2010), we theorized about the conditions of effective governance in areas of limited statehood with dysfunctional state institutions. We identified functional equivalents to the “shadow of hierarchy” cast by effective state institutions. First, the absence of state governance provides an incentive for other actors, e.g., (trans)national companies and non-governmental organizations, to engage in the provision of public goods (*shadow of anarchy*). Second, external actors, such as international organizations or foreign governments, can directly provide public goods. Or they substitute for a lacking shadow of hierarchy and commit non-state actors to engage in governance (*external shadow of hierarchy*). Third, social norms may create reputational incentives for non-state actors to contribute to governance (*shadow of the socially embedded market*).³

The literature provides ample evidence for the existence of functional equivalents to effective state institutions. Yet, these equivalents still rely at least to some degree on consolidated statehood. For instance, the *external shadow of hierarchy* still requires consolidated statehood. External governments use their functioning state institutions to set and enforce (inter)national norms and rules for non-state actors operating in areas of limited statehood. Thus, Prakash and Potoski have shown that environmental management standards are upheld by companies investing in areas of limited statehood that are bound by these rules in their home markets in the global North (Prakash & Potoski 2006, 2007).

The *shadow of the market* can put the non-provision of public goods at a significant competitive disadvantage. Yet, such economic incentives depend on the social and regulatory embeddedness of markets in which the consumer demand is also influenced by moral obligations. Consumers in the domestic markets of the global North require companies to uphold, say, the same environmental and human rights (e.g., child labor) standards in areas of limited statehood by which they are bound in their Northern home markets. Thus, the regulations of functioning state institutions provide for domestic markets where the consumer demand for corporate social responsibility translates into competitive (dis)advantages for transnational companies investing in the global South.

Overall, the various shadows require at least some degree of consolidated statehood or functioning state institutions to deploy their effects in areas of limited statehood. The good news is that external statehood is sufficient. Thus, the multi-level nature of governance, linking areas of consolidated and limited statehood, provides a functional equivalent to the shadow of hierarchy that areas of limited statehood are often unable to generate (Krasner & Risse 2014). The international community and/or Western consolidated states use their functional state institutions to cast a shadow of hierarchy, causing non-state actors to engage in governance and provide public goods in areas of limited statehood. In some cases, these actors – rather

³ A fourth functional equivalent – the shadow of the community – is endogenous to areas of limited statehood and will be dealt with below.

than external states or international organizations – even exercise legitimate authority when the state is dysfunctional (Koehler & Zürcher 2007).

Yet, the engagement of international organizations, individual states, non-governmental organizations and business in fighting environmental pollution, pandemics, or water shortages in areas of limited statehood has been selective at best. So, what about factors endogenous to areas of limited statehood that can compensate for dysfunctional state institutions? In the following section, we turn to social trust as a major precondition for effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood with dysfunctional formal institutions.

3. Social Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood

What is social trust? Niklas Luhmann has conceptualized trust as “upfront risk-taking” (*riskante Vorleistung*, Luhmann 1989), that is, deliberately abstaining from checking whether one’s interaction partner is telling the truth about keeping or not defecting from her commitments. As Anthony Giddens put it, trust entails the decision not to insist upon complete information (Giddens 1984; see also Hartmann 2011). Andrew Kydd uses game theoretic models to show how trust can overcome the security dilemma in international relations. He defines trust as “a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it” (Kydd 2005: 6; Hardin 2002: 12).

The international relations literature on trust is particularly helpful in this context, since the “cooperation under anarchy” perspective (Oye 1986) does not assume functioning state institutions to enforce rules. Similar arguments have been advanced for local communities and society-based networks (Ostrom 1990, 2002, Ostrom *et al.* 1994; Ellickson 1991; Putnam 1993; Hooghe & Stolle 2003). The latter rely on *personalized trust* among community members who trust each other because they know each other, or trust people whom they do not know because group members whom they do know (snowballing effect) trust them. In contrast, *generalized trust* reaches “beyond the borders of face-to-face interactions to incorporate people not personally known” (Stolle 2002: 397). Generalized trust concerns “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) whose members do not have any personal relationships among each other.

In the following, we first discuss how personalized trust in local communities can overcome the governance problem in areas of limited statehood characterized by dysfunctional state institutions. We then turn to the more daunting problem of generalized trust in socially heterogeneous societies.

3.1 Personalized Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood

Personalized social trust serves as a functional equivalent for weak or dysfunctional state institutions in areas of limited statehood and, thus, helps explain the governance puzzle discussed above. It does not necessarily involve external actors but is rather endogenous to local communities and society-based networks.⁴ Personalized social trust contributes to the effective provision of governance in the absence of functioning state institutions in at least three ways.

First, social trust enables actors to solve collective action problems in the first place (Rothstein 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta 1988). As Fritz Scharpf has argued, trust generates the expectation that information about actors' preferences are communicated truthfully and that commitments are complied with (Scharpf 1997, 137). Social trust enables expectations of diffuse reciprocity and future cooperation and, thus, facilitates the making of credible commitments. Robert Axelrod and Andrew Kydd have used game theoretic models to show how trust stabilizes cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Kydd 2005; cf. also Hardin 1982, Hardin 2002). Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated through experimental designs that local communities where members trust each other are likely to produce common pool resources without having to refer to strong institutions with their monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms (Ostrom 1990, 2002, Ostrom *et al.* 1994). The literature on social capital focuses on collective action by communities to provide governance themselves rather than rely on other actors and induce them to govern (Boix & Posner 1998). Society-based networks or social capital provide an alternative to the provision of public goods by the state (cf. Putnam 1993; Ellickson 1991). They operate based on social trust that fosters the willingness to cooperate and engage in the provision of common goods. Personalized social trust thus enhances the action capacity of local communities. The study of Esther Thomas on conflicts between multinational mining companies and neighboring communities in Tanzania and Guinea demonstrates that local communities with high levels of social trust have a higher capacity to engage with companies in order to manage conflicts (Thomas 2014).

