6 research outputs found
Physically unclonable functions based on a controlled ring oscillator
Π Π΅ΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠ° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠ° ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΡ
ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ (Π€ΠΠ€) Π½Π° Π±Π°Π·Π΅ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ»Π»ΡΡΠΎΡΠ° (Π£ΠΠ). ΠΠΊΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ·Π΄Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π£ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€ ΡΠ²ΡΠ·Π°Π½Π° Ρ Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΠΌ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΡΠΈΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΎΠΉ Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΉ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ·Π΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΠΉ ΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΡΠΈΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ. ΠΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π½ΠΎ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΡΡ
ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ»Π»ΡΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ² (ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€) Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ·ΡΡΡΡΡ Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠΉ Π°ΠΏΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈΠ·Π±ΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΡ ΠΈΠ·-Π·Π° Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ²ΡΠ²Π°ΡΡ Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠ΅ ΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΎ ΠΠ, Π² ΡΠΈΠ»Ρ ΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΆΠ΄ΡΠΉ Π±ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ° ΡΡΠ΅Π±ΡΠ΅Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΡΠΈΡ Π½Π΅Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΠ. Π ΡΠΎΠΆΠ΅ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ·ΡΡΡΡΡ Π»ΡΡΡΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π°ΠΌΠΈ ΠΏΠΎ ΡΡΠ°Π²Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Ρ Π€ΠΠ€ ΡΠΈΠΏΠ° Π°ΡΠ±ΠΈΡΡ ΠΈ Π½Π΅ ΡΡΠ΅Π±ΡΡΡ ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΡ
ΠΠ. Π ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅ Π°Π»ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠ²Ρ ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΠΉ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΡ
ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ, Π° ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ£ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€, ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΡΡΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ»Π»ΡΡΠΎΡΡ, ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΡ
ΠΈΠΌΠΏΡΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠ² Π±Π΅Π· ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ»Π»ΡΡΠΎΡΠ°. ΠΠ°ΠΆΠ½ΡΠΌ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ²ΠΎΠΌ Π£ΠΠ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° Π΅Π³ΠΎ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠΆΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π° ΠΠ,ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ
Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ³Π°Π΅Ρ 2m, Π³Π΄Π΅ m Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ² ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ»Π»ΡΡΠΎΡΠ°, ΠΈ ΠΊΠ°ΠΆΠ΄ΡΠΉ ΠΈΠ· Π½ΠΈΡ
ΠΎΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π°Π²Π°Π΅ΠΌΡΠΌ Π·Π°ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΌ. Π ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΠΈ Π°Π»ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΠΌΡΡ
Π€ΠΠ€, Π° ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎ Π£ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€1, Π£ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€2 ΠΈ Π£ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€3. ΠΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·ΡΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΈΡ
ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΡΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ²Π° ΠΈ Π½Π΅Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠ°ΡΠΊΠΈ, Π² ΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅, Π² ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅ Π΄Π²ΡΡ
Π²Π°ΡΠΈΠ°Π½ΡΠΎΠ² ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ, Π° ΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΊΠ΅ (FPGA) ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΈΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΊΠ΅ (ASIC). Π ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅ Π±Π°Π·ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π²Π°ΡΠΈΠ°Π½ΡΠ° Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° FPGA ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π£ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€2 ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π²Π΅ΡΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠΊΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈ, ΡΡΠΎ Π±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½ΠΎ, Π²Π½ΡΡΡΠΈΠΊΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ, Π²ΡΠ·Π²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π½ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΡΠΌΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΈΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ°. ΠΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠ»ΠΈΡΡ ΠΏΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° ΡΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
FPGA Π£ΠΠΠ€ΠΠ€2, ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ Π΅Π΅ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΡΡ
Π΅Π΅ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ. ΠΠΊΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΆΠ΄Π΅Π½Π° ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΡΠ° Π€ΠΠ€ ΠΏΡΠΈ ΠΈΡ
ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΌΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΎΠΉ Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΊΠ΅, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π²ΡΡΠΎΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΈΡ
ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ
MeLPUF: Memory in Logic PUF
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are used for securing electronic designs
across the implementation spectrum ranging from lightweight FPGA to
server-class ASIC designs. However, current PUF implementations are vulnerable
to model-building attacks; they often incur significant design overheads and
are challenging to configure based on application-specific requirements. These
factors limit their application, primarily in the case of the system on chip
(SoC) designs used in diverse applications. In this work, we propose MeL-PUF -
Memory-in-Logic PUF, a low-overhead, distributed, and synthesizable PUF that
takes advantage of existing logic gates in a design and transforms them to
create cross-coupled inverters (i.e. memory cells) controlled by a PUF control
signal. The power-up states of these memory cells are used as the source of
entropy in the proposed PUF architecture. These on-demand memory cells can be
distributed across the combinational logic of various intellectual property
(IP) blocks in a system on chip (SoC) design. They can also be synthesized with
a standard logic synthesis tool to meet the area,power, or performance
constraints of a design. By aggregating the power-up states from multiple such
memory cells, we can create a PUF signature or digital fingerprint of varying
size. We evaluate the MeL-PUF signature quality with both circuit-level
simulations as well as with measurements in FPGA devices. We show that MeL-PUF
provides high-quality signatures in terms of uniqueness, randomness, and
robustness, without incurring large overheads. We also suggest additional
optimizations that can be leveraged to improve the performance of MeL-PUF.Comment: 5 pages, 16 figure
Assessing Security Risks with the Internet of Things
For my honors thesis I have decided to study the security risks associated with the Internet of Things (IoT) and possible ways to secure them. I will focus on how corporate, and individuals use IoT devices and the security risks that come with their implementation. In my research, I found out that IoT gadgets tend to go unnoticed as a checkpoint for vulnerability. For example, often personal IoT devices tend to have the default username and password issued from the factory that a hacker could easily find through Google. IoT devices need security just as much as computers or servers to keep the security, confidentiality, and availability of data in the right hands
Practical Lightweight Security: Physical Unclonable Functions and the Internet of Things
In this work, we examine whether Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can act as lightweight security mechanisms for practical applications in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). In order to do so, we first discuss what PUFs are, and note that memory-based PUFs seem to fit the best to the framework of the IoT. Then, we consider a number of relevant memory-based PUF designs and their properties, and evaluate their ability to provide security in nominal and adverse conditions. Finally, we present and assess a number of practical PUF-based security protocols for IoT devices and networks, in order to confirm that memory-based PUFs can indeed constitute adequate security mechanisms for the IoT, in a practical and lightweight fashion.
More specifically, we first consider what may constitute a PUF, and we redefine PUFs as inanimate physical objects whose characteristics can be exploited in order to obtain a behaviour similar to a highly distinguishable (i.e., β(quite) uniqueβ) mathematical function. We note that PUFs share many characteristics with biometrics, with the main difference being that PUFs are based on the characteristics of inanimate objects, while biometrics are based on the characteristics of humans and other living creatures. We also note that it cannot really be proven that PUFs are unique per instance, but they should be considered to be so, insofar as (human) biometrics are also considered to be unique per instance.
We, then, proceed to discuss the role of PUFs as security mechanisms for the IoT, and we determine that memory-based PUFs are particularly suited for this function. We observe that the IoT nowadays consists of heterogeneous devices connected over diverse networks, which include both high-end and resource-constrained devices. Therefore, it is essential that a security solution for the IoT is not only effective, but also highly scalable, flexible, lightweight, and cost-efficient, in order to be considered as practical. To this end, we note that PUFs have been proposed as security mechanisms for the IoT in the related work, but the practicality of the relevant security mechanisms has not been sufficiently studied.
We, therefore, examine a number of memory-based PUFs that are implemented using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, and assess their potential to serve as acceptable security mechanisms in the context of the IoT, not only in terms of effectiveness and cost, but also under both nominal and adverse conditions, such as ambient temperature and supply voltage variations, as well as in the presence of (ionising) radiation. In this way, we can determine whether memory-based PUFs are truly suitable to be used in the various application areas of the IoT, which may even involve particularly adverse environments, e.g., in IoT applications involving space modules and operations.
Finally, we also explore the potential of memory-based PUFs to serve as adequate security mechanisms for the IoT in practice, by presenting and analysing a number of cryptographic protocols based on these PUFs. In particular, we study how memory-based PUFs can be used for key generation, as well as device identification, and authentication, their role as security mechanisms for current and next-generation IoT devices and networks, and their potential for applications in the space segment of the IoT and in other adverse environments. Additionally, this work also discusses how memory-based PUFs can be utilised for the implementation of lightweight reconfigurable PUFs that allow for advanced security applications. In this way, we are able to confirm that memory-based PUFs can indeed provide flexible, scalable, and efficient security solutions for the IoT, in a practical, lightweight, and inexpensive manner