27 research outputs found

    Does High Voter Turnout Help the Democratic United Party? Partisan Bias of Voter Turnout in the 2012 Legislative Election

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    ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ œ19๋Œ€ ์ด์„ ์„ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญ์—์„œ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚œ ํˆฌํ‘œ์œจ์˜ ์ •๋‹นํŽธํ–ฅ(partisan bias)์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ํˆฌํ‘œ์œจ์ด ์ƒ์Šนํ•  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์•ผ๋‹น, ํŠนํžˆ ๋ฏผ์ฃผํ†ตํ•ฉ๋‹น์—๊ฒŒ ์œ ๋ฆฌํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ์˜ˆ์ธก์ด ๋„๋ฆฌ ์ˆ˜์šฉ๋˜์–ด์™”์Œ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ , ์—ฌ์ „ํžˆ ์ด์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ๊ฒฝํ—˜์  ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฐ€ ์ง€๊ทนํžˆ ๋ถ€์žฌํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๋ฌธ์ œ์˜์‹์— ๊ธฐ์ดˆํ•˜์—ฌ, ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํˆฌํ‘œ์œจ์ด ์ƒ์Šนํ•  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ๊ณผ์—ฐ ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์–ผ๋งˆ๋‚˜ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์— ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•˜์—ฌ ์—ฌ๋ก ์กฐ์‚ฌ์ž๋ฃŒ์™€ ์ง‘ํ•ฉ์  ์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์˜ˆ์ƒ๊ณผ ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ ํˆฌํ‘œ์— ์ฐธ์—ฌํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค ๊ฐ€์šด๋ฐ ์ƒˆ๋ˆ„๋ฆฌ๋‹น๋ณด๋‹ค ๋ฏผ์ฃผํ†ตํ•ฉ๋‹น์„ ์„ ํ˜ธํ•˜๋Š” ์ด๋“ค์ด ์ฐจ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„์œจ๋ฟ๋งŒ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ, ์ด๋“ค์˜ ์ •๋‹น์„ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ•๋„์™€ ํˆฌํ‘œ์˜๋ฌด๊ฐ์˜ ์ˆ˜์ค€ ์—ญ์‹œ ๋” ๋‚ฎ์•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์„ ๋ฐํ˜”๋‹ค. ์•„์šธ๋Ÿฌ ํˆฌํ‘œ์œจ์ด ๋†’์€ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ ์ƒˆ๋ˆ„๋ฆฌ๋‹น ํ›„๋ณด๋ณด๋‹ค ๋ฏผ์ฃผํ†ตํ•ฉ๋‹น ํ›„๋ณด์˜ ๋“ํ‘œ์œจ๊ณผ ๋‹น์„  ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์ด ์˜คํžˆ๋ ค ๋‚ฎ์•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์„ ํ™•์ธํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ ์ €์ž๋Š” ๋ฏผ์ฃผํ†ตํ•ฉ๋‹น์—๊ฒŒ ์œ ๋ฆฌํ•œ ํˆฌํ‘œ์œจ์˜ ์ •๋‹นํŽธํ–ฅ์€ ์ผ์ข…์˜ ์‹ ํ™”์— ๋ถˆ๊ณผํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด์— ์˜์กดํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฒด์ œ์˜ ์ •์น˜์  ๋Œ€ํ‘œ์„ฑ์„ ๊ณ ์–‘์‹œํ‚ค๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ํˆฌํ‘œ๋…๋ คํ–‰์œ„๋ฅผ ๋‹นํŒŒ์ ์ธ ์„ ๊ฑฐ์šด๋™์œผ๋กœ ํ„ํ•˜ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€ ๋ถ€๋‹นํ•˜๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ฃผ์žฅํ•œ๋‹ค. This study examines whether and how the partisan bias of voter turnout affects electoral outcomes in the 2012 legislative election of Korea. It analyzes both the individual- and aggregate-level data to find that no significant partisan bias favorable to the Democratic United Party (DUP) exists. Instead, this study shows that the portion of pro-Saenuri Party (SNP) voters among non-voters is larger than that of pro-DUP, which is contrasting to the conventional wisdom that high voter turnout helps the DUP. In addition, pro-SNP voters have stronger party closeness and obligation to vote than pro-DUP voters. Finally, it shows that SNP candidates rather than DUP candidates tend to gain more votes in those districts with high voter turnout. Based on these findings, the author claims that the partisan bias of voter turnout seems to be only a myth in Korea, and that it is not reasonable to restrict any political activities to promote voter turnout