Second, personalized social trust enhances the legitimacy of governance actors. Communities whose members trust each other are likely to put leaders in charge and convey authority and rules to people whom they also trust (Schatzberg 2001; Paller 2014). Trust generates legitimacy, thereby inducing voluntary compliance with costly decisions – again in the absence of formal institutions with sanctioning and enforcement capacities. Our research indicates that legitimacy is a necessary condition for effective governance in areas of limited statehood (Krasner & Risse 2014). Without legitimacy, governance in areas of limited statehood (and beyond) tends to be ineffective in the provision of collective goods. Social trust is one mechanism through which legitimacy is generated (the others being input and output legitimacy, see again Scharpf 1999). In this context, Schäferhoff has shown that trust among Somali indigenous communities provided them with the capacity to act in the fight against HIV/AIDS and to accept foreign assistance as

⁴ This is not to say that external governance providers in areas of limited statehood do not require the trust of local communities – on the contrary. Since legitimacy is a necessary condition for the effective provision of common goods and services in areas of limited statehood, trust in external actors is a powerful source of (empirical) legitimacy (Krasner & Risse 2014; Hölck 2012).

legitimate in the provinces of Somaliland and Puntland despite the complete absence of central state authorities (Schäferhoff 2013, 2014; see also Debiel *et al.* 2010; Beisheim & Liese 2014). Hölck has demonstrated that Spanish colonial rule in Sonora (Mexico) and Araukania (Southern Chile) was only effective to the extent that personal trust relationships developed between colonial authorities and indigenous communities (Hölck 2012; see also Rinke *et al.* 2011).

Third, social trust among community members with their own standards of appropriate behavior holds state authorities accountable to the community. Areas of limited statehood are often populated by traditional communities with their own standards of what should be considered in the public interest – although state actors might not reflect and uphold such standards, and these standards do not always fully conform to global standards of human rights, democracy, and good governance. Using comparative case studies of public goods provision in rural China, Lily Tsai has shown that state representatives embedded in inclusive societal institutions at the local level are more likely to strive for public goods provision than those who are not embedded or who are working in areas with no inclusive societal institutions (Tsai 2007). Likewise, Hönke and Börzel have found that local communities in Sub-Saharan Africa exhibiting high levels of social trust restrain local state representatives and customary authorities in the use of their powers (Hönke & Börzel 2014). This “shadow of the community” holds state representatives accountable in the absence of formal institutions through which citizens can voice their claims. Community institutions affect the willingness of state or non-state actors external to the community to engage in governance.

Fourth, and related to the third point, this “shadow of the community” based on mutual respect and shared norms tends to exhibit strong monitoring and sanctioning capacities that ensure compliance with costly rules. The quest for social approval and the threat of social exclusion from the community serve as a powerful incentive to comply with the rules and to provide public goods. One should not underestimate the sanctioning potential of these informal institutions, ranging from social ostracism to physical punishment (Hönke & Börzel 2014; Paller 2014).

Thus, the presence or absence of personalized social trust in local communities offers a powerful explanation for the variation in effective governance in areas of limited statehood. Yet, two issues remain. First, social trust in local communities is not geared per se toward governance in terms of providing binding rules and public goods and services. Clientelistic networks also rely on high levels of social trust, but provide exclusionary club goods for their clientel. Mancur Olsen has argued that closely knit social, economic, or political organizations are prone to act as special rather than public interest groups and engage in rent seeking and corruption (Olson 1982). Moreover, in many areas of limited statehood with dysfunctional state institutions, those occupying state positions use their power for racketeering and private rent seeking while enjoying the full trust of their clientelistic networks so long as their followers continue to “eat” (Schatzberg 2001; Bayart 1993). Finally, criminal or terrorist networks, such as the mafia, Hamas, or Hezbollah, are built on relationships of trust, too (Stolle & Rochon 1998; Portes 1998: 15-18).

The literature on social capital is only partially helpful in explaining when society-based networks or local communities develop the necessary social trust to make governance without functioning state institutions work. It argues that trust is built in voluntary associations and social networks of civic engagement, which socialize their members into norms of diffuse reciprocity, breed a sense of shared responsibility, and make them trust each other (Putnam 1993, Putnam 2000; Hooghe & Stolle 2003). Yet, even if this claim holds true,⁵ such civil society organizations and networks have to form in the first place. If they are willing to engage, non-state actors have to have the necessary autonomy to act free from political control (cf. Mayntz 1993). Semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes tend to suppress the political organization of societal or community interests. Moreover, local authorities in areas of limited statehood often have sufficient power to prevent collective self-organization, e.g. if it threatens their rent seeking opportunities (Börzel *et al.* 2012). In other words, local self-organization in areas of limited statehood seems to require some degree of participatory rule or at least non-interference with local community building. Interestingly enough, though, it might be precisely the absence of functioning state institutions that fosters community self-organization. Weak states are often usurped by rent seeking and clientelistic networks that capture what remains of the state and try to exploit the institutions for private gains. As James Scott has argued, self-organization among local communities is particularly likely in stateless societies precisely because of the absence of predatory, rent seeking, or repressive state institutions (Scott 2009).

