64 research outputs found
Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders
In the context of online ad serving, display ads may appear on different types of webpages, where each page includes several ad slots and therefore multiple ads can be shown on each page. The set of ads that can be assigned to ad slots of the same page needs to satisfy various prespecified constraints including exclusion constraints, diversity constraints, and the like. Upon arrival of a user, the ad serving system needs to allocate a set of ads to the current webpage respecting these per-page allocation constraints. Previous slot-based settings ignore the important concept of a page and may lead to highly suboptimal results in general. In this article, motivated by these applications in display advertising and inspired by the submodular welfare maximization problem with online bidders, we study a general class of page-based ad allocation problems, present the first (tight) constant-factor approximation algorithms for these problems, and confirm the performance of our algorithms experimentally on real-world datasets.
A key technical ingredient of our results is a novel primal-dual analysis for handling free disposal, which updates dual variables using a “level function” instead of a single level and unifies with previous analyses of related problems. This new analysis method allows us to handle arbitrarily complicated allocation constraints for each page. Our main result is an algorithm that achieves a 1 &minus frac 1 e &minus o(1)-competitive ratio. Moreover, our experiments on real-world datasets show significant improvements of our page-based algorithms compared to the slot-based algorithms.
Finally, we observe that our problem is closely related to the submodular welfare maximization (SWM) problem. In particular, we introduce a variant of the SWM problem with online bidders and show how to solve this problem using our algorithm for whole-page optimization.postprin
Whole-page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders
In the context of online ad serving, display ads may appear on different types of web-pages, where each page includes several ad slots and therefore multiple ads can be shown on each page. The set of ads that can be assigned to ad slots of the same page needs to satisfy various pre-specified constraints including exclusion constraints, diversity constraints, and the like. Upon arrival of a user, the ad serving system needs to allocate a set of ads to the current web-page respecting these per-page allocation constraints. Previous slot-based settings ignore the important concept of a page, and may lead to highly suboptimal results in general. In this paper, motivated by these applications in display advertising and inspired by the submodular welfare maximization problem with online bidders, we study a general class of page-based ad allocation problems, present the first (tight) constant-factor approximation algorithms for these problems, and confirm the performance of our algorithms experimentally on real-world data sets. A key technical ingredient of our results is a novel primal-dual analysis for handling free-disposal, which updates dual variables using a "level function" instead of a single level, and unifies with previous analyses of related problems. This new analysis method allows us to handle arbitrarily complicated allocation constraints for each page. Our main result is an algorithm that achieves a 1 − 1 e − o(1) competitive ratio. Moreover, our experiments on real-world data sets show significant improvements of our page-based algorithms compared to the slot-based algorithms. Finally, we observe that our problem is closely related to the submodular welfare maximization (SWM) problem. In particular, we introduce a variant of the SWM problem with online bidders, and show how to solve this problem using our algorithm for whole page optimization
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard
State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with
items achieve approximation guarantees of [Assadi and
Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an
NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is
unavoidable, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an
-approximation for any [Dobzinski and
Vondr\'ak, 2016]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between
computationally-efficient and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms.
We show that this distinction disappears with a mild relaxation of
truthfulness, which we term implementation in advised strategies, and that has
been previously studied in relation to "Implementation in Undominated
Strategies" [Babaioff et al, 2009]. Specifically, advice maps a tentative
strategy either to that same strategy itself, or one that dominates it. We say
that a player follows advice as long as they never play actions which are
dominated by advice. A poly-time mechanism guarantees an -approximation
in implementation in advised strategies if there exists poly-time advice for
each player such that an -approximation is achieved whenever all
players follow advice. Using an appropriate bicriterion notion of approximate
demand queries (which can be computed in poly-time), we establish that (a
slight modification of) the [Assadi and Singla, 2019] mechanism achieves the
same -approximation in implementation in advised
strategies
A Tight Competitive Ratio for Online Submodular Welfare Maximization
In this paper we consider the online Submodular Welfare (SW) problem. In this
problem we are given bidders each equipped with a general (not necessarily
monotone) submodular utility and items that arrive online. The goal is to
assign each item, once it arrives, to a bidder or discard it, while maximizing
the sum of utilities. When an adversary determines the items' arrival order we
present a simple randomized algorithm that achieves a tight competitive ratio
of \nicefrac{1}{4}. The algorithm is a specialization of an algorithm due to
[Harshaw-Kazemi-Feldman-Karbasi MOR`22], who presented the previously best
known competitive ratio of to the problem. When
the items' arrival order is uniformly random, we present a competitive ratio of
, improving the previously known \nicefrac{1}{4} guarantee.
