A Bayesian Approach to Modelling Graphical Vector Autoregressions

We introduce a Bayesian approach to model assessment in the class of graphical vector autoregressive (VAR) processes. Due to the very large number of model structures that may be considered, simulation based inference, such as Markov chain Monte Carlo, is not feasible. Therefore, we derive an approximate joint posterior distribution of the number of lags in the autoregression and the causality structure represented by graphs using a fractional Bayes approach. Some properties of the approximation are derived and our approach is illustrated on a four-dimensional macroeconomic system and five-dimensional air pollution data

The Multivariate Split Normal Distribution and Asymmetric Principal Components Analysis

The multivariate split nomal distribution extends the usual multivariate normal distribution by a set of parameters which allows for skewness in the form of contraction/dilation along a subset of the prinicpal axis. The paper derives some properties for this distribution, including its moment generating function, multivariate skewness and kurtosis. Maximum likelihood estimation is discussed and a complete Bayesian analysis of the multivariate split normal distribution is developed

The Welfare Cost of Imperfect Competition and Distortionary Taxation

The welfare cost of imperfect competition in the product and labor market as well as distortionary taxation is quantified in a dynamic general equilibrium model parameterized to fit the U.S. economy. We find that the welfare cost of imperfect competition in the product market is 35.74 percent while it is 0.66 percent in the labor market, taking the transition from the distorted to the optimal steady state into account. If we also take into account that the U.S. economy is characterized by distortionary taxation the welfare cost in the product market increases to 48.26 percent and 4.70 percent in the labor market

KEMAMPUAN RASIO CAMEL DALAM MEMPREDIKSI PERTUMBUHAN LABA BANK BUMN

The  focus  of  this  study  aimed  to  analyze  the  influence  of  financial  ratios  to  future earnings growth consist of  CAR, KAP, PPAP, NIM, ROA, ROA, and LDR. The sample in this research is the state-owned banking company listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange which issued  quarterly  and  annual  financial statements  for  fiscal  year  2009  to 2013,  namely  PT. Bank  Mandiri  (Persero),  Tbk,  PT.  Bank  Rakyat  Indonesia  (Persero),  Tbk,  and  PT.  Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero), Tbk. These three state-owned banks are located in the category of Commercial Bank Business Activities (BUKU) 4 with core capital above Rp. 30 trillion. Data collection methods used are literature and documentation. Data were analyzed using classic  assumption  test,  multiple  linear  regression  analysis  test,  and  test  the  hypothesis  by using the tool SPSS. This study could not provide the empirical evidence on the influence of CAR, KAP, PPAP, NIM, BOPO, ROA, dan LDR to earning growth. 

Inflation, Markups and Monetary Policy

The correlation between persistent changes in the markup in one sector of an economy and the inflation rate is quantified in a 2-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. How this relationship is affected by monetary policy is also studied. We find that the correlation is in general positive under an exogenous money growth rule as well as under an inflation targeting rule. That is, a decrease of the markup leads to a decrease in the CPI-inflation rate. However, if inflation is measured by an optimal price index that also includes the wage rate the correlation is slightly negative. That is, a decrease in the markup leads to higher inflation rates. This is due to higher wage rates. The correlation is sensitive to whether the policy rule includes an output term. If monetary policy accommodates output strongly the correlation is negative. A decrease in the markup leads to higher inflation rates, as measured by both the CPI and the optimal price index

Diversification and delegation in firms

This paper shows how separation of ownership and control may arise as a response to overload costs, despite agency costs, and how conglomerates arise as solution to information asymmetries in capital markets. In a context where entrepreneurs have the ability to run projects and improve their future cash flow, there could be rationing of credit due to moral hazard between entrepreneurs and investors. Diversification could mitigate the moral hazard problem. However for a single entrepreneur running many different projects might be increasingly costly due to overload costs. Delegating the running of projects to several managers can not only reduce overload costs, but also the moral hazard problem of external financing. In this paper we show that delegation can be the only way to exploit the gains from diversification when overload costs of diversification are high; delegation thus is the key ingredient to be able to diversify

Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring

When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher managerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company leverage and lower company diversification. These predictions find some support in the empirical literature.

Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring

This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts. The model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to investment projects, firms are less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs. These results are consistent with empirical observations concerning small business lending and loan syndication

Financial structure, Managerial Compensation and Monitoring

When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher managerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company leverage and lower company diversification. These predictions find some support in the empirical literature.Keywords: Managerial Compensation; Financial Structure; Monitoring; Diversification.