Second, collective goods provision requires governance beyond local communities and society-based networks where people know each other. Their resources are often too limited to provide complex public goods and services, such as health, education, and infrastructure. Many common goods problems, such as environmental pollution or pandemics, have to be addressed on a larger scale. The scaling-up of governance has been a major driver for building state and international institutions (Ostrom 1990; Keohane & Ostrom 1995). State or non-state, the formation of such institutions in itself constitutes a collective action problem, whose solution requires trust. Cooperation and collective action, particularly in complex diversified societies, requires social trust that is generalized (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000; Delhey & Newton 2005). This is a major challenge for areas of limited statehood.

3.2 Generalized Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood

Developing generalized trust as a precondition for the scaling-up of governance in the absence of functional and effective state institutions presents a major challenge for areas of limited statehood. Generalized trust is most unlikely to emerge where it is probably needed most, namely in post-conflict societies with weak institutional capacities. These societies have suffered through decades of communal warfare, ethno-nationalist conflicts, and the like, and are very

⁵ The social capital literature finds a correlation between membership in social communities and trust (Knack & Keefer 1997; Putnam 1993). However, studies point to endogeneity problems or omitted variable biases that cast some serious doubts about the existence of a causal relationship (Uslaner 1999; Uslaner & Conley 2003; Whiteley 1999; Stolle 2002; Knack 2003; Hooghe 2003; Delhey & Newton 2005).

unlikely to generate trust among their members. Essentialized ethnic or faith-based identities may generate social trust within communities – at best what Putnam calls “bonding social capital,” which is inward looking and “reinforces exclusive identities and homogeneous groups” (Putnam 2000: 22). It enables groups to cooperate more effectively, albeit to the detriment of the wider society (Putnam 1995: 665). At worst, bonding social capital results in strong social mistrust and hatred among communities. Or, to put it differently, personalized social trust among ethnic or faith-based communities might prevent rather than foster generalized trust across diverse communities.

This consideration results in a paradox for governance in areas of limited statehood, where formal institutions are weak and social heterogeneity is high. The greater the ethnic, cultural, political, and economic diversity, the greater the need for bridging social capital or generalized trust to make governance work. At the same time, diversity has been found to undermine the formation of generalized trust and civic engagement (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002; Rice & Steele 2001; Costa & Kahn 2003; Knack 2003; Delhey & Newton 2005; Putnam 1993). Is there a way out?

The social capital literature has identified several mechanisms through which personalized trust can become generalized. First, generalized trust can emerge through the positive experience of acting under the assumption that the other will reciprocate instead of defect. Such rational learning can evolve through tit-for-tat strategies (Axelrod 1984), a form of specific reciprocity combined with the expectation of repeated interaction. Repeated acts of specific reciprocity generate sufficient information on actors’ preferences to support the expectation of future cooperation, particularly if these acts involve sending costly signals designed to achieve reassurance (Kydd 2000; Kahan 2003). Generalized trust promotes reciprocity and cooperation beyond tit-for-tat schemes (Whiteley 1999); information about specific actors’ motivations and strategies may be generalized to others (Hardin 2002). In principle, this mechanism does not require a preexisting institutional framework and is therefore suitable for areas of limited statehood.

Second, society-centered approaches to social capital emphasize regular social interaction in voluntary associations and social networks of civic engagement through which people learn trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. Some also claim that generalized trust depends on cultural norms and values, such as optimism, egalitarianism, or Protestantism, in which people become socialized (Banfield 1958; Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994; Uslaner 2002; Delhey *et al.* 2011). The formation of such norms and values, however, is a long-term process “anchored in historical and cultural experiences that can be traced over centuries” (Stolle 2002: 404; Putnam 1993). Whether this mechanism is available in areas of limited statehood depends on the *longue durée* of community building and the respective historical memories of, for example, indigenous communities (Scott 2009; Hölck 2012; Thomas 2014). However, this mechanism of generalized trust building is likely to depend on socially and culturally homogenous communities, which we rarely find in areas of limited statehood.

Third, in places where voluntary associations, networks of civic engagement, or historical legacies of community building are absent, social capital formation has to rely on formal political and legal institutions (Braithwaite & Levi 1998; Levi & Stoker 2000; Hartmann 2011; Rothstein & Stolle 2008; Herreros 2012). Social trust emerges from political trust in institutions, which are perceived as efficient, fair, and just (Knight 2001; Freitag & Bühlmann 2009). Even if functional (state) institutions bring generalized “trust from above” (Fukuyama 2000: 242), they are almost by definition absent in areas of limited statehood.⁶ Dysfunctional state institutions, if they exist at all, are unlikely to generate trust precisely because the state is unable to effectively implement and enforce decisions. Instead, as mentioned above, we often find strong informal institutions in areas of limited statehood through religious or tribal communities based on shared normative beliefs and practices. Identification and categorization is a way of generalizing trust (Fukuyama 2000; Newton 1999). People trust strangers because they are members of the same social group based on kinship, a shared ethnic background, faith, values, common history or language, geographical proximity, or behavioral similarities (Brewer 1981; Tanis & Postmes 2005). On the one hand, these “imagined communities” no longer rely on personalized trust and can encompass transnational bonds among millions and billions of people (e.g., the Catholic Church as a global transnational community). On the other hand, these forms of generalized trust have their limits, since they are based on shared identities and similarities with regard to ethnicity, religion, and the like. They do not include people who do not belong to the social group or category that the members are part of or feel close to (Stolle 2002). “Groups segregated by class, occupation or ethnicity may build cooperation and trust only among group members, perhaps even encouraging distrust between members and non-members” (Knack 2003: 343; Stolle & Rochon 1998). In-group trust or bonding social capital can ensure the survival of a group or community; it also fosters in-group favoritism (Hammond & Axelrod 2006). However, the provision of public goods requires generalized trust or bridging social capital which “encompasses people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam 2000: 22; Uslaner & Conley 2003).

At this point, we are back at square one. How is generalized trust possible in areas of limited statehood characterized by social and cultural heterogeneity and strong cleavages? We argue that the nature of group identity is pivotal. The inclusiveness of group identities is an important scope condition under which social trust in local communities and society-based networks becomes generalized, promoting the provision of public goods rather than undermining it by fostering clientelism and conflict. According to Social Identity Theory, people that share a strong sense of group identity cooperate more within their group but less with outsiders (Tajfel 1945). Yet, group identities can be more or less inclusive and accommodating to strangers. The more inclusive a group identity is, the more easily it can be extended to encompass other groups.⁷ Moreover, self-categorization theory tells us that individuals naturally identify with

⁶ The question remains whether institution-based approaches to social capital actually rely on social trust in the Luhmannian sense of “upfront risk-taking” (see above) or rather on confidence in effective institutions and their enforcement capacities (on the difference between trust and confidence see Luhmann 2000).

⁷ Another scope condition identified by the literature is more applicable to consolidated statehood, namely formal institutions (e.g. group rights, power sharing arrangements) by which societies manage diversity (Hooghe 2007; Freitag & Bühlmann 2009).

several social groups holding multiple identities (Turner 1987; Abrams & Hogg 1990). These identity categories can then be nested or blended into each other (I can identify with my village, my district, and my nation); they can also intersect or overlap each other (e.g. gender identities and ethnic identifications; see Brewer 2001; Herrmann & Brewer 2004).

In this context, Shmuel Eisenstadt and Bernd Giesen distinguish between three types of social identities, namely primordial, sacred, and civic (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995). Civic identities are the most inclusive and tolerant toward the “out-group” and do not treat one’s own community as particularly special. Rather, relationships to other communities are characterized by mutual respect. As a consequence, social trust among members is likely conducive to governance and the provision of public goods.

At the other end of the spectrum are primordial identities. Not only do community members perceive themselves as very special, but the various “out-groups” are also regarded as inferior—and the “others” have no way to become members of the “in-group.” Essentialized ethnic identities often have primordial characteristics.⁸ It follows that social trust among community members with primordial group identities is unlikely to contribute to public goods provision outside the group. Rather, social trust is likely to further the provision of exclusionary club goods as is common within clientelistic networks.

In between these two extremes are so-called “sacred” identity constructions. While the “in-group” is considered superior and the “out-group” is looked down upon, “out-group” members can convert and be integrated into the community. It is no coincidence that religious communities often exhibit such “sacred identities.” Since they regard members of other (religious) communities as potential converts, some degree of religious tolerance is at least a possibility. As a result, trust can be built between communities, and governance and public service provision becomes possible. The latter then depends entirely on the community’s own beliefs about the “in-group’s” degree of “sacredness.” It is not by chance that we often find religious communities providing public goods and services and, thus, governing areas of limited statehood.

To sum up, social heterogeneity impedes the formation of social trust within local communities and society-based networks. Once in-group trust is built, however, it makes the generalization of social trust more likely when combined with an inclusive civic or at least sacred identity, which allows for the emergence of multiple, overlapping communities. “The more identity-categories overlap in the positive cooperation experience, the easier the transfer of trust to society at large” (Stolle 2002: 405). Cleavages cutting across multiple categories can moderate the harmful effect of social fragmentation (Buzasi 2014; Dunning & Harrison 2010; cf. Coser 1956). Overlapping identities are not the same as a global identity or an identity based on universal values, which might be too general to generate sufficient generalized trust (Brewer 1981). Rather, the “nesting” or “layering” of identities (Risse 2010) allows people to broaden their

⁸ Note that primordial identities are still social constructions, but they are constructed in an essentialized way.

belief in the trustworthiness of known persons to also encompass strangers (Stolle 2002). It is therefore crucial in socially and culturally heterogeneous areas of limited statehood to construct overlapping identities that allow for “communities among strangers” (Habermas 1996). The good news is that ethnic or religious identities do not have to be primordial; they can be civic or sacred, allowing for generalized trust among socially diverse groups as a crucial precondition for the provision of collective goods in areas of limited statehood in the absence of functioning state institutions. The bad news is that all too often political and social elites construct such identities in primordial ways for power-political purposes (Fearon & Laitin 2000).

4. Conclusion

Our starting point in this essay was the empirical observation that states with dysfunctional and ineffective institutions are neither ungoverned nor ungovernable. Rather, we observe huge variations with regard to the provision of public goods and compliance with costly rules in areas of limited statehood. How can this be explained? We have argued previously (Börzel & Risse 2010) that “governance without the state” often relies on functional equivalents for the shadow of hierarchy in order to be effective. However, many of these mechanisms ultimately depend on effective institutions in consolidated states (mostly in the global North). In this article, we focused on a particular endogenous mechanism to ensure effective and “good” governance in areas of limited statehood, namely social trust defined as “upfront risk-taking” (Luhmann). Social trust helps to overcome collective action problems, stabilize cooperation in the absence of effective formal institutions, and enhance the legitimacy of rulers. We then distinguished between personalized and generalized trust, the latter referring to social trust in “imagined communities among strangers.”

