Quarkonium Suppression

I discuss quarkonium suppression in equilibriated strongly interacting matter. After a brief review of basic features of quarkonium production I discuss the application of recent lattice data on the heavy quark potential to the problem of quarkonium dissociation as well as the problem of direct lattice determination of quarkonium properties in finite temperature lattice QCD.Comment: Invited plenary talk presented on 4th International Conference on Physics and Astrophysics of Quark Gluon Plasma (ICPAQGP-2001), November 26-30, 2001, Jaipur; 12 pp, LaTeX, uses pramana.st

A voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication and income heterogeneity

One-way communication has been found to increase contributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirm the robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity. Our analysis indicates that the communicator directs the members of his group to the highest payoff that they may attain

Leading by words: a voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication

We use experimental methods to study the power of leading by words. The context is a voluntary contribution mechanism with one-way communication. One group member can send a free-form text message to his fellow players. Contrary to the commonly accepted wisdom that the cooperation-enhancing effect of communication requires the mutual exchange of promises, we find that the introduction of one-way communication increases contributions substantially and decreases their variation. When communication is oneshot, its effect on contribution levels persists over time. Moreover, one-way communication is effective even in the absence of strategic concerns

Providing revenue-generating projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis

This paper considers a procedurally fair provision mechanism that allows members of a small group to determine, through their bids, which project to implement. Previous experiments with (only) costly projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests whether the mechanism remains conducive to efficiency when revenue-generating, but less efficient, projects are made available. We find that this is not the case. Additionally, we detect no significant difference in bid levels depending on whether mixed valuations are present or absent, and on whether the others' valuations are known or unknown. We interpret these results as evidence that the availability of revenue-generating projects engenders a biased perception of the efficient costly project

Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and experimental functionality

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive