Global safety : how to deal with necessary truths

According to the safety condition, a subject knows that p only if she would believe that p only if p was true. The safety condition has been a very popular necessary condition for knowledge of late. However, it is well documented that the safety condition is trivially satisfied in cases where the subject believes in a necessary truth. This is for the simple reason that a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds, and therefore it is true in all possible worlds where it is believed. But clearly, all beliefs concerning necessary truths do not amount to knowledge. The safety theorists have attempted to deal with the problem caused by necessary truths by restricting the safety condition to purely contingent truths and by globalizing the safety condition to a set of propositions. Both of these solutions are problematic. The principal aim of this paper is to develop a version of the safety condition that is able to deal with cases featuring necessary truths.Peer reviewe

The routines and rituals of a design and technology classroom: An ethnographic study

This research examines questions and issues raised from an ethnographic study of a secondary design and technology classroom. A critical ethnographic methodology was employed to explore the \u27way of life\u27 in design and technology and examine how aspects of this micro-culture impact on teaching and learning. This ethnographic account includes description and discussion of four significant aspects of design and technology culture. The first examines the predominant masculine culture within this classroom and the subject area at large. The second is the story of four girls and their perceived alienation and exclusion from the dominance of a boy subject . Third is an account of both internal and external perceptions of the status of design and technology compared to the more traditionally liberal pursuits. The final point is an analysis of how aspects of the culture within this classroom impact teaching and learning. The implications of aspects of this classroom culture are discussed

October 15, 2007

The Breeze is the student newspaper of James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia

Rycenga Symposium Spring 1985

Interdisciplinary journal published by students of SHU.https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/stupub_rycengasymposium/1002/thumbnail.jp

The Epistemology of Perception

An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume

Beware of Safety

Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The latter is central to our epistemic endeavours: we want to be able to get right answers, whatever they are, to questions of interest. I argue that we are sufficiently safe from error (in some relevant domain) by being sufficiently sensitive (to relevant distinctions)

Meta-epistemological scepticism: criticisms and a defence

The epistemological problem of the external world asks: (1) “How is knowledge of the world possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible?” This is a “how-possible?” question: it asks how something is possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible (cf. Cassam 2007; Nozick 1981; Stroud 1984). Now consider the following question, which asks: (2) “How is a philosophically satisfying answer to (1) possible?” Scepticism is the thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the first question. Meta-epistemological scepticism is the thesis that a satisfying philosophical explanation of how our knowledge of the world is possible is itself not possible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the second question. In this thesis, I explore the prospects of meta-epistemological scepticism. In particular, I structure the thesis around two master arguments from Stroud (1984, 2000, 2004, and 2009) for meta-epistemological scepticism. The first argument is what I call “Stroud’s puzzle”, and the second argument is “Stroud’s dilemma” (cf. Cassam 2009). I argue that Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. However, I also argue that Stroud’s dilemma withstands serious objections (e.g., from Sosa 1994, Williams 1996, and Cassam 2009). In short, while Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism, Stroud’s dilemma does seem to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. This thesis therefore represents a partial defence of meta-epistemological scepticism. Meta-epistemological scepticism is therefore a live option in epistemology. In Chapter 1, I explain what meta-epistemological is, present Stroud’s puzzle and Stroud’s dilemma for meta-epistemological scepticism, and argue that meta-epistemological sceptics are not committed to first-order scepticism. In Chapter 2, I examine what I call the “anti-revisionist” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 3, I examine the “conditional scepticism” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 4, I look at Williams’s (1996) master argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and argue that it fails. In Chapter 5, I look at externalist responses to Stroud’s dilemma, and in particular, Sosa (1994). I argue that Sosa’s objection fails, and therefore Stroud’s dilemma survives serious externalist objections. In Chapter 6, I explain Cassam’s (2009) argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and I argue that it fails. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, summarising the main results