Explaining the transformation from personalized to generalized trust presents a particular puzzle under conditions of limited and dysfunctional statehood, where formal (state) institutions are by definition weak or absent. Society-based approaches to social capital identify regular social interaction in voluntary associations and society-based networks as a way to broaden trust relations. However, society-driven trust building is most likely to emerge in homogeneous groups. While those may exist in areas of limited statehood at the local level, the provision of public goods requires generalized trust, which is hard to generate precisely when groups are tightly knit. They tend to feature high levels of social trust within the group or community but are prone to clientelism, rent seeking, corruption, and often distrust and hostility toward other groups and communities.

We have argued that the paradox of diversity and trust is mitigated by inclusive identities that accommodate membership in different groups. Overlapping group memberships are a way to generalize trust that relies on neither functional (state) institutions nor voluntary associations or networks of civic engagement but can rather involve families, neighborhoods, school- or work-related groups, and religious communities – as long as they are not based on primordial identities.

In sum, dysfunctional institutions – limited statehood in our case – are not the end of governance. Most people in the world have to cope with inefficient and ineffective state institutions in areas of limited statehood. However, some of these areas are reasonably well governed. Our task as researchers is to explore when and how collective action emerges in the absence of effective formal (state) institutions rather than engaging in fruitless attempts at state and nation building. Generalized trust enabling the provision of collective goods and governance can emerge even in dysfunctional states, resulting from inclusive group identities in communities of overlapping memberships.

References

- Abrams D, Hogg MA* (1990) *Social Identity Theory*. Harvester Wheatsheaf, London
- Alesina A, La Ferrara E* (2002) Who Trusts Others? *Journal of Public Economics* 85, 207–234.
- Anderson B* (1991) *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London
- Avant D, Finnemore M, Sell SK* (2010) *Who Governs the Globe?* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK
- Axelrod RA* (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books, New York
- Banfield EC* (1958) *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Free Press, Glencoe
- Bayart J-F* (1993) *The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly*. Longman, London und New York
- Beisheim M, Liese A* (2014) *Transnational Partnerships. Effectively Providing for Sustainable Development?* Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke
- Beisheim M, Liese A, Jannetschek H, Sarre J* (2014) *Transnational Public Private Partnerships and the Provision of Services in Areas of Limited Statehood in South Asia and East Africa*. *Governance* 27, 655-673.
- Benz A* (2004) *Governance - Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden
- Boix C, Posner DN* (1998) Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government Performance. *British Journal of Political Science* 28, 686-693.
- Börzel TA* (2010) *Governance Without Government - False Promises or Flawed Premises? In: Statehood"* RCGiAoL (ed) SFB Governance Working Paper Series. Freie Universität Berlin: SFB 700, Berlin
- Börzel TA, Hönke J, Thauer C* (2012) *How Much State Does it Take? Corporate Responsibility, Multinational Corporations, and Limited Statehood in South Africa*. *Business and Politics* 14, 1-34.
- Börzel TA, Risse T* (2010) *Governance Without a State - Can It Work?* *Regulation and Governance* 4, 1-22.
- Börzel TA, Thauer C* (2013) *Business and Governance in South Africa Governance and Limited Statehood*. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke
- Braithwaite VA, Levi M* (1998) *Trust and Governance*. Russell Sage Foundation, New York
- Brewer M* (2001) *The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Social Psychology*. *Political Psychology* 22.
- Brewer MB* (1981) *Ethnocentrism and its Role in Interpersonal Trust*. In: Brewer MB, Collins BE (eds) *Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences*, pp. 214-231. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco
- Buzasi K* (2014) *Languages, communication potential and generalized trust in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence based on the Afrobarometer Survey*. *Social Science Research* 49, 141-155.
- Coser LA* (1956) *Functions of Social Conflict*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
- Costa DL, Kahn ME* (2003) *Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist's Perspective*. *Perspectives in Politics* 1, 103-111.
- Debiel T, Glassner R, Schetter C, Terlinden U* (2010) *Local State-Building in Afghanistan and Somaliland*. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 21, 38-44.

- Delhey J, Newton K* (2005) Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism? *European Sociological Review* 21, 311-327.
- Delhey J, Newton K, Welzel C* (2011) How General Is Trust in "Most People"? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem. *American Sociological Review* 76, 786-807.
- Dorff RH* (2005) Failed States after 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned? *International Studies Perspectives* 6, 20-34.
- Dunning T, Harrison L* (2010) Cross-cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review* 104, 21-39.
- Eisenstadt SN, Giesen B* (1995) The Construction of Collective Identity. *European Journal of Sociology* 36, 72-102.
- Ellickson RC* (1991) *Order Without Law. How Neighbors Settle Disputes*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
- Fearon JD, Laitin DD* (2000) Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity. *International Organization* 54, 845-877.
- Freitag M, Bühlmann M* (2009) Crafting Trust: The Role of Political Institutions in a Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Political Studies* 42, 1537-1566.
- Fukuyama F* (1995) *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. Basic Books, New York
- Fukuyama F* (2000) *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*. Free Press, New York
- Gambetta D* (1988) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Blackwell Publishers, New York
- Giddens A* (1984) *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Habermas J* (1996) *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main
- Hammond RA, Axelrod RA* (2006) The Evolution of Ethnocentrism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, 926-936.
- Hardin R* (1982) *Collective Action*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD
- Hardin R* (2002) *Trust and Trustworthiness*. Russell Sage Foundation, New York
- Hartmann M* (2011) *Die Praxis des Vertrauens*. Suhrkamp, Berlin
- Héritier A, Lehmkuhl D* (2008) Introduction: The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance. *Journal of Public Policy* 38, 1-17.
- Herreros F* (2012) The State Counts: State Efficacy and the Development of Trust. *Rationality and Society* 24, 483-509.
- Herrmann RK, Brewer MB* (2004) Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU. In: Herrmann RK, Risse T, Brewer MB (eds) *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, pp. 1-22. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham MD
- Hölck L* (2012) Die strenge Liebkosung der Heimat. Vertrauen als ethnohistorische Analysekatgorie am Beispiel der Comcáac (Seris) von Sonora (Mexiko) Fachbereich Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaft. Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin
- Hönke J* (2013) *Transnational Companies and Security Governance. Hybrid Practices in a Postcolonial World*. Routledge, London

- Hönke J, Börzel TA (2014) Restraint of Statehood and the Quality of Governance by Multinational Companies in Sub-Saharan Africa. SFB Working Papers; Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Freie Universität Berlin.
- Hooghe M (2003) Voluntary Associations and Democratic Attitudes: Values and Conference as a Causal Mechanisms. In: Hooghe M, Stolle D (eds) *Generating Social Capital Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 89-111. Palgrave, Houndmills
- Hooghe M (2007) Social Capital and Diversity Generalized Trust, Social Cohesion and Regimes of Diversity. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40, 709-732.
- Hooghe M, Stolle D (2003) *Generating Social Capital - Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective*. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill
- Kahan DM (2003) The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law. *Michigan Law Review* 102 71-103.
- Keohane RT, Ostrom E (1995) *Local Commons and Global Interdependence*. Sage, London
- Knack S (2003) Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses. *Public Choice* 117, 341-355.
- Knack S, Keefer P (1997) Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, 1251-1288.
- Knight J (2001) Social Norms and the Rule of Law: Fostering Trust in a Socially Diverse Society. In: Cook KS (ed) *Trust in Society*, pp. 354-373. Russel Sage Foundation, New York
- Koehler J, Zürcher C (2007) Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results from a Representative Survey. SFB Working Papers; Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Freie Universität Berlin.
- Kooiman J (1993) *Modern Governance. New Government-Society Interactions*. Sage, London
- Krasner SD (1999) *Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ
- Krasner SD, Risse T (2014) External Actors, State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood. Special Issue of "Governance". John Wiley Publ., Hoboken NJ
- Kydd A (2000) Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. *International Organization* 54.
- Kydd AH (2005) *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ
- Lee M, Walter-Drop G, Wiesel J (2014) Taking the State (Back) Out? A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Statehood and the Delivery of Collective Goods and Services. *Governance* 27, 635-654.
- Levi M, Stoker L (2000) Political Trust and Trustworthiness. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, 475-507.
- Luhmann N (1989) *Vertrauen. Ein Mechanismus zur Reduktion sozialer Komplexität*. Enke, Stuttgart
- Luhmann N (2000) Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives. In: Gambetta D (ed) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, pp. 94-107. Department of Sociology, Oxford
- Mayntz R (2009) *Über Governance. Institutionen und Prozesse politischer Regelung*. Campus, Frankfurt/Main
- Menkhaus K (2006/2007) Governance Without Government in Somalia. Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping. *International Security* 31, 74-106.

- Milliken J, Krause K (2002) State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons, and Strategies. *Development and Change* 33, 753-774.
- Newton K (1999) Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies. In: Norris P (ed) *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic government* pp. 169-187. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Olson M (1982) *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Ostrom E (1990) *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Ostrom E (2002) Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation. In: Ostrom E, Walker J (eds) *Trust and Reciprocity Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research*, pp. 19-79. Russell Sage Foundation, New York
- Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J (1994) *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI
- Oye KA (1986) *Cooperation under Anarchy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton
- Paller J (2014) Shame and Honor: The Everyday Practice of Accountability in African Democracies. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Washington DC, August 27-31, 2014.
- Piazza JA (2008) Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism? *International Studies Quarterly* 52, 469-488.
- Portes A (1998) Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24, 1-24.
- Prakash A, Potoski M (2006) Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001. *American Journal of Political Science* 50, 350-364.
- Prakash A, Potoski M (2007) Investing Up: FDI and the Cross-Country Diffusion of ISO 14001 Management Systems. *International Studies Quarterly* 51, 723-744.
- Putnam RD (1993) *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton
- Putnam RD (1995) Turning in, Turning out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28, 664-683.
- Putnam RD (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Simon and Schuster, New York
- Rhodes RAW (1997) *Understanding Governance. Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Open University Press, Buckingham and Philadelphia
- Rice TW, Steele B (2001) White Ethnic Diversity and Community Attachment in Small Iowa Towns. *Social Science Quarterly* 82 397-407.
- Rinke S, Contreras Saiz M, Hölck L (2011) *Regieren an der Peripherie. Amerika zwischen Kolonien und unabhängigen Republiken*. Heinz, Stuttgart
- Risse T (2010) *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY
- Risse T (2011a) Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview. In: Risse T (ed) *Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood*, pp. 1-35. Columbia University Press, New York

- Risse T (2011b) *Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood*. Columbia University Press, New York NY
- Rotberg RI (2003) *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.
- Rotberg RI (2004) *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ
- Rothstein B (2000) Trust, Social dilemmas and Collective Memories. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12, 477-501.
- Rothstein B, Stolle D (2008) The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust. *Comparative Politics* 40, 441-459.
- Schäferhoff M (2013) *Transnational Health Partnerships in Areas of Limited Statehood - How Much State is Enough?* Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaft. Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin
- Schäferhoff M (2014) External Actors and the Provision of Public Health Services in Somalia – Task Complexity Matters. *Governance* 27, 675-695.
- Scharpf FW (1997) *Games real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Westview Press, Boulder, CO
- Scharpf FW (1999) *Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic?* Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Schatzberg MG (2001) *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN
- Scott JC (2009) *The Art of Not Being Governed. An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press, New Haven CT
- Stolle D (2002) Trusting Strangers. The Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspective. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 31, 397-412.
- Stolle D, Rochon TR (1998) Are all Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type, and the Creation of Social Capital. *American Behavioral Scientist* 42, 47-65.
- Tajfel H (1945) Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior. *Social Science Information* 13, 65-93.
- Tanis M, Postmes T (2005) A Social Identity approach to Trust: Interpersonal Perception, Group Membership and Trusting Behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 35, 413-424.
- Thomas E (2014) *Sustainable Conflict Management by Multinational Mining Companies in Areas of Limited Statehood* Otto-Suhr-Institute of Political Science. Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin
- Tsai LL (2007) *Accountability without Democracy. Solidarity Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Turner JC (1987) *Rediscovering the Social Group. A Self-Categorization Theory*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Uslaner EM (1999) Democracy and Social Capital. In: Warren ME (ed) *Democracy and Trust*, pp. 121-150. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Uslaner EM (2002) *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Uslaner EM, Conley RS (2003) Civic Engagement and Particularized Trust: The Ties that Bind People to their Ethnic Communities. *American Politics Research* 31, 331-360.
- Weber M (1921/1980) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen

- Whiteley PF* (1999) The Origins of Social Capital. In: Deth Jv, Maraffi M, Newton K, Whiteley PF (eds) *Social Capital and European Democracy*, pp. 25-44. Routledge, London
- Yamagishi T, Yamagishi M* (1994) Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan. *Motivation and Emotion* 18, 129-166.

Previously published Working Papers from the SFB-Governance Working Paper Series

- Ickler, Christian* 2014: Challenges to Spatiotemporal Analysis of Sub-State War, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 66, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2014.
- Hönke, Jana/Börzel, Tanja* 2013: Restraint of Statehood and the Quality of Governance by Multinational Companies in Sub-Saharan Africa, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 65, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, Dezember 2013.
- Daxner, Michael/Schrade, Urs* 2013: Higher Education in Afghanistan. Governance at Stake, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 63, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2013.
- Krieger, Heike* 2013: A Turn to Non-State Actors: Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law in War-Torn Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 62, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2013.
- Kocak, Deniz* 2013: Security sector reconstruction in a post-conflict country: Lessons from Timor-Leste, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 61, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2013.
- Kode, Johannes* 2013: On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 60, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, September 2013.
- Börzel, Tanja A./Van Hüllen, Vera* 2014: External State-Building and Why Norms Matter - The European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus, No. 59, Berlin, Januar 2014
- Kötter, Matthias* 2013: Wie viel Recht steckt in Good Governance? Eine Betrachtung aus juristischer Perspektive, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series Nr. 58, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, September 2013
- Wrase, Michael* 2013: Wie wirkt Recht? – Überlegungen zur Rechtswirkungsforschung unter den Bedingungen konsolidierter und begrenzter Staatlichkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series Nr. 57, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Juni 2013
- van Hüllen, Vera/Börzel, Tanja A.* 2013: The EU's Governance Transfer. From External Promotion to Internal Protection?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 56, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2013.
- Chojnacki, Sven/Engels, Bettina* 2013: Material Determinism and Beyond: Spatial Categories in the Study of Violent Conflict, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 55, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2013.
- Elliesie, Hatem* 2014: Binnenpluralität des Islamischen Rechts - Diversität religiöser Normativität rechtsdogmatisch und -methodisch betrachtet, No. 54, Berlin, April 2014
- Jetschke, Anja* 2013: Governance Transfer by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A B2 Case Study Report, No. 50, Berlin, December 2013

- Lohaus, Mathis* 2013: Governance Transfer by the Organization of American States (OAS) - A B2 Case Study Report, No. 49, Berlin, Dezember 2013
- van der Vleuten, Anna/Hulse, Merran* 2013: Governance Transfer by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) - A B2 Case Study Report, No. 48, Berlin, Dezember 2013
- Hartmann, Christof* 2013: Governance Transfer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - A B2 Case Study Report, No. 47, Berlin, Dezember 2013
- Duina, Francesco* 2013: Governance Transfer in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - A B2 Case Study Report, No. 46, Berlin, Dezember 2013
- Bothe, Lukas/Grundmann, Kai* 2013: Legitimitätsressourcen im Übergang von antiker zu mittelalterlicher Staatlichkeit. Zwei Perspektiven auf postimperiale Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series Nr. 44, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Juni 2013
- Böhnke, Jan/Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph* 2013: Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in Northeast Afghanistan: Approaches and Methods. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 43, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2013.
- Börzel, Tanja A./van Hüllen, Vera/Lohaus, Mathis* 2013: Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations. Following a Global Script? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 42, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2013.
- Goikhman, Izabella/Herrmann, Barbara* 2012: The Governance Discourse in China. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 41, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2012.
- Willms, Jan* 2012: Justice through Armed Groups' Governance – An Oxymoron? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 40, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2012.
- Ickler, Christian/Wiesel, John* 2012: New Method, Different War? Evaluating Supervised Machine Learning by Coding Armed Conflict, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 39, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, September 2012.
- Livingston, Steven/Walter-Drop, Gregor* 2012: Information and Communication Technologies in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 38, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, September 2012.
- Schüren, Verena* 2012: Two TRIPs to Innovation. Pharmaceutical Innovation Systems in India and Brazil, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 37, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
- Sonderforschungsbereich 700*: Grundbegriffe der Governanceforschung, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 36, 2. revised edition, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.

