Brookes equation: The basis for a qualitative characterization of information behaviours

Brookes equation, which has hitherto been regarded as a kind of non-mathematical shorthand description of information use, is extended so as to show the qualitative pattern of information access. Information inputs are represented by a simple power law, and changes in knowledge structure by possible changes to a simple mental map. The resulting pattern shows seven forms of information input and three forms of change in knowledge structure, giving 21 categories overall. These have the potential for use as an explanatory tool and taxonomy for studying and summarizing information behaviour, and offer the possibility of being developed into more sophisticated and quantitative treatments

Bayes and health care research.

Bayes’ rule shows how one might rationally change one’s beliefs in the light of evidence. It is the foundation of a statistical method called Bayesianism. In health care research, Bayesianism has its advocates but the dominant statistical method is frequentism. There are at least two important philosophical differences between these methods. First, Bayesianism takes a subjectivist view of probability (i.e. that probability scores are statements of subjective belief, not objective fact) whilst frequentism takes an objectivist view. Second, Bayesianism is explicitly inductive (i.e. it shows how we may induce views about the world based on partial data from it) whereas frequentism is at least compatible with non-inductive views of scientific method, particularly the critical realism of Popper. Popper and others detail significant problems with induction. Frequentism’s apparent ability to avoid these, plus its ability to give a seemingly more scientific and objective take on probability, lies behind its philosophical appeal to health care researchers. However, there are also significant problems with frequentism, particularly its inability to assign probability scores to single events. Popper thus proposed an alternative objectivist view of probability, called propensity theory, which he allies to a theory of corroboration; but this too has significant problems, in particular, it may not successfully avoid induction. If this is so then Bayesianism might be philosophically the strongest of the statistical approaches. The article sets out a number of its philosophical and methodological attractions. Finally, it outlines a way in which critical realism and Bayesianism might work together. </p

Scapegoat: John Dewey and the character education crisis

Many conservatives, including some conservative scholars, blame the ideas and influence of John Dewey for what has frequently been called a crisis of character, a catastrophic decline in moral behavior in the schools and society of North America. Dewey’s critics claim that he is responsible for the undermining of the kinds of instruction that could lead to the development of character and the strengthening of the will, and that his educational philosophy and example exert a ubiquitous and disastrous influence on students’ conceptions of moral behavior. This article sets forth the views of some of these critics and juxtaposes them with what Dewey actually believed and wrote regarding character education. The juxtaposition demonstrates that Dewey neither called for nor exemplified the kinds of character-eroding pedagogy his critics accuse him of championing; in addition, this paper highlights the ways in which Dewey argued consistently and convincingly that the pedagogical approaches advocated by his critics are the real culprits in the decline of character and moral education

Exploring the cultural dimensions of environmental victimization

It has become increasingly clear in recent years that our understanding of ‘victimisation’ is informed by a whole range of societal and political factors which extend well beyond whatever particular form of words appears in any given directive, code or legislative instrument concerning crime, crime victims or criminal justice systems. In this paper, I will seek for the first time to apply recent developments in our understanding of so-called 'cultural victimology' to the issue of environmental harm and its impact on human and non-human animals. McCGarry and Waklate (2015) characterise cultural victimology as broadly comprising of two key aspects. These are the wider sharing and reflection of individual and collective victimisation experiences on the one hand and, on the other, the mapping of those experiences through the criminal justice process. In this discussion I will examine how environmental victimisation is viewed by and presented to society at large and will argue that such representations often fail, as a form of testimony, to adequately convey the traumas involved. Nor is this achieved through the application of present models of criminal, civil or administrative justice regimes in many jurisdictions. This lack of cultural acknowledgement of the harms vested on environmental victims, it is argued, afford us a clearer understand of the continued reticence amongst lawmakers, politicians and legal practitioners to adequately address the impacts of such victimisation through effective justice or regulatory mechanisms. This is unfortunate given that the often collective nature of environmental victimisation makes this particularly suited to a more cultural analysis and understanding. It is argued that various forms of environmental mediation processes might hold the key to this cultural reticence to accept environmental harm as a 'real' and pressing problem as compared to other criminal and civil justice concerns