Our approach for the latter result is based on a better analysis of the
(offline) Residual Random Greedy (RRG) algorithm of
[Buchbinder-Feldman-Naor-Schwartz SODA`14], which we believe might be of
independent interest
Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions
Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations
by (Babaioff et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion
of perturbation stability in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) and study the extend
to which stability helps in social welfare maximization and mechanism design. A
CA is if the optimal solution is resilient to
inflation, by a factor of , of any bidder's valuation for any
single item. On the positive side, we show how to compute efficiently an
optimal allocation for 2-stable subadditive valuations and that a Walrasian
equilibrium exists for 2-stable submodular valuations. Moreover, we show that a
Parallel 2nd Price Auction (P2A) followed by a demand query for each bidder is
truthful for general subadditive valuations and results in the optimal
allocation for 2-stable submodular valuations. To highlight the challenges
behind optimization and mechanism design for stable CAs, we show that a
Walrasian equilibrium may not exist for -stable XOS valuations for any
, that a polynomial-time approximation scheme does not exist for
-stable submodular valuations, and that any DSIC mechanism that
computes the optimal allocation for stable CAs and does not use demand queries
must use exponentially many value queries. We conclude with analyzing the Price
of Anarchy of P2A and Parallel 1st Price Auctions (P1A) for CAs with stable
submodular and XOS valuations. Our results indicate that the quality of
equilibria of simple non-truthful auctions improves only for -stable
instances with
The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design
Greedy algorithms are known to provide near optimal approximation guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) with multidimensional bidders, ignoring incentive compatibility. Borodin and Lucier [5] however proved that truthful greedy-like mechanisms for CAs with multi-minded bidders do not achieve good approximation guarantees. In this work, we seek a deeper understanding of greedy mechanism design and investigate under which general assumptions, we can have efficient and truthful greedy mechanisms for CAs. Towards this goal, we use the framework of priority algorithms and weak and strong verification, where the bidders are not allowed to overbid on their winning set or on any subsets of this set, respectively. We provide a complete characterization of the power of weak verification showing that it is sufficient and necessary for any greedy fixed priority algorithm to become truthful with the use of money or not, depending on the ordering of the bids. Moreover, we show that strong verification is sufficient and necessary for the greedy algorithm of [20], which is 2-approximate for submodular CAs, to become truthful with money in finite bidding domains. Our proof is based on an interesting structural analysis of the strongly connected components of the declaration graph
Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover
The Adwords and Online Bipartite Matching problems have enjoyed a renewed
attention over the past decade due to their connection to Internet advertising.
Our community has contributed, among other things, new models (notably
stochastic) and extensions to the classical formulations to address the issues
that arise from practical needs. In this paper, we propose a new generalization
based on matroids and show that many of the previous results extend to this
more general setting. Because of the rich structures and expressive power of
matroids, our new setting is potentially of interest both in theory and in
practice.
In the classical version of the problem, the offline side of a bipartite
graph is known initially while vertices from the online side arrive one at a
time along with their incident edges. The objective is to maintain a decent
approximate matching from which no edge can be removed. Our generalization,
called Matroid Online Bipartite Matching, additionally requires that the set of
matched offline vertices be independent in a given matroid. In particular, the
case of partition matroids corresponds to the natural scenario where each
advertiser manages multiple ads with a fixed total budget.
Our algorithms attain the same performance as the classical version of the
problems considered, which are often provably the best possible. We present
-competitive algorithms for Matroid Online Bipartite Matching under the
small bid assumption, as well as a -competitive algorithm for Matroid
Online Bipartite Matching in the random arrival model. A key technical
ingredient of our results is a carefully designed primal-dual waterfilling
procedure that accommodates for matroid constraints. This is inspired by the
extension of our recent charging scheme for Online Bipartite Vertex Cover.Comment: 19 pages, to appear in EC'1
Near-Optimal Asymmetric Binary Matrix Partitions
We study the asymmetric binary matrix partition problem that was recently introduced by Alon et al. (Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pp 1–14, 2013). Instances of the problem consist of an n× m binary matrix A and a probability distribution over its columns. A partition schemeB= (B1, … , Bn) consists of a partition Bifor each row i of A. The partition Biacts as a smoothing operator on row i that distributes the expected value of each partition subset proportionally to all its entries. Given a scheme B that induces a smooth matrix AB, the partition value is the expected maximum column entry of AB. The objective is to find a partition scheme such that the resulting partition value is maximized. We present a 9/10-approximation algorithm for the case where the probability distribution is uniform and a (1 - 1 / e) -approximation algorithm for non-uniform distributions, significantly improving results of Alon et al. Although our first algorithm is combinatorial (and very simple), the analysis is based on linear programming and duality arguments. In our second result we exploit a nice relation of the problem to submodular welfare maximization
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