Issues and challenges in the application of Husserlian phenomenology to the Lived Experience of Hate Crime and Its Legal Aftermath

The field of hate crime research addresses the presence, sources and impact of particular types of expressions of prejudice, often perceived as particularly damaging and hurtful forms of interpersonal abuse and violence. Little, if any, credible academic research seeks to vindicate the specific racist, gendered and other vicious prejudices articulated by many perpetrators of hate crime. In turn, this raises the reflexive question of the possibilities of researchers themselves ever being able to adopt a truly "unprejudiced" approach to the presence of such damaging prejudices. Can this goal be realised without a researcher necessarily losing an experientially-grounded understanding of what these meanings, values and purposes have come to mean, and how they are themselves interpretatively re-constituted anew, including within the lived experience of victims, witnesses, police, prosecutors, judges and victim support workers? A possible philosophically-informed approach to the dilemmas posed by this topic is offered by Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's perpetually unfinished philosophical methodology strives, with concerted if sometimes tragic reflective rigor, to "suspend," "bracket out" and "neutralise" those core presuppositions constitutive of the research field that typically pre-judge precisely whatever demands to be questioned and explored in a radically non-prejudicial manner. This study critically explores the possibilities, reflective stages and theoretical limitations of a sympathetically reconstructed Husserlian approach to hate crime, itself understood as a would-be qualitative "science of consciousness." It argues that despite its manifest tensions, gaps, ambiguities and internal contradictions, aspects of the Husserlian philosophical approach directed towards the different levels of experienced hate crime still retain the potential to both challenge and advance our understanding of this topic. It is the "instructive" part of "instructive failure" that this article highlights

Reinventing grounded theory: some questions about theory, ground and discovery

Grounded theory’s popularity persists after three decades of broad-ranging critique. In this article three problematic notions are discussed—‘theory,’ ‘ground’ and ‘discovery’—which linger in the continuing use and development of grounded theory procedures. It is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions—embodied in continuing reinventions of grounded theory—constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that ‘ground’ is a misnomer when talking about interpretation and that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention. The procedures admittedly provide signposts for qualitative inquirers, but educational researchers should be wary, for the significance of interpretation, narrative and reflection can be undermined in the procedures of grounded theory

Qualitative interviews in psychology: problems and possibilities

This paper distinguishes a series of contingent and necessary problems that arise in the design, conduct, analysis and reporting of open-ended or conversational qualitative interviews in psychological research. Contingent problems in the reporting of interviews include: (1) the deletion of the interviewer; (2) the conventions of representation of interaction; (3) the specificity of analytic observations; (4) the unavailability of the interview set-up; (5) the failure to consider interviews as interaction. Necessary problems include: (1) the flooding of the interview with social science agendas and categories; (2) the complex and varying footing positions of interviewer and interviewee; (3) the orientations to stake and interest on the part of the interviewer and interviewee; (4) the reproduction of cognitivism. The paper ends with two kinds of recommendation. First, we argue that interviews should be studied as an interactional object, and that study should feed back into the design, conduct and analysis of interviews so that they can be used more effectively in cases where they are the most appropriate data gathering tools. Second, these problems with open-ended interviews highlight a range of specific virtues of basing analysis on naturalistic materials. Reasons for moving away from the use of interviews for many research questions are described

The experience of being a partner to a spinal cord injured person: A phenomenological-hermeneutic study

This qualitative focuses on the personal experiences of partners to a spinal cord injured person. Using a Ricoeurian phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, we analysed seven partners’ narratives 1 and 2 years after their partner's injury. The study revealed how the injury was experienced from the partners’ perspective through the aftermath. In the acute phase after the injury, partners also felt harmed, and support was needed in relation to their own daily activities, eating, resting, and managing distress. During the institutionalized rehabilitation, partners felt torn between supporting the injured partner and the demanding tasks of everyday life outside the institution. After discharge, partners struggled for the injured partner to regain a well-functioning everyday life and for reestablishing life as a couple. The partner struggled to manage the overwhelming amount of everyday tasks. Some sought to reestablish their usual functions outside the family, whereas others focused on establishing a new life together. The partners experienced much distress and appreciated the support they got, but felt that they were mainly left to manage the difficult process on their own

Articulating practice through the interview to the double

The paper aims to realise the critical potential of the practice lens by contributing to the development of a coherent set of methodologies for investigating work and organisational activity. It does so by introducing and critically assessing the "interview to the double" as a method to articulate and represent practice. After briefly illustrating its history and usage, the paper analyses in depth the setting generated by this unusual interview method. It argues that the nature of the encounter produces narratives that are often morally connoted and idealised in character. As a consequence the method is especially useful to capture the going concerns which orient the conduct of the members and the normative and moral dimension of practice. The paper also shows that because it mimics familiar instruction-giving discursive practices, the method constitutes an effective textual device to convey this moral and normative dimension in a way which remains faithful to its situated and contingent nature of practice

Why Do Evaluations of eHealth Programs Fail? An Alternative Set of Guiding Principles

Trisha Greenhalgh and Jill Russell discuss the relative merits of “scientific” and “social practice” approaches to evaluation and argue that eHealth evaluation is in need of a paradigm shift

The moral work of subversion

This article critically reconsiders dominant understandings of morality and subversion within organizations. Existing organizational literature does not adequately address the important productive role of morality for producing and justifying everyday subversive practices as well as the use of subversion to legitimate power relations and dominant values. Drawing upon interactionist insights, we develop a practice-based account of morality, highlighting the means through which subversion retroactively legitimates the diverse range of actions performed by organizational subjects. This form of retrospective reasoning, which we term ‘moralization’, serves as an important resource for subjects to actively negotiate the often competing moral and practical demands placed on them as organizational subjects. Consequently, we position subversion as an important means of accomplishing, legitimating and preserving a given organizational order, rather than a ‘common sense’ view that subversion necessarily subverts organizational values. In doing so, we make explicit the ‘positive’ function of rule-bending for processes of organizational control