44 research outputs found
When sports rules go awry
Wright (Wright, M. OR analysis of sporting rules - A survey. European Journal of Operational Research, 232(1):1-8, 2014) recently presented a survey of sporting rules from an Operational Research (OR) perspective. He surveyed 21 sports, which consider the rules of sports and tournaments and whether changes have led to unintended consequences. The paper concludes: "Overall, it would seem that this is just a taster and there may be plenty more such studies to come". In this paper we present one such study. This is an interdisciplinary paper, which cuts across economics, sport and operational research (OR). We recognize that the paper could have been published in any of these disciplines but for the sake of continuity with the paper that motivated this study, we wanted to publish this paper in an OR journal. We look at specific examples where the rules of sports have led to unforeseen and/or unwanted consequences. We hope that the paper will be especially useful to sports administrators, helping them to review what has not previously worked and also encouraging them to engage with the scientific community when considering making changes. We believe that this is the first time that such a comprehensive review of sporting rules, which have led to unexpected consequences, has been published in the scientific literature
Was Zidane honest or well-informed? How UEFA barely avoided a serious scandal
UEFA European Championship 1996 qualification is known to violate
strategy-proofness. It has been proved recently that a team could be better off
by exerting a lower effort: it might be optimal to concede some goals in order
to achieve a better position among runners-up, and hence avoid a hazardous
play-off. We show that it is not only