Incomplete financial markets and jumps in asset prices

For incomplete financial markets, jumps in both prices and consumption can be unavoidable. We consider pure-exchange economies with infinite horizon, discrete time, uncertainty with a continuum of possible shocks at every date. The evolution of shocks follows a Markov process, and fundamentals depend continuously on shocks. It is shown that: (1) equilibria exist; (2) for effectively complete financial markets, asset prices depend continuously on shocks; and (3) for incomplete financial markets, there is an open set of economies U such that for every equilibrium of every economy in U, asset prices at every date depend discontinuously on the shock at that date

Do taxspots matter?: A study of optimal tax uncertainty

Should the government run an uncertain fiscal policy to finance its liabilities? We call the resulting uncertainty taxspots, and study conditions that make taxspots optimal, and recurrent, in standard Ramsey problems. We show that prudence and market incompleteness play a role in sustaining taxspots, and that equal-treatment randomizations can be decentralized via taxspots even in the absence of financial markets

The taxation of trade in assets

When the asset market is incomplete, there typically exist taxes on trades in assets that are Pareto improving. This fiscal policy is anonymous, it is fully and correctly anticipated by traders, and it results in ex post Pareto optimal allocations; as such, it improves over previously proposed constrained interventions

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We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences