The Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine After \u3ci\u3eOhio v. Amex\u3c/i\u3e and the \u3ci\u3eApple v. Pepper\u3c/i\u3e Decision That Should Have Been

If the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper (Apple) had hewed to the precedent established by Ohio v. American Express Co. (Amex), it would have begun its antitrust inquiry with the observation that the relevant market for the provision of app services is an integrated one, in which the overall effect of Apple’s conduct on both app users and app developers must be evaluated. A crucial implication of the Amex decision is that participants on both sides of a transactional platform are part of the same relevant market, and the terms of their relationship to the platform are inextricably intertwined. We believe the Amex Court was correct in deciding that effects falling on the “other” side of a tightly integrated, two-sided market from challenged conduct must be addressed by the plaintiff in making its prima facie case. But that outcome entails a market definition that places both sides of such a market in the same relevant market for antitrust analysis. As a result, the Amex Court’s holding should also have required a finding in Apple that an app user on one side of the platform who transacts with an app developer on the other side of the market, in a transaction made possible and directly intermediated by Apple’s App Store, is similarly deemed to be in the same market for standing purposes. Under the proper conception of the market, it is difficult to maintain that either side does not have standing to sue the platform for alleged anticompetitive conduct relating to the terms of its overall pricing structure, whether the specific terms at issue apply directly to that side or not. Both end users and app developers are “direct” purchasers from Apple—of superficially different products, but in a single, inextricably interrelated market. Both groups should have standing and should be able to establish antitrust injury—harm to competition—by showing harm to either group, as long as they can establish the requisite interrelatedness of the two sides of the market. As we discuss, such a result would have been consistent with the way antitrust doctrine has long evolved—in both its substantive and its procedural aspects—to reflect new economic knowledge, particularly with respect to such “nonstandard” business models. I. Introduction ... A. Ohio v. American Express Co. and Apple Inc. v. Pepper: A Failure of Antitrust Doctrinal Evolution II. The Nexus Between Procedure and Substance in Antitrust Law ... A. Quick Look and the Evolution of the Standards of Antitrust Review ... B. The Interplay of Procedure and Substance in the Doctrines of Antitrust Standing ... 1. Antitrust Injury and Antitrust Standing ... 2. The Indirect Purchaser Doctrine III. Nonstandard Contracts and Antitrust Doctrine: Accommodating the Economics of Two-Sided Markets in Antitrust Procedure ... A. The Basic Economics of Two-Sided Markets ... B. Amex, Market Definition, and Effects Analysis ... 1. Implications for the Consideration of “Out-of-Market” Effects ... C. The Relationship Between Market Definition and Standing IV. The Court’s Failure to Incorporate the Economics of Two-Sided Markets in Its Apple Inc. v. Pepper Decision ... A. Campos v. Ticketmaster and the Error of Doctrinal Formalism ... 1. The Consequences of the Formalistic Application of Illinois Brick to New Business Models V. What the Proper Procedural Analysis in Apple Inc. v. Pepper Would Have Looked Like ... A. Procedure Does Not Determine Substantive Outcomes VI. Conclusio

Fuels for Future Electric Power

OVER THE NEXT FORTY YEARS, THE U.S. WILL EXPERIENCE PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF DWINDLING SUPPLIES OF FOSSIL FUELS AND AN INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL. SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE, SUCH AS MORE STRINGENT CONSERVATION MEASURES OR ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY. HOWEVER, NO SINGLE ALTERNATIVE WILL BE SUFFICIENT. A STUDY WAS CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE THE MOST EFFICIENT ALLOCATION POSSIBLE OF RESOURCES. THE ANALYSIS WAS CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF ASSUMED HAPPENINGS IN THE FUTURE RATHER THAN BY PROJECTING HISTORIC TRENDS INTO THE FUTURE. FOR EXAMPLE, AS ONE SOURCE OF ENERGY SUCH AS OIL BECOMES MORE SCARCE, THE COST WILL GO UP, INDUCING A CHANGE TO ANOTHER SOURCE. SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL AND HYDROGEN FROM ELECTROLYSIS WILL BECOME MORE PRACTICAL BY THE END OF THE CENTURY. COAL AND OIL WILL BE USED. HEAVILY THIS CENTURY WITH NUCLEAR FUEL BECOMING MORE EFFICIENT EARLY IN THE NEXT CENTURY. CHART