    The Magnitude of District and Voting Choice of Minor Party Supporters : An Empirical Analysis of the 2010 Municipal Council Election in Korea

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    ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ 2010๋…„ ์ง€๋ฐฉ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์ด ์ƒ์ดํ•œ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ ์ œ๋„์— ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๋ฐ˜์‘ํ•˜์˜€๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ ํƒ์ƒ‰ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐ ๋ชฉ์ ์„ ๋‘์—ˆ๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ด‘์—ญ์˜ํšŒ์„ ๊ฑฐ์™€ ๊ธฐ์ดˆ์˜ํšŒ์„ ๊ฑฐ, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  2์ธ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์™€ 3ยท4์ธ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚œ ๊ตฐ์†Œ์ •๋‹น ์ง€์ง€์ž๋“ค์˜ ํˆฌํ‘œํ–‰ํƒœ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ฐ€์„ค๋“ค์„ ๊ฒ€์ฆํ•จ์œผ๋กœ์จ ํ˜„ํ–‰ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์ œ์˜ ์ˆ˜ํ˜œ์ž๊ฐ€ ๋ˆ„๊ตฌ์ธ์ง€๋ฅผ ๊ทœ๋ช…ํ•˜๊ณ ์ž ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ํ•œ๊ตญ์‚ฌํšŒ๊ณผํ•™๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ์„ผํ„ฐ(KSDC)์˜ ์„ ๊ฑฐํ›„ ์—ฌ๋ก ์กฐ์‚ฌ๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ˆœ์ˆ˜ํˆฌํ‘œ์™€ ์ „๋žต์  ํˆฌํ‘œ๋Š” ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์ œ์•ฝ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ  ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ ํฌ๊ธฐ์˜ ํ•จ์ˆ˜๋ผ๋Š” ์ ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ด‘์—ญ์˜ํšŒ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋ณด๋‹ค ๊ธฐ์ดˆ์˜ํšŒ์„ ๊ฑฐ์—์„œ, ๊ธฐ์ดˆ๋น„๋ก€๋Œ€ํ‘œ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋ณด๋‹ค ๊ด‘์—ญ๋น„๋ก€๋Œ€ํ‘œ์„ ๊ฑฐ์—์„œ, 2์ธ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ๋ณด๋‹ค 3ยท4์ธ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ ๊ตฐ์†Œ์ •๋‹น ์ง€์ง€์ž๋“ค์˜ ์ „๋žต์  ํˆฌํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ์ฐจ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„์œจ์ด ๋” ๋‚ฎ๊ณ  ์ˆœ์ˆ˜ํˆฌํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ์ฐจ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„์œจ์ด ๋” ๋†’์•˜๋‹ค. ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ, ํ˜„ํ–‰ ์ค‘์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์ œ์˜ ์ตœ๋Œ€ ์ˆ˜ํ˜œ์ž๋Š” ๊ตฐ์†Œ์ •๋‹น์ด ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ๋‹น์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ํ† ๋Œ€๋กœ ์ €์ž๋Š” ์ค‘์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์ œ์˜ ๋„์ž… ์ทจ์ง€๋ฅผ ์‚ด๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” 3ยท4์ธ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ™•๋Œ€๋งŒ์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ์ถฉ๋ถ„ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ฃผ์žฅํ•œ๋‹ค.Utilizing the KSDC survey dataset, this study examines whether and how the multimember district system (MMD) has affected voter choice in the 2010 municipal council election of Korea. More specifically, it examines voting choice of minor party supporters in municipal council elections and provincial council elections and in 3 or 4 member districts and 2 member districts. Test results show that, rather than provincial council elections, municipal elections for proportional representatives, and 2 member districts, municipal council elections, provincial elections for proportional representatives, and 3 or 4 member districts promote sincere voting and suppress strategic voting. In addition, the biggest beneficiary of the current MMD is major parties, especially the Democratic Party rather than minor parties. Based on these findings, this study claims that institutional reform to increase the number of 3 or 4 member districts is not sufficient to achieve the goals of the MMD reform

