80,973 research outputs found
Lorentz-invariant, retrocausal, and deterministic hidden variables
We review several no-go theorems attributed to Gisin and Hardy, Conway and
Kochen purporting the impossibility of Lorentz-invariant deterministic
hidden-variable model for explaining quantum nonlocality. Those theorems claim
that the only known solution to escape the conclusions is either to accept a
preferred reference frame or to abandon the hidden-variable program altogether.
Here we present a different alternative based on a foliation dependent
framework adapted to deterministic hidden variables. We analyse the impact of
such an approach on Bohmian mechanics and show that retrocausation (that is
future influencing the past) necessarily comes out without time-loop paradox
Ontology as Product-Service System: Lessons Learned from GO, BFO and DOLCE
This paper defends a view of the Gene Ontology (GO) and of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as examples of what the manufacturing industry calls product-service systems. This means that they are products (the ontologies) bundled with a range of ontology services such as updates, training, help desk, and permanent identifiers. The paper argues that GO and BFO are contrasted in this respect with DOLCE, which approximates more closely to a scientific theory or a scientific publication. The paper provides a detailed overview of ontology services and concludes with a discussion of some implications of the product-service system approach for the understanding of the nature of applied ontology. Ontology developer communities are compared in this respect with developers of scientific theories and of standards (such as W3C). For each of these we can ask: what kinds of products do they develop and what kinds of services do they provide for the users of these products
Processes endure, whereas events occur
In this essay, we aim to help clarify the nature of so-called 'occurrences' by attributing distinct modes of existence and persistence to processes and events. In doing so, we break with the perdurantism claimed by DOLCEâs authors and we distance ourselves from mereological analyzes like those recently conducted by Guarino to distinguish between 'processes' and 'episodes'. In line with the works of Stout and Galton, we first bring closer (physical) processes and objects in their way of enduring by proposing for processes a notion of dynamic presence (contrasting with a static presence for objects). Then, on the events side, we attribute to them the status of abstract entities by identifying them with objects of thought (by individual and collective subjects), and this allows us to distinguish for themselves between existence and occurrence. We therefore identify them with psychological (or even social) endurants, which may contingently occur
âNature doesnât care that weâre thereâ: Re-Symbolizing Natureâs âNaturalâ Contingency
This article draws upon the work of Timothy Morton and Slavoj ĆœiĆŸek in order to critically examine how mountain bike trail builders orientated themselves within nature relations. Beginning with a discussion of the key ontological differences between Mortonâs object-oriented ontology and ĆœiĆŸekâs blend of Hegelian- Lacanianism, we explore how Mortonâs dark ecology and ĆœiĆŸekâs account of the radical contingency of nature, can offer parallel paths to achieving an ecological awareness that neither idealises nor mythologises nature, but instead, acknowledges its strange (Morton) and contingent (ĆœiĆŸek) form. Empirically, we support this theoretical approach in interviews with twenty mountain bike trail builders. These interviews depicted an approach to trail building that was ambivalently formed in/with the contingency of nature. In doing so, the trail builders acted with a sense of temporal awareness that accepted the radical openness of nature, presenting a âsymbolic frameworkâ that was amiable to natureâs ambivalent, strange and contingent form. In conclusion, we argue that we should not lose sight of the ambivalences and strange surprises that emanate from our collective and unpredictable attempts to symbolize nature and that such knowledge can coincide with Mortonâs âdark ecologyâ â an ecological awareness that remains radically open to our ecological existence
Using conceptual metaphor and functional grammar to explore how language used in physics affects student learning
This paper introduces a theory about the role of language in learning
physics. The theory is developed in the context of physics students' and
physicists' talking and writing about the subject of quantum mechanics. We
found that physicists' language encodes different varieties of analogical
models through the use of grammar and conceptual metaphor. We hypothesize that
students categorize concepts into ontological categories based on the
grammatical structure of physicists' language. We also hypothesize that
students over-extend and misapply conceptual metaphors in physicists' speech
and writing. Using our theory, we will show how, in some cases, we can explain
student difficulties in quantum mechanics as difficulties with language.Comment: Accepted for publication in Phys. Rev. ST:PE
Definitions in ontologies
Definitions vary according to context of use and target audience. They must be made relevant for each context to fulfill their cognitive and linguistic goals. This involves adapting their logical structure, type of content, and form to each context of use. We examine from these perspectives the case of definitions in ontologies
Is a time symmetric interpretation of quantum theory possible without retrocausality?
Huw Price has proposed an argument that suggests a time-symmetric ontology
for quantum theory must necessarily be retrocausal, i.e. it must involve
influences that travel backwards in time. One of Price's assumptions is that
the quantum state is a state of reality. However, one of the reasons for
exploring retrocausality is that it offers the potential for evading the
consequences of no-go theorems, including recent proofs of the reality of the
quantum state. Here, we show that this assumption can be replaced by a
different assumption, called -mediation, that plausibly holds
independently of the status of the quantum state. We also reformulate the other
assumptions behind the argument to place them in a more general framework and
pin down the notion of time symmetry involved more precisely. We show that our
assumptions imply a timelike analogue of Bell's local causality criterion and,
in doing so, give a new interpretation of timelike violations of Bell
inequalities. Namely, they show the impossibility of a (non-retrocausal)
time-symmetric ontology.Comment: Accepted for publication in Proc. Roy. Soc. A., 18 pages, 3 figures,
revTeX4.
Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I: Spacetime State Realism
What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant
view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We
elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological
picture; and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against
it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function
realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an
opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism; a view which takes the
states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a
number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it
involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate
the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite
acceptable feature; even one which proves fruitful in the context of
relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for
combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested
by Deutsch and HaydenComment: LaTeX; 29 pages, 1 Fig. Forthcoming in the British Journal for the
Philosophy of Scienc
Truth and Existence
Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can then be strengthened to the conclusion that infinitely many things exist. Those things are not just all Gödel codes of sentences but rather all natural numbers. Against this background inclusive negative free logic collapses into noninclusive free logic, which collapses into classical logic. The consequences for ontological deflationism with respect to truth are discussed
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