Collective narcissism and intergroup hostility: the dark side of 'in group love'.

This paper addresses the relationship between ‘in-group love’ and ‘out-group hate’ and integrates findings of psychology of intergroup relations with findings regarding psychological outcomes of narcissism. It reviews current research on intergroup consequences of collective narcissism – an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief in exaggerated greatness of an in-group - which indicates that the differentiation between narcissistic and genuine positive group regard uncovers the potential of genuine ‘in-group’ love to motivate positive out-group attitudes and intergroup tolerance. It also sheds new light on these aspects of positive group attachment that inspire intergroup hostility. Narcissistic idealization of an in-group is contingent on external validation and underlain by internal doubts. Collective narcissists are never fully satisfied with external acknowledgment of the in-group and they are sensitive to anything that may undermine the in-group’s exaggerated image. Collective narcissism is reliably related to defensive and retaliatory intergroup hostility

Negative evaluation of the group increases collective narcissism and intergroup hostility under intergroup threat.

Results of 3 experimental studies in two countries indicate that collective narcissism can be experimentally manipulated. Collective narcissism is an emotional investment in a belief in exaggerated greatness of an in-group (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009). It increases when people face negative evaluation of the in-group (e.g. national group or university peers). This effect is independent of initial identification with the group. Momentary increase in collective narcissism results in retaliatory out-group negativity under intergroup threat. Thus, the present results replicate and extend the previous findings that individual levels of narcissistic identification with an in-group increase sensitivity to and hostile responses to intergroup threat. Unlike collective self-esteem that does not change in response to in-group evaluations, collective narcissism is unstable and defensive positive regard for the in-group. Study 2 indicates that it increases because the negative evaluation of the in-group is perceived as offence. Study 2 also shows that pairing negative evaluation with positive assessment of the in-group on a different dimension prevents the increase in collective narcissism. Therefore, it reduces a chance of escalation of intergroup hostility

Collective narcissism and anti-semitism in Poland

Two survey studies examined the relationship between collective narcissism - an identification with an in-group linked to an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about its unparalleled greatness (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) - and anti-Semitism in Poland. The results indicate that this relationship is simultaneously mediated by (a) a belief that the in-group is constantly threatened by hostile intentions of other groups (the Polish siege beliefs; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a, b) and (b) a belief that the Jewish out-group is particularly threatening because its members secretly aim to dominate the world (the conspiracy stereotype of Jews; Bergmann, 2008; Kofta & Sędek, 2005). The results confirm the earlier findings that collective narcissism is linked to increased sensitivity to intergroup threat which drives its association with intergroup hostility. The results also support earlier suggestions that Polish anti-Semitism is grounded in threatened national pride

Understanding responses to political conflict: interactive effects of the need for closure and salient conflict schemas.

Two studies examined the relationship between the need for cognitive closure and preferences for conflict-resolution strategies in two different samples of elite political actors. While research suggests that the high need for closure should be associated with competitiveness, we argue that this relationship should be strongest among political actors with a hostile “conflict schema,” or representation of what a conflict is and how it should be dealt with. We provide evidence for this hypothesis using archival survey data on American foreign policy officials’ attitudes toward international conflict at the height of the Cold War (Study 1) and our own data on the relationship between the need for closure and conflict-strategy preferences among samples of activists from two political parties in Poland – a centrist party with a reputation for cooperativeness and an extremist party with a reputation for confrontation (Study 2). The broader implications of these findings are discussed

Correspondence between images of terrorists and preferred approaches to counterterrorism: the moderating role of ideological orientations.

Two studies examined the moderating effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on the relationship between terrorist images (soldiers vs. criminals) and preference for counterterrorist actions (military aggression vs. criminal prosecution). Study 1 indicated that the perception of Al-Qaeda terrorists as soldiers was related to preference for military counterterrorism, especially among people high in social dominance orientation. The relationship between the perception of Al-Qaeda terrorists as criminals and preference for the criminal prosecution of terrorists was strengthened among those high in right wing authoritarianism. Study 2 showed that when terrorists were framed as soldiers, social dominance orientation was related to support for military counterterrorism. When terrorists were framed as criminals, only people who endorsed high levels of right wing authoritarianism supported criminal prosecution of terrorists. Social dominance orientation was related to opposition towards military counterterrorism when terrorists were not perceived as soldiers or framed as criminals. It was also related to opposition towards criminal prosecution of terrorists when terrorists were framed as criminals. The findings suggest that different terrorist images are related to preference for counterterrorism that corresponds with the content of the images and individuals’ chronic ideological orientations

Need for cognitive closure and conservative political beliefs: differential mediation by personal worldviews.

The paper investigates the relationships between motivated social cognition (need for cognitive closure), personal worldviews (traditional, modern or postmodern), and conservative political beliefs. The relationships were analyzed in a sample of 189 Polish adults. High need for closure was found to be associated with support for both traditional and modern worldviews. Although different in content (i.e. endorsing different values and assumptions about the methods and limits of cognition), the worldviews share similar formal characteristics: both assume the absolute nature of values and the existence of definite truths. However, acceptance of the traditional worldview was related political conservatism (i.e., support for nationalist and isolationist opinions and a stronger role for traditional, religious values in public life), whereas acceptance of the modern worldview was associated with a rejection of conservative political beliefs. Moreover, personal worldviews mediated the relationship between need for closure and political beliefs: support for social conservatism was mediated by acceptance of the traditional worldview, whereas acceptance of the modern worldview predicted rejection of conservative values

Collective narcissism moderates the effect of in-group image threat on intergroup hostility

WOS:000319485100005 (Nº de Acesso Web of Science)Results of 4 experiments demonstrated that under in-group image threat collective narcissism predicts retaliatory intergroup hostility. Under in-group criticism (vs. praise) collective narcissists expressed intention to harm the offending out-group but not other, nonoffending out-groups. This effect was specific to collective narcissism and was replicated in studies that accounted for the overlap between collective narcissism and individual narcissism, in-group positivity (in-group identification, blind and constructive patriotism), social dominance orientation, and right wing authoritarianism. The link between collective narcissism and retaliatory intergroup hostility under in-group image threat was found in the context of national identity and international relations and in the context of a social identity defined by university affiliation. Study 4 demonstrated that the relationship between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility was mediated by the perception of in-group criticism as personally threatening. The results advance our understanding of the mechanism driving the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. They indicate that threatened egotism theory can be extended into the intergroup domain

The paradox of in-group love: differentiating collective narcissism advances understanding of the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes

The article looks at the relation between positive in-group regard (“in-group love”) and out-group negativity (“out-group hate”), a subject of ongoing controversy. Five studies performed in different cultural and national contexts, using different samples (including an adult representative sample) and different inter-group contexts examined the relationship between narcissistic versus genuine positive group regard and out-group negativity. Results reveal that collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and positive group regard have opposite effects on out-group hostility. Moreover, they function as mutual suppressors. Controlling for their shared variance strengthens the positive relationship between collective narcissism and out-group negativity and reveals the significant negative association between out-group hostility and genuine positive group regard operationalized as high collective self-esteem (Study 1), positive in-group identification (Studies 2, 3 and 5) or constructive patriotism (Study 4). These results corroborate earlier findings differentiating between constructive and destructive forms of in-group favoritism. They also parallel at the inter-group level findings indicating that mature and stable, personal self-esteem and individual narcissism differentially predict interpersonal aggressiveness

Political conservatism, need for cognitive closure and intergroup hostility

Two studies examined the interaction of political conservatism and the need for cognitive closure in predicting aggressiveness in intergroup conflict and hostility toward out-groups. In the first study, Polish participants indicated their preference for coercive conflict strategies in the context of a real-life intergroup conflict. Only among participants who identify themselves as conservative, need for cognitive closure was positively and significantly related to preference for aggressive actions against the out-group. In the second study, the predicted interaction was investigated in the context of the terrorist threat in Poland. The findings indicated that high in need for closure conservatives showed greater hostility against Arabs and Muslims only when they believed that Poland was under threat of terrorist attacks inspired by Islamist fundamentalism

The relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against Iraq: moderating effects of national attachment.

A variety of studies suggest that a high need for closure—that is,a desire for knowledge that is clear, stable, and unambiguous as opposed to confusing or uncertain—may be associated with greater hostility toward relevant outgroups. Using international attitudes as the context, the authors examine the hypothesis that the relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against Iraq may be moderated by identification with the national ingroup. Specifically, it is expected that this relationship will be moderated by nationalism (i.e., an aggressive form of identification based on a desire for national dominance)but not patriotism (i.e., a more neutral love of one’s country). The data provided a clear pattern of support for this hypothesis and additional analyses indicated that a high need for closure reduced variability about the use of force among the highly nationalistic but not the highly patrioti