5,388 research outputs found
Software Engineering Challenges for Investigating Cyber-Physical Incidents
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are characterized by the interplay between digital and physical spaces. This characteristic has extended the attack surface that could be exploited by an offender to cause harm. An increasing number of cyber-physical incidents may occur depending on the configuration of the physical and digital spaces and their interplay. Traditional investigation processes are not adequate to investigate these incidents, as they may overlook the extended attack surface resulting from such interplay, leading to relevant evidence being missed and testing flawed hypotheses explaining the incidents. The software engineering research community can contribute to addressing this problem, by deploying existing formalisms to model digital and physical spaces, and using analysis techniques to reason about their interplay and evolution. In this paper, supported by a motivating example, we describe some emerging software engineering challenges to support investigations of cyber-physical incidents. We review and critique existing research proposed to address these challenges, and sketch an initial solution based on a meta-model to represent cyber-physical incidents and a representation of the topology of digital and physical spaces that supports reasoning about their interplay
Automatically Securing Permission-Based Software by Reducing the Attack Surface: An Application to Android
A common security architecture, called the permission-based security model
(used e.g. in Android and Blackberry), entails intrinsic risks. For instance,
applications can be granted more permissions than they actually need, what we
call a "permission gap". Malware can leverage the unused permissions for
achieving their malicious goals, for instance using code injection. In this
paper, we present an approach to detecting permission gaps using static
analysis. Our prototype implementation in the context of Android shows that the
static analysis must take into account a significant amount of
platform-specific knowledge. Using our tool on two datasets of Android
applications, we found out that a non negligible part of applications suffers
from permission gaps, i.e. does not use all the permissions they declare
KASR: A Reliable and Practical Approach to Attack Surface Reduction of Commodity OS Kernels
Commodity OS kernels have broad attack surfaces due to the large code base
and the numerous features such as device drivers. For a real-world use case
(e.g., an Apache Server), many kernel services are unused and only a small
amount of kernel code is used. Within the used code, a certain part is invoked
only at runtime while the rest are executed at startup and/or shutdown phases
in the kernel's lifetime run. In this paper, we propose a reliable and
practical system, named KASR, which transparently reduces attack surfaces of
commodity OS kernels at runtime without requiring their source code. The KASR
system, residing in a trusted hypervisor, achieves the attack surface reduction
through a two-step approach: (1) reliably depriving unused code of executable
permissions, and (2) transparently segmenting used code and selectively
activating them. We implement a prototype of KASR on Xen-4.8.2 hypervisor and
evaluate its security effectiveness on Linux kernel-4.4.0-87-generic. Our
evaluation shows that KASR reduces the kernel attack surface by 64% and trims
off 40% of CVE vulnerabilities. Besides, KASR successfully detects and blocks
all 6 real-world kernel rootkits. We measure its performance overhead with
three benchmark tools (i.e., SPECINT, httperf and bonnie++). The experimental
results indicate that KASR imposes less than 1% performance overhead (compared
to an unmodified Xen hypervisor) on all the benchmarks.Comment: The work has been accepted at the 21st International Symposium on
Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses 201
Attack-Surface Metrics, OSSTMM and Common Criteria Based Approach to “Composable Security” in Complex Systems
In recent studies on Complex Systems and Systems-of-Systems theory, a huge effort has been put to cope with behavioral problems, i.e. the possibility of controlling a desired overall or end-to-end behavior by acting on the individual elements that constitute the system itself. This problem is particularly important in the “SMART” environments, where the huge number of devices, their significant computational capabilities as well as their tight interconnection produce a complex architecture for which it is difficult to predict (and control) a desired behavior; furthermore, if the scenario is allowed to dynamically evolve through the modification of both topology and subsystems composition, then the control problem becomes a real challenge. In this perspective, the purpose of this paper is to cope with a specific class of control problems in complex systems, the “composability of security functionalities”, recently introduced by the European Funded research through the pSHIELD and nSHIELD projects (ARTEMIS-JU programme). In a nutshell, the objective of this research is to define a control framework that, given a target security level for a specific application scenario, is able to i) discover the system elements, ii) quantify the security level of each element as well as its contribution to the security of the overall system, and iii) compute the control action to be applied on such elements to reach the security target. The main innovations proposed by the authors are: i) the definition of a comprehensive methodology to quantify the security of a generic system independently from the technology and the environment and ii) the integration of the derived metrics into a closed-loop scheme that allows real-time control of the system. The solution described in this work moves from the proof-of-concepts performed in the early phase of the pSHIELD research and enrich es it through an innovative metric with a sound foundation, able to potentially cope with any kind of pplication scenarios (railways, automotive, manufacturing, ...)
