Hinge trust*

Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive, as the current debate highlights. This paper addresses the foundational question of what trust entails, rather than the conditions under which one is trustworthy. Specifically, we examine Wittgenstein's On Certainty to propose a characterization of trust in its most fundamental form, termed “hinge trust.” Hinge trust is a stance preceding the ability to form justified beliefs, directed not only at people but also at perceptual faculties, objects, and the environment. It underpins our epistemic practices, particularly in acquiring epistemic hinges essential for reasoning and inquiry. Building on this, we advocate a “trust-first” framework, analogous to the “knowledge-first” approach in epistemology. Trust is conceptualized as a primitive stance, distinct from “reliance +” a reactive attitude, or goodwill or commitment. These elements, while significant, are not constitutive of trust. Additionally, we explore the interplay between trust and distrust, arguing that trust is both conceptually and axiologically prior to distrust. Finally, we address the role of trust in testimony and hinge epistemology, demonstrating its foundational significance

More and Happier Women: On the Political Significance of Wittgenstein and Hinge Epistemology

The paper presents a Wittgensteinian account of the concept WOMAN, in terms of family resemblance. This approach is deemed superior to the Carnapian account, championed by Sally Haslanger, in that it allows for more inclusivity and to locate the source of sexism not so much in the very concept of woman but in the beliefs sexist people have about women. The compatibility of this account with semantic externalism is explored, as well as its relationship with stereotypes and paradigmatic examples of women. It is further shown how present-day attempts to extend the application of the concept of woman beyond human females may be made sense in terms of a change of hinges—that is, of the rules of evidential significance, which a community of speakers brings to bear on the determination of whether a person is a woman. Finally, it is argued that, despite Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical quietism, such an account is politically significant. This in turn shows that in fact Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical pronouncements far from being inimical to political and societal change may in fact be conducive to it

Deep disagreements and the genealogical challenge

This paper looks at the so-called "genealogical challenge", encapsulated in the "you just believe that because & mldr;" (YJBTB) schema, through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically believed just because one has been brought up to believe them (1). Yet, due to their extreme variability, it is not always the case that hinges are not rationally held, while fitting into the YJBTB schema. In particular, they are rationally held when either different (de facto empirical) hinges are taken for granted merely because of one's position in history, or else when (de jure) hinges, constitutive of epistemic rationality, are plugged into the YJBTB schema. By contrast, they are not rationally held when different hinges are taken for granted while aware of the fact that one's reasons for them are either question-begging or no stronger than the ones in favor of incompatible ones ( 3-4). These would all be cases of "deep disagreement" - that is, disagreement that depends on different and incompatible hinges, which prevent parties from utilizing a common epistemic method or practice to rationally resolve the disagreement. Finally, we look at the possible extension of this framework to what may be regarded as religious and moral hinges. It is claimed that, depending on the hinge in question, these disagreements may (or may not) be "deep" (5). Hence, looking at the genealogical challenge through the lens of hinge epistemology helps elucidate its nature, its epistemic significance and its scope

Woman: Concept, Prototype and Stereotype

Drawing on previous work, I argue that a family resemblance account of the concept woman has several beneficial consequences. Namely, it promotes hermeneutical justice, and, in time, it may serve to change the prototypes and stereotypes people tend unreflectively to associate with woman. I claim that only at that point will full hermeneutical justice be achieved. To this end, I propose a reconceptualization of the notion of hermeneutical injustice, first presented by Fricker (2007). First, I present the family resemblance account of woman. Accordingly, that concept isn’t identified by a set of necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions, but, roughly, by different criteria. Second, I show how concepts, prototypes and stereotypes relate to one another and how they may contribute to hermeneutical injustice. Finally, I show how the proposed account of woman may in time foster a change in the associated prototype and stereotypes, which will ameliorate societies by doing more justice to the lived experience of trans women–that is, by promoting full hermeneutical justice

Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering

In this paper, we look at what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical injustice” as it arises in the medical context. By drawing on the history of hysteria, I argue that the concept of hysteria has been held in place by power structures affected by negative prejudice against women. In this sense, the concept of hysteria fits the central conditions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice as characterized by Fricker. Yet, reflection on the case of hysteria also signals the need for widening the understanding of hermeneutical injustice. I thus propose to ameliorate the concept of hermeneutical injustice and show how, once thus ameliorated, it can be used as a powerful tool to advocate for the amelioration of the concept of woman. I then return to the concept of hysteria and argue that it is still in use in everyday contexts, where it embodies identity prejudice against women and constitutes a particularly pernicious form of put-down that perpetrates various forms of epistemic injustice. I conclude that also in that kind of context the concept of hysteria should be abandoned. Like with other loaded concepts, the only admissible uses of that concept would then be in contexts of reclaiming or re-appropriation

Against neo-wittgensteinian entitlements

In this paper I raise some worries against one specific notion of entitlement defended in the last decade mainly by Crispin Wright (but also, in some ways, by Michael Williams). As first proposed, entitlements should be novel kinds of warrant, hereto unknown to epistemological reflection and capable of solving the old and most challenging problem of epistemology—that is, scepticism of both a Cartesian and of a Humean fashion. Furthermore, the notion of entitlement here under consideration is taken to be of Wittgensteinian descent—or so it is argued by its supporters. It would therefore usefully lend itself to an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas in On Certainty. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present Wright’s views. In the second, I show why entitlements cannot be appealed to in the course of a fair rendition of Wittgenstein’s ideas. In the third, I show why, irrespective of their alleged Wittgensteinian lineage, entitlements are highly problematic in their own right

Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology

The paper discusses some themes in Duncan Pritchard’s last book, Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. It considers it in relation to other forms of Wittgenstein-inspired hinge-epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the proposed treatment of Closure in relation to entailments containing hinges, the treatment of Underdetermination-based skeptical paradox and the avail to disjunctivism to respond to the latter. It argues that, although bold and thought-provoking, the mix of hinge epistemology and disjunctivism Pritchard proposes is not motivated

What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein

The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

Précis

The paper is a précis of my The Varieties of Self-Knowledge (Palgrave, 2016

Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo

status: publishe