The influence of holes in the mechanical properties of EWT solar cells

EWT back contact solar cells are manufactured from very thin silicon wafers. These wafers are drilled by means of a laser process creating a matrix of tiny holes with a density of approximately 125 holes per square centimeter. Their influence in the stiffness and mechanical strength has been studied. To this end, both wafers with and without holes have been tested with the ring on ring test. Numerical simulations of the tests have been carried out through the Finite Element Method taking into account the non-linearities present in the tests. It's shown that one may use coarse meshes without holes to simulate the test and after that sub models are used for the estimation of the stress concentration around the holes

End-User Composition of Graphical User Interfaces for PalCom Systems

AbstractIn ubiquitous computing, end-user composition allows users to combine multiple single-purpose devices into new, interesting constellations. In PalCom – a ubiquitous middleware – this is achieved without the need to write program code. In this paper we present a solution that in the same way allows users to create Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) for such systems without coding. The approach is to focus on presenting functionality in a GUI rather than attaching functionality to manually added components. We see this as an inverted way of working with GUI development. The solution was realized in the form of a graphical editor for a PalCom specific User Interface Description Language. The tool produces platform independent GUI descriptions that can be interpreted on any platform. When compared to another common tool, the presented editor exhibited roughly 10x shorter development times. The learning time for new users was also evaluated with positive outcome, and a scalability evaluation showed that the solution can be used to create professional grade GUIs

Distinguishing the opponents in the prisoner dilemma in well-mixed populations

Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary process in which strategies that provide reproductive success are imitated and players replace one of their worst interactions by the new one. We set individuals in a well-mixed population so that network reciprocity effect is excluded and we analyze both synchronous and asynchronous updates. As a consequence of the replacement rule, we show that mutual cooperation is never destroyed and the initial fraction of mutual cooperation is a lower bound for the level of cooperation. We show by simulation and mean-field analysis that for synchronous update cooperation dominates while for asynchronous update only cooperations associated to the initial mutual cooperations are maintained. As a side effect of the replacement rule, an "implicit punishment" mechanism comes up in a way that exploitations are always neutralized providing evolutionary stability for cooperation

Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive $w$ players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative $w$ the opposite holds. Setting $w$ equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e. setting $w$ positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of $w$ facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of $w$ effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

On the micro mechanics of one-dimensional normal compression

Discrete-element modelling has been used to investigate the micro mechanics of one-dimensional compression. One-dimensional compression is modelled in three dimensions using an oedometer and a large number of particles, and without the use of agglomerates. The fracture of a particle is governed by the octahedral shear stress within the particle due to the multiple contacts and a Weibull distribution of strengths. Different fracture mechanisms are considered, and the influence of the distribution of fragments produced for each fracture on the global particle size distribution and the slope of the normal compression line is investigated. Using the discrete-element method, compression is related to the evolution of a fractal distribution of particles. The compression index is found to be solely a function of the strengths of the particles as a function of size

Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation

We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players $\mu$ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In addition, players characterized with the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant opponents of the same kind with probability $p$, thus introducing shortcut connections among the distinguished. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to sustain cooperation throughout the whole range of the temptation to defect. Remarkably, we observe that as the temptation to defect increases the optimal $\mu$ decreases, and moreover, only minute values of $p$ warrant the best promotion of cooperation. Our study thus indicates that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a defection prone environment.Comment: 6 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

On Phase Transitions to Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Game theory formalizes certain interactions between physical particles or between living beings in biology, sociology, and economics, and quantifies the outcomes by payoffs. The prisoner's dilemma (PD) describes situations in which it is profitable if everybody cooperates rather than defects (free-rides or cheats), but as cooperation is risky and defection is tempting, the expected outcome is defection. Nevertheless, some biological and social mechanisms can support cooperation by effectively transforming the payoffs. Here, we study the related phase transitions, which can be of first order (discontinous) or of second order (continuous), implying a variety of different routes to cooperation. After classifying the transitions into cases of equilibrium displacement, equilibrium selection, and equilibrium creation, we show that a transition to cooperation may take place even if the stationary states and the eigenvalues of the replicator equation for the PD stay unchanged. Our example is based on adaptive group pressure, which makes the payoffs dependent on the endogeneous dynamics in the population. The resulting bistability can invert the expected outcome in favor of cooperation.Comment: For related work see http://www.soms.ethz.ch

Chemical fracture and distribution of extreme values

When a corrosive solution reaches the limits of a solid sample, a chemical fracture occurs. An analytical theory for the probability of this chemical fracture is proposed and confirmed by extensive numerical experiments on a two dimensional model. This theory follows from the general probability theory of extreme events given by Gumbel. The analytic law differs from the Weibull law commonly used to describe mechanical failures for brittle materials. However a three parameters fit with the Weibull law gives good results, confirming the empirical value of this kind of analysis.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures, to appear in Europhysics Letter

Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Aging is always present, tailoring our interactions with others and postulating a finite lifespan during which we are able to exercise them. We consider the prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice, and examine how quenched age distributions and different aging protocols influence the evolution of cooperation when taking the life experience and knowledge accumulation into account as time passes. In agreement with previous studies, we find that a quenched assignment of age to players, introducing heterogeneity to the game, substantially promotes cooperative behavior. Introduction of aging and subsequent death as a coevolutionary process may act detrimental on cooperation but enhances it efficiently if the offspring of individuals that have successfully passed their strategy is considered newborn. We study resulting age distributions of players, and show that the heterogeneity is vital yet insufficient for explaining the observed differences in cooperator abundance on the spatial grid. The unexpected increment of cooperation levels can be explained by a dynamical effect that has a highly selective impact on the propagation of cooperator and defector states.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review