Which symbol grounding problem should we try to solve?

Floridi and Taddeo propose a condition of “zero semantic commitment” for solutions to the grounding problem, and a solution to it. I argue briefly that their condition cannot be fulfilled, not even by their own solution. After a look at Luc Steels' very different competing suggestion, I suggest that we need to re-think what the problem is and what role the ‘goals’ in a system play in formulating the problem. On the basis of a proper understanding of computing, I come to the conclusion that the only sensible ground-ing problem is how we can explain and re-produce the behavioral ability and function of meaning in artificial computational agent

Embodied cognition: A field guide

The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus

A Review of Verbal and Non-Verbal Human-Robot Interactive Communication

In this paper, an overview of human-robot interactive communication is presented, covering verbal as well as non-verbal aspects of human-robot interaction. Following a historical introduction, and motivation towards fluid human-robot communication, ten desiderata are proposed, which provide an organizational axis both of recent as well as of future research on human-robot communication. Then, the ten desiderata are examined in detail, culminating to a unifying discussion, and a forward-looking conclusion

A Praxical Solution of the Symbol Grounding Problem

Peer reviewe

How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable? A review of conceptual obstacles

Fifty years of effort in artificial intelligence (AI) and the formalization of legal reasoning have produced both successes and failures. Considerable success in organizing and displaying evidence and its interrelationships has been accompanied by failure to achieve the original ambition of AI as applied to law: fully automated legal decision-making. The obstacles to formalizing legal reasoning have proved to be the same ones that make the formalization of commonsense reasoning so difficult, and are most evident where legal reasoning has to meld with the vast web of ordinary human knowledge of the world. Underlying many of the problems is the mismatch between the discreteness of symbol manipulation and the continuous nature of imprecise natural language, of degrees of similarity and analogy, and of probabilities

The adaptive advantage of symbolic theft over sensorimotor toil: Grounding language in perceptual categories

Using neural nets to simulate learning and the genetic algorithm to simulate evolution in a toy world of mushrooms and mushroom-foragers, we place two ways of acquiring categories into direct competition with one another: In (1) "sensorimotor toil,” new categories are acquired through real-time, feedback-corrected, trial and error experience in sorting them. In (2) "symbolic theft,” new categories are acquired by hearsay from propositions – boolean combinations of symbols describing them. In competition, symbolic theft always beats sensorimotor toil. We hypothesize that this is the basis of the adaptive advantage of language. Entry-level categories must still be learned by toil, however, to avoid an infinite regress (the “symbol grounding problem”). Changes in the internal representations of categories must take place during the course of learning by toil. These changes can be analyzed in terms of the compression of within-category similarities and the expansion of between-category differences. These allow regions of similarity space to be separated, bounded and named, and then the names can be combined and recombined to describe new categories, grounded recursively in the old ones. Such compression/expansion effects, called "categorical perception" (CP), have previously been reported with categories acquired by sensorimotor toil; we show that they can also arise from symbolic theft alone. The picture of natural language and its origins that emerges from this analysis is that of a powerful hybrid symbolic/sensorimotor capacity, infinitely superior to its purely sensorimotor precursors, but still grounded in and dependent on them. It can spare us from untold time and effort learning things the hard way, through direct experience, but it remain anchored in and translatable into the language of experience

Learning programs by learning from failures

We describe an inductive logic programming (ILP) approach called learning from failures. In this approach, an ILP system (the learner) decomposes the learning problem into three separate stages: generate, test, and constrain. In the generate stage, the learner generates a hypothesis (a logic program) that satisfies a set of hypothesis constraints (constraints on the syntactic form of hypotheses). In the test stage, the learner tests the hypothesis against training examples. A hypothesis fails when it does not entail all the positive examples or entails a negative example. If a hypothesis fails, then, in the constrain stage, the learner learns constraints from the failed hypothesis to prune the hypothesis space, i.e. to constrain subsequent hypothesis generation. For instance, if a hypothesis is too general (entails a negative example), the constraints prune generalisations of the hypothesis. If a hypothesis is too specific (does not entail all the positive examples), the constraints prune specialisations of the hypothesis. This loop repeats until either (i) the learner finds a hypothesis that entails all the positive and none of the negative examples, or (ii) there are no more hypotheses to test. We introduce Popper, an ILP system that implements this approach by combining answer set programming and Prolog. Popper supports infinite problem domains, reasoning about lists and numbers, learning textually minimal programs, and learning recursive programs. Our experimental results on three domains (toy game problems, robot strategies, and list transformations) show that (i) constraints drastically improve learning performance, and (ii) Popper can outperform existing ILP systems, both in terms of predictive accuracies and learning times.Comment: Accepted for the machine learning journa

The Latent Structure of Dictionaries

How many words (and which ones) are sufficient to define all other words? When dictionaries are analyzed as directed graphs with links from defining words to defined words, they reveal a latent structure. Recursively removing all words that are reachable by definition but that do not define any further words reduces the dictionary to a Kernel of about 10%. This is still not the smallest number of words that can define all the rest. About 75% of the Kernel turns out to be its Core, a Strongly Connected Subset of words with a definitional path to and from any pair of its words and no word’s definition depending on a word outside the set. But the Core cannot define all the rest of the dictionary. The 25% of the Kernel surrounding the Core consists of small strongly connected subsets of words: the Satellites. The size of the smallest set of words that can define all the rest (the graph’s Minimum Feedback Vertex Set or MinSet) is about 1% of the dictionary, 15% of the Kernel, and half-Core, half-Satellite. But every dictionary has a huge number of MinSets. The Core words are learned earlier, more frequent, and less concrete than the Satellites, which in turn are learned earlier and more frequent but more concrete than the rest of the Dictionary. In principle, only one MinSet’s words would need to be grounded through the sensorimotor capacity to recognize and categorize their referents. In a dual-code sensorimotor-symbolic model of the mental lexicon, the symbolic code could do all the rest via re-combinatory definition

Lazy Model Expansion: Interleaving Grounding with Search

Finding satisfying assignments for the variables involved in a set of constraints can be cast as a (bounded) model generation problem: search for (bounded) models of a theory in some logic. The state-of-the-art approach for bounded model generation for rich knowledge representation languages, like ASP, FO(.) and Zinc, is ground-and-solve: reduce the theory to a ground or propositional one and apply a search algorithm to the resulting theory. An important bottleneck is the blowup of the size of the theory caused by the reduction phase. Lazily grounding the theory during search is a way to overcome this bottleneck. We present a theoretical framework and an implementation in the context of the FO(.) knowledge representation language. Instead of grounding all parts of a theory, justifications are derived for some parts of it. Given a partial assignment for the grounded part of the theory and valid justifications for the formulas of the non-grounded part, the justifications provide a recipe to construct a complete assignment that satisfies the non-grounded part. When a justification for a particular formula becomes invalid during search, a new one is derived; if that fails, the formula is split in a part to be grounded and a part that can be justified. The theoretical framework captures existing approaches for tackling the grounding bottleneck such as lazy clause generation and grounding-on-the-fly, and presents a generalization of the 2-watched literal scheme. We present an algorithm for lazy model expansion and integrate it in a model generator for FO(ID), a language extending first-order logic with inductive definitions. The algorithm is implemented as part of the state-of-the-art FO(ID) Knowledge-Base System IDP. Experimental results illustrate the power and generality of the approach