- Eimer, Thomas R.* 2012: When Modern Science Meets Traditional Knowledge: A Multi-Level Process of Adaption and Resistance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 35, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
- Kötter, Matthias* 2012: Non-State Justice Institutions: A Matter of Fact and a Matter of Legislation, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 34, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
- Koehler, Jan* 2012: Social Order Within and Beyond the Shadows of Hierarchy. Governance-Patchworks in Afghanistan, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 33, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2012.
- Risse, Thomas* 2012: Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood. Actors, Modes, Institutions, and Resources, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 32, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2012.
- Hönke, Jana, with Thomas, Esther* 2012: Governance for Whom? – Capturing the Inclusiveness and Unintended Effects of Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 31, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2012.
- Contreras Saíz, Mónica/Hölck, Lasse/Rinke, Stefan* 2012: Appropriation and Resistance Mechanisms in (Post-) Colonial Constellations of Actors: The Latin American Frontiers. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 30, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2012.
- Börzel, Tanja* 2012: How Much Statehood Does it Take – and What For? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 29, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2012.
- Prigge, Judit* 2012: Friedenswächter. Institutionen der Streitbeilegung bei den Amhara in Äthiopien. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 28, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2012.
- Jacob, Daniel/Ladwig, Bernd/Oldenbourg, Andreas* 2012: Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited Statehood. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 27, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2012.
- Schmelzle, Cord* 2011: Evaluating Governance. Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 26, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2011.
- Börzel, Tanja A./Hönke, Jana* 2011: From Compliance to Practice. Mining Companies and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 25, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2011.
- Draude, Anke/Neuweiler, Sonja* 2010: Governance in der postkolonialen Kritik. Die Herausforderung lokaler Vielfalt jenseits der westlichen Welt. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 24, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, May 2010.
- Börzel, Tanja A.* 2010: Governance with/out Government. False Promises or Flawed Premises? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 23, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2010.

Wilke, Boris 2009: Governance und Gewalt. Eine Untersuchung zur Krise des Regierens in Pakistan am Fall Belutschistan, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 22, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2009.

Schneckener, Ulrich 2009: Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 21, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2009.

Mueller Debus, Anna Kristin/Thauer, Christina R./Börzel, Tanja A. 2009: Governing HIV/AIDS in South Africa. The Role of Firms, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 20, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2009.

Nagl, Dominik/Stange, Marion 2009: Staatlichkeit und Governance im Zeitalter der europäischen Expansion. Verwaltungsstrukturen und Herrschaftsinstitutionen in den britischen und französischen Kolonialimperien, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 19, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 2009.

Börzel, Tanja A./Pamuk, Yasemin/Stahn, Andreas 2008: The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in its Near Abroad. One Size Fits All?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 18, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, December 2008.

Koehler, Jan 2008: Auf der Suche nach Sicherheit. Die internationale Intervention in Nordost-Afghanistan, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 17, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2008.

Beisheim, Marianne/Fuhr, Harald (ed.) 2008: Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher Akteure. Entstehungsbedingungen, Effektivität und Legitimität sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 16, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, August 2008.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne 2008: Transitional Justice als Weg zu Frieden und Sicherheit. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 15, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, July 2008.

Beisheim, Marianne/Dingwerth, Klaus 2008: Procedural Legitimacy and Private Transnational Governance. Are the Good Ones Doing Better?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 14, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2008.

Benecke, Gudrun/Branović, Željko/Draude, Anke 2008: Governance und Raum. Theoretisch-konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur Verräumlichung von Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 13, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, May 2008.

Schuppert, Gunnar Folke 2008: Von Ko-Produktion von Staatlichkeit zur Co-Performance of Governance. Eine Skizze zu kooperativen Governance-Strukturen von den Condottieri der Renaissance bis zu Public Private Partnerships, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 12, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2008.

These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered in printed versions via e-mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.

The Authors



Professor Tanja A. Börzel holds the Chair for European Integration at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin. She co-directs the Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe.” She mainly focuses on questions of governance and institutional change

as a result of Europeanization, as well as on the diffusion of European ideas and policies within and outside of the EU. The latter is part of her current research, which addresses compliance with EU norms and rules in member states, accession countries, and neighboring countries. Within the SFB 700, Tanja Börzel directs the project B2 on “Governance Export by Regional Organizations.”

Contact: tanja.boerzel@fu-berlin.de



Thomas Risse is professor of International Politics and director of the Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy at the Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science at the Freie Universität Berlin. He is co-director of the Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe” as

well as the coordinator of the Research Center (SFB) 700 “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood.” In the SFB he also directs the project A1 on “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Contributions to Theory Building” and co-directs the project T3 on “Policy Implications of Governance Research for German Foreign Policy” in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office.

Contact: thomas.risse@fu-berlin.de

Research Framework

Governance has become a central theme in social science research. The Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of limited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of colonies. How and under what conditions can governance deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the University of Potsdam, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA).

Partner Organizations

Host University:

Freie Universität Berlin



University of Potsdam



German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)



Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)



German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

