International R&D Spillovers and other Unobserved Common Spillovers and Shocks

Studies which are based on Coe and Helpman (1995) and use weighted foreign R&D variables to estimate channel-specific R&D spillovers disregard the interaction between international R&D spillovers and other unobserved common spillovers and shocks. Using a panel of 50 economies from 1970-2011, we find that disregarding this interaction leads to inconsistent estimates whenever knowledge spillovers and other unobserved effects are correlated with foreign and domestic R&D. When this interaction is modeled, estimates are consistent; however, they confound foreign and domestic R&D effects with unobserved effects. Thus, the coefficient of a weighted foreign R&D variable cannot capture genuine channel-specific R&D spillovers.Comment: 28 page

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies the role of prudence in modern central banking. To that end, it relaxes the usual assumption of quadratic preferences and adopts instead an asymmetric preference specification whereby positive deviations from a target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations. It is shown that prudence with respect to inflation (unemployment) reduces (increases) equilibrium inflation. The overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of the preference parameters and the conditional variances of inflation and unemployment. The implications of the model are examined using cross-section data from OECD countries. . Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund

Optimización de señal de control en reguladores PID con arquitectura antireset Wind-Up

This paper shows the reader the methods of tuning PID controllers Kayser-Rajka (KR) and Astrom-Haglund (AH), with the aim of evaluatingtheir performance against some conventional methods like Ziegler-Nichols tuning (ZN). It also shows the method for improving the control signal based on the architecture Antireset Wind-Up

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inefficient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank's control is infrequently adjustedCommittees, status-quo bias, interest-rate smoothing, dynamic voting

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee.

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power, and in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inefficient and inertial around the previously agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and helps explain the empirical observation that the distribution of actual interest rate changes has a mode of zero.Interest rate smoothing; status-quo bias; policy conservatism; policy inertia; gridlock interval; dynamic voting;

Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. In order to study whether the latter relation is causal, we construct a model of committee decision making and dissent where members' decisions are not a function of past dissents. The model is estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision-making frictions in our model help account for the predictive power of current dissents. The eect of institutional characteristics and structural parameters on dissent rates is examined using simulations as well.Committees, voting models, political economy of central banking

Factor Analysis of a Large DSGE Model

We study the workings of the factor analysis of high-dimensional data using arti…cial series generated from a large, multi-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The objective is to use the DSGE model as a laboratory that allow us to shed some light on the practical bene…ts and limitations of using factor analysis techniques on economic data. We explain in what sense the arti…cial data can be thought of having a factor structure, study the theoretical and fi…nite sample properties of the principal components estimates of the factor space, investigate the substantive reason(s) for the good performance of diffusion index forecasts, and assess the quality of the factor analysis of highly dissagregated data. In all our exercises, we explain the precise relationship between the factors and the basic macroeconomic shocks postulated by the model.Multisector economies, principal components, forecasting, pervasiveness, FAVAR