Online Dispute Resolution Through the Lens of Bargaining and Negotiation Theory: Toward an Integrated Model

[Excerpt] In this article we apply negotiation and bargaining theory to the analysis of online dispute resolution. Our principal objective is to develop testable hypotheses based on negotiation theory that can be used in ODR research. We have not conducted the research necessary to test the hypotheses we develop; however, in a later section of the article we suggest a possible methodology for doing so. There is a vast literature on negotiation and bargaining theory. For the purposes of this article, we realized at the outset that we could only use a small part of that literature in developing a model that might be suitable for empirical testing. We decided to use the behavioral theory of negotiation developed by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, which was initially formulated in the 1960s. This theory has stood the test of time. Initially developed to explain union-management negotiations, it has proven useful in analyzing a wide variety of disputes and conflict situations. In constructing their theory, Walton and McKersie built on the contributions and work of many previous bargaining theorists including economists, sociologists, game theorists, and industrial relations scholars. In this article, we have incorporated a consideration of the foundations on which their theory was based. In the concluding section of the article we discuss briefly how other negotiation and bargaining theories might be applied to the analysis of ODR

Privacy-Preserving Trust Management Mechanisms from Private Matching Schemes

Cryptographic primitives are essential for constructing privacy-preserving communication mechanisms. There are situations in which two parties that do not know each other need to exchange sensitive information on the Internet. Trust management mechanisms make use of digital credentials and certificates in order to establish trust among these strangers. We address the problem of choosing which credentials are exchanged. During this process, each party should learn no information about the preferences of the other party other than strictly required for trust establishment. We present a method to reach an agreement on the credentials to be exchanged that preserves the privacy of the parties. Our method is based on secure two-party computation protocols for set intersection. Namely, it is constructed from private matching schemes.Comment: The material in this paper will be presented in part at the 8th DPM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management (DPM 2013

An Investigation of the Negotiation Domain for Electronic Commerce Information Systems

To support fully automatic business cycles, information systems for electronic commerce need to be able to conduct negotiation automatically. In recent years, a number of general frameworks for automated negotiation have been proposed. Application of such frameworks in a specific negotiation situation entails selecting the proper framework and adapting it to this situation. This selection and adaptation process is driven by the specific characteristics of the situation. This paper presents a systematic investigation of there characteristics and surveys a number of frameworks for automated negotiation

Controlled secret leakage

How to leak authoritative secrets in an elegant way? The paper aims to solve this problem. The desired security properties i.e. Semantic-Security; Recipient-Designation; Verification-Dependence; Designated-Verifier Signature-Verifiability; Public Signature-Verifiability; Recipient-Ambiguity; Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability; Public Recipient-Verifiability; Signer-Ambiguity; Signer- Verifiability are specified in secret leakage. Based on Chow-Yiu-Hui's ID-based ring signature scheme and techniques of zero-knowledge proof, an ID-based controlled secret leakage scheme is proposed. The proposed scheme satisfies all specified security properties and can be used in trust negotiation

The Business Lawyer as Terrorist Transaction Cost Engineer

Lawyers have garnered a reputation for being unreasonable and excessively contentious. This popular sentiment is embedded in our culture. If lawyers cannot change that perception, a second-best outcome (from the perspective of lawyers) would be the formation of an understanding that there is a reason why they appear to act unreasonably, that it can be desirable for lawyers to act in a way that initially appears to be unreasonable. This Article attempts to build a basis for that understanding in the context of lawyers participating in large commercial transactions

Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.Fil: Niella, Tamara. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; ArgentinaFil: Stier, Nicolas. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Trust Strategies for the Semantic Web

Everyone agrees on the importance of enabling trust on the SemanticWebto ensure more efficient agent interaction. Current research on trust seems to focus on developing computational models, semantic representations, inference techniques, etc. However, little attention has been given to the plausible trust strategies or tactics that an agent can follow when interacting with other agents on the Semantic Web. In this paper we identify five most common strategies of trust and discuss their envisaged costs and benefits. The aim is to provide some guidelines to help system developers appreciate the risks and gains involved with each trust strategy