네트워크 구조가 있는 비용 배분 문제에서의 샤플리 밸류에 관한 연구

학위논문 (박사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 사회과학대학 경제학부, 2021. 2. 전영섭.This study consists of three chapters. Each chapter addresses independent issues. However they are connected in that they are analyzing economic phenomena using a network structure and they investigate the distribution of benefits or costs arising from cooperation using cooperative game theory. The first chapter investigate positional queueing problem which is a generalized problem of the classical queueing problem. In this chapter, we obtain generalized versions of the minimal transfer rule and of the maximal transfer rule. We also investigate properties of each rules and axiomatically characterized them. The second chapter investigate the minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. We investigate the properties and axiomatic characterization of the Kar rule for the minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. The final chapter investigate the profit allocation in the Korean automotive industry using the buyer-supplier network among the vehicle manufacturers and its first-tier vendors from the perspective of cooperative game theory. Some models are constructed and the Shapley values of each models are calculated. We compare them with real profit allocation of the Korean automotive industry.본 연구는 3개의 장으로 구성되어 있다. 각 장은 독립적인 문제를 다루고 있지만, 경제학적 현상을 네트워크 구조를 활용하여 분석하고 있다는 것과 협력에서 발생하는 이익 또는 비용의 배분 문제를 협조적 게임이론을 활용하여 분석하고 있다는 점에서 각 장은 상호 연결성을 갖는다. 첫 번째 장에서는 고전적인 대기열게임을 일반화한 문제(positional queueing problem)에서의 최소이전규칙(minimal transfer rule)과 최대이전규칙(maximal transfer rule)의 특성을 밝힌다. 두 번째 장에서는 소스가 여러 개인 최소신장가지문제(minimum cost spanning tree problem with multiple sources)에서의 카규칙(Kar rule)의 특성을 밝힌다. 마지막 장에서는 한국의 자동차 산업에서의 완성차 기업과 1차 벤더 사이의 이윤분배 문제를 협조적 게임이론적 접근법을 통해서 분석한다. 4가지 모형을 구축하고 각 모형에서 계산된 이윤분배와 현실의 이윤분배를 비교할 때, 완성차 기업의 영향력을 가장 크게 가정한 모형의 이윤분배 결과가 현실의 이윤분배와 가장 근접한 것을 확인하였다.1. The Shapley Value in Positional Queueing Problems and axiomatic characterizations 1 1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. The Positional Queueing Problem 2 1.3. An optimistic approach and the minimal transfer rule 5 1.4. A pessimistic approach and the maximal transfer rule 8 1.5. Axioms and characterizations 21 1.6. Concluding remarks 31 Bibliography. 46 2. The Kar Solution for multi-source minimum cost spanning tree problems 49 2.1. Introduction 49 2.2. Model 50 2.3. An axiomatic characterization 51 2.4. Conclusion 62 Bibliography. 63 3. A cooperative game theoretic approach on the profit allocation of the Koreanautomotive industry 65 3.1. Introduction 65 3.2. Model 66 3.3. Analysis method 71 3.4. Analysis result 78 3.5. Conclusion 80 Bibliography. 82Docto

Strong Demand Operator and the Dutta-Kar Rule for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부, 2013. 2. 전영섭.We study the strong demand operator introduced by Granot and Huberman (1984) for minimum cost spanning tree problems. First, we review the strong demand operator. Next, we study the irreducible minimum cost spanning tree games and the irreducible core. Finally,we define a procedure with tie-breaking rule which generates an allocation from given initial allocation. In our procedure, a cost matrix is changed to its irreducible matrix before the operator is applied. We show that the Dutta-Kar allocation is obtained by applying the strong demand operator from any allocation in irreducible core.1. Introduction 1 2. Preliminaries 2 2.1 Minimum cost spanning tree problem 2 2.2 Prim algorithm 3 2.3 Rules 4 3. Strong demand operator 5 4. Irreducible minimum cost spanning tree problem 7 4.1 Irreducible matrix 7 4.2 Partition by irreducible matrix 7 5. Main results 10 5.1 Procedure with tie-breaking rule 10 5.2 Separability 11 5.3 Coincidence 12 6. Concluding remark 17Maste

스키마 비의존적인 객체의 생성과 스키마 생성연산에 대한 연구

Maste

New algorithm for offset of plane domain

Thesis (master`s)--서울대학교 대학원 :수학과,1997.Maste

피타고라스-호도그래프 곡선의 오일러-로드리게스 프레임

Thesis (doctoral)--서울대학교 대학원 :수학과,2002.Docto