Reducing Attack Surface of a Web Application by Open Web Application Security Project Compliance
The attack surface of a system is the amount of application area that is exposed to the adversaries. The overall vulnerability can be reduced by reducing the attack surface of a web application. In this paper, we have considered the web components of two versions of an in-house developed project management web application and the attack surface has been calculated prior and post open web application security project (OWASP) compliance based on a security audit to determine and then compare the security of this Project Management Application. OWASP is an open community to provide free tools and guidelines for application security. It was observed that the attack surface of the software reduced by 45 per cent once it was made OWASP compliant. The vulnerable surface exposed by the code even after OWASP compliance was due to the mandatory access points left in the software to ensure accessibility over a network.Defence Science Journal, 2012, 62(5), pp.324-330, DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14429/dsj.62.129
Exploiting Hardware from Software:An attack-surface analysis
In recent years we observed a deepening integration between hardware and software; we now have dedicated hardware for all sorts of applications and software heavily optimized for the underlying hardware. And while this allowed modern systems to keep up with the increasing demand for performance, this new paradigm came at the cost of a more complex hardware-software stack. Unfortunately, between the cracks of these two domains, we notice a new class of attacks gaining momentum: software-based hardware attacks. As the name suggests, these attacks target underlying hardware vulnerabilities while being leveraged from software—notorious examples being the Rowhammer bug, Spectre, and Meltdown. In this thesis, we perform an in-depth attack surface analysis of different software-based hardware vulnerabilities while revisiting some of the assumptions upon which the current attacks and defenses are built. More specifically, we deepen the understanding of the DRAM Rowhammer bug from various perspectives: we show how it represents a serious threat to various targets such as mobile devices, web browsers, and Deep Neural Networks; and, we demonstrate that the silver-bullet defense introduced on DDR4 devices against the issue—in-DRAM Target Row Refresh—does not prevent an attacker from triggering bit-flips on millions of devices previously deemed safe. On top of that, we investigate the effectiveness of hardware defenses introduced against the recent Spectre bug and show how those deployed to prevent cross-privilege Spectre attacks are incomplete, allowing attackers to build new exploits
A framework to detect cyber-attacks against networked medical devices (Internet of Medical Things):an attack-surface-reduction by design approach
Most medical devices in the healthcare system are not built-in security concepts. Hence, these devices' built-in vulnerabilities prone them to various cyber-attacks when connected to a hospital network or cloud. Attackers can penetrate devices, tamper, and disrupt services in hospitals and clinics, which results in threatening patients' health and life. A specialist can Manage Cyber-attacks risks by reducing the system's attack surface. Attack surface analysis, either as a potential source for exploiting a potential vulnerability by attackers or as a medium to reduce cyber-attacks play a significant role in mitigating risks. Furthermore, it is necessitated to perform attack surface analysis in the design phase. This research proposes a framework that integrates attack surface concepts into the design and development of medical devices. Devices are classified as high-risk, medium-risk, and low-risk. After risk assessment, the employed classification algorithm detects and analyzes the attack surfaces. Accordingly, the relevant adapted security controls will be prompted to hinder the attack. The simulation and evaluation of the framework is the subject of further research.</p
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