    Survey Democracy?: A Case Study of 2010 Regional Election in Korea

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    ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ตœ๊ทผ ํ•œ๋‚˜๋ผ๋‹น๊ณผ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ๋‹น ๋“ฑ ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ ์ฃผ์š”์ •๋‹น๋“ค์ด ๋„๋ฆฌ ์‹œํ–‰ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์—ฌ๋ก ์กฐ์‚ฌ๋ฅผ ํฌํ•จํ•œ ๊ณต์ฒœ๋ฐฉ์‹์˜ ํƒ€๋‹น์„ฑ์„ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์  ๋˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•๋ก ์  ์ฐจ์›์—์„œ ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์—ฌ๊ธฐ์„œ๋Š” ์—ฌ๋ก ์กฐ์‚ฌ ์‘๋‹ต์ž์— ์˜ํ•œ ๊ณต์งํ›„๋ณด์„ ์ถœ๋ฐฉ์‹์ด ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ๊ฐ€์น˜์— ๋ถ€ํ•ฉํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ธ์ง€์™€ ์—ฌ๋ก ์กฐ์‚ฌ๊ฐ€ ๊ณผ์—ฐ ํˆฌํ‘œ๊ฒฝ์„ ์„ ๋Œ€์‹ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„ ๋งŒํผ ๋ชจ์ง‘๋‹จ, ์ฆ‰ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๊ตฌ ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์˜ ์ •์น˜์  ์„ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ์ œ๋Œ€๋กœ ๋ฐ˜์˜ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”์ง€์— ๊ด€ํ•ด ๋…ผํ•˜๊ณ , ๋™์•„์‹œ์•„์—ฐ๊ตฌ์›(EAI)์˜ 6.2 ์ง€๋ฐฉ์„ ๊ฑฐ ํŒจ๋„์กฐ์‚ฌ ์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ, ์„ค๋ฌธ์‘๋‹ต์ž์˜ ํ–‰ํƒœ๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํ›„๋ณด๊ฒฝ์„ ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ์—ฌ๋ก ์กฐ์‚ฌ์™€ ์„ ๊ฑฐ์—์„œ ํ‘œ์ถœ๋˜๋Š” ํ•œ๊ตญ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์˜ ํ›„๋ณด์„ ํ˜ธ ์‚ฌ์ด์—๋Š” ๋ถ„๋ช…ํ•œ ์ฐจ์ด๊ฐ€ ์กด์žฌํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์˜ ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์ด ์„ ๊ฑฐ์— ์ž„๋ฐ•ํ•ด์„œ์•ผ ํ›„๋ณด์ž์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํƒœ๋„๋ฅผ ํ˜•์„ฑํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ์ ˆ๋ฐ˜์— ๊ฐ€๊นŒ์šด ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์˜ ์„ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ€ ์„ ๊ฑฐ์šด๋™๊ณผ์ •์—์„œ ๋ณ€ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์„ ๋ฐํ˜€๋ƒˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ํ† ๋Œ€๋กœ ์ €์ž๋Š” ์—ฌ๋ก ์กฐ์‚ฌ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ๊ฐ ์ •๋‹น์˜ ํ›„๋ณด๊ณต์ฒœ๊ณผ์ •์ด ์œ ๋Šฅํ•œ ํ›„๋ณด์„ ์ถœ์— ๋„์›€์„ ์ฃผ๊ธฐ๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ณต์ฒœ๋ฏผ์ฃผํ™”์— ๊ฑธ๋ฆผ๋Œ์ด ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๊ฒฝ๊ณ ํ•œ๋‹ค. This study aims to evaluate the survey-dependent candidate selection method (SDCSM) which has been widely adopted by major political parties in Korea. More specifically, it examines whether the SDCSM. in which selectorates are survey respondents, is accordance with democracy and whether it functions as primary elections that effectively reflects political preferences of constituents. Analyzing the panel survey dataset for the 2010 regional election culled by the East Asian Institute, it shows that there exist notable attitudinal and behavioral differences in selecting representatives between voters and survey respondents. It also shows that a majority of Korean voters did not make their electoral decision until the last few weeks of the regional election and that almost a half of voters changed their candidate preferences during the campaign period. Based on these find ings, it claims that the SDCSM does not help selecting competitive candidates, but causes critical problems in democratizing the candidate selection method
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