Gleason-Type Derivations of the Quantum Probability Rule for Generalized Measurements

We prove a Gleason-type theorem for the quantum probability rule using frame functions defined on positive-operator-valued measures (POVMs), as opposed to the restricted class of orthogonal projection-valued measures used in the original theorem. The advantage of this method is that it works for two-dimensional quantum systems (qubits) and even for vector spaces over rational fields--settings where the standard theorem fails. Furthermore, unlike the method necessary for proving the original result, the present one is rather elementary. In the case of a qubit, we investigate similar results for frame functions defined upon various restricted classes of POVMs. For the so-called trine measurements, the standard quantum probability rule is again recovered.Comment: 10 pages RevTeX, no figure

The Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine After \u3ci\u3eOhio v. Amex\u3c/i\u3e and the \u3ci\u3eApple v. Pepper\u3c/i\u3e Decision That Should Have Been

If the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper (Apple) had hewed to the precedent established by Ohio v. American Express Co. (Amex), it would have begun its antitrust inquiry with the observation that the relevant market for the provision of app services is an integrated one, in which the overall effect of Apple’s conduct on both app users and app developers must be evaluated. A crucial implication of the Amex decision is that participants on both sides of a transactional platform are part of the same relevant market, and the terms of their relationship to the platform are inextricably intertwined. We believe the Amex Court was correct in deciding that effects falling on the “other” side of a tightly integrated, two-sided market from challenged conduct must be addressed by the plaintiff in making its prima facie case. But that outcome entails a market definition that places both sides of such a market in the same relevant market for antitrust analysis. As a result, the Amex Court’s holding should also have required a finding in Apple that an app user on one side of the platform who transacts with an app developer on the other side of the market, in a transaction made possible and directly intermediated by Apple’s App Store, is similarly deemed to be in the same market for standing purposes. Under the proper conception of the market, it is difficult to maintain that either side does not have standing to sue the platform for alleged anticompetitive conduct relating to the terms of its overall pricing structure, whether the specific terms at issue apply directly to that side or not. Both end users and app developers are “direct” purchasers from Apple—of superficially different products, but in a single, inextricably interrelated market. Both groups should have standing and should be able to establish antitrust injury—harm to competition—by showing harm to either group, as long as they can establish the requisite interrelatedness of the two sides of the market. As we discuss, such a result would have been consistent with the way antitrust doctrine has long evolved—in both its substantive and its procedural aspects—to reflect new economic knowledge, particularly with respect to such “nonstandard” business models. I. Introduction ... A. Ohio v. American Express Co. and Apple Inc. v. Pepper: A Failure of Antitrust Doctrinal Evolution II. The Nexus Between Procedure and Substance in Antitrust Law ... A. Quick Look and the Evolution of the Standards of Antitrust Review ... B. The Interplay of Procedure and Substance in the Doctrines of Antitrust Standing ... 1. Antitrust Injury and Antitrust Standing ... 2. The Indirect Purchaser Doctrine III. Nonstandard Contracts and Antitrust Doctrine: Accommodating the Economics of Two-Sided Markets in Antitrust Procedure ... A. The Basic Economics of Two-Sided Markets ... B. Amex, Market Definition, and Effects Analysis ... 1. Implications for the Consideration of “Out-of-Market” Effects ... C. The Relationship Between Market Definition and Standing IV. The Court’s Failure to Incorporate the Economics of Two-Sided Markets in Its Apple Inc. v. Pepper Decision ... A. Campos v. Ticketmaster and the Error of Doctrinal Formalism ... 1. The Consequences of the Formalistic Application of Illinois Brick to New Business Models V. What the Proper Procedural Analysis in Apple Inc. v. Pepper Would Have Looked Like ... A. Procedure Does Not Determine Substantive Outcomes VI. Conclusio

Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

Several high-profile academic articles and reports claim to have identified important gaps in current merger enforcement rules, particularly with respect to tech and pharma acquisitions involving nascent and potential competitors—so-called “killer acquisitions” and “kill zones.” As a result of these perceived deficiencies, scholars and enforcers have called for tougher rules, including the introduction of lower merger filing thresholds and substantive changes, such as the inversion of the burden of proof when authorities review mergers and acquisitions in the digital platform industry. Meanwhile, and seemingly in response to the increased political and advocacy pressures around the issue, U.S. antitrust enforcers have recently undertaken several enforcement actions directly targeting such acquisitions. As this paper discusses, however, these proposals tend to overlook the important tradeoffs that would ensue from attempts to decrease the number of false positives under existing merger rules and thresholds. While merger enforcement ought to be mindful of these possible theories of harm, the theories and evidence are not nearly as robust as many proponents suggest. Most importantly, there is insufficient basis to conclude that the costs of permitting the behavior they identify is greater than the costs would be of increasing enforcement to prohibit it

Birds and people in Europe

At a regional scale, species richness and human population size are frequently positively correlated across space. Such patterns may arise because both species richness and human density increase with energy availability. If the species-energy relationship is generated through the 'more individuals' hypothesis, then the prediction is that areas with high human densities will also support greater numbers of individuals from other taxa. We use the unique data available for the breeding birds in Europe to test this prediction. Overall regional densities of bird species are higher in areas with more people; species of conservation concern exhibit the same pattern. Avian density also increases faster with human density than does avian biomass, indicating that areas with a higher human density have a higher proportion of small-bodied individuals. The analyses also underline the low numbers of breeding birds in Europe relative to humans, with a median of just three individual birds per person, and 4 g of bird for every kilogram of human

Behavioral Economics Goes to Court: The Fundamental Flaws in the Behavioral Law & Economics Arguments Against No-Surcharge Laws

During the past decade, academics – predominantly scholars of behavioral law and economics – have increasingly turned to the claimed insights of behavioral economics in order to craft novel policy proposals in many fields, most significantly consumer credit regulation. Over the same period, these ideas have also gained traction with policymakers, resulting in a variety of legislative efforts, such as the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Most recently, the efforts of behavioral law and economics scholars have been directed toward challenging a number of state laws that regulate retailers’ use of surcharge fees for consumer credit card payments. In part as a result of these efforts, the issue has come before multiple courts with varying outcomes. In this article, we examine the merits of that effort. Claims about the realworld application of behavioral economic theories should not be uncritically accepted, and this is especially true when such claims are advanced to challenge a state’s commercial regulation on constitutional grounds. And courts should be particularly careful before relying on such claims where the available evidence fails to support them

A tandem duplication within the fibrillin 1 gene is associated with the mouse tight skin mutation.

Mice carrying the Tight skin (Tsk) mutation have thickened skin and visceral fibrosis resulting from an accumulation of extracellular matrix molecules. These and other connective tissue abnormalities have made Tskl + mice models for scleroderma, hereditary emphysema, and myocardial hypertrophy. Previously we localized Tsk to mouse chromosome 2 in a region syntenic with human chromosome 15. The microfibrillar glycoprotein gene, fibrillin 1 (FBN1), on human chromosome 15q, provided a candidate for the Tsk mutation. We now demonstrate that the Tsk chromosome harbors a 30- to 40-kb genomic duplication within the Fbn1 gene that results in a larger than normal in-frame Fbn1 transcript. These findings provide hypotheses to explain some of the phenotypic characteristics of Tskl + mice and the lethality of Tsk/Tsk embryos

Collagen Content in Skin and Internal Organs of the Tight Skin Mouse: An Animal Model of Scleroderma.

The Tight Skin mouse is a genetically induced animal model of tissue fibrosis caused by a large in-frame mutation in the gene encoding fibrillin-1 (Fbn-1). We examined the influence of gender on the collagen content of tissues in C57BL/6J wild type (+/+) and mutant Tight Skin (Tsk/+) mice employing hydroxyproline assays. Tissue sections were stained with Masson\u27s trichrome to identify collagen in situ. Adult Tsk/+ mice skin contains ~15% more collagen, on average, than skin from +/+ mice of the same gender. The heart of Tsk/+ males had significantly more collagen than that of +/+ males. No significant gender differences were found in lungs and kidney collagen content. Overall, the collagen content of Tsk/+ males and +/+ males was higher than that of their Tsk/+ and +/+ female counterparts, respectively. Our data confirm increased deposition of collagen in skin and hearts of Tsk/+ mice; however, the effects of the Tsk mutation on collagen content are both tissue specific and gender specific. These results indicate that comparative studies of collagen content between normal and Tsk/+ mice skin and internal organs must take into account gender differences caused by expression of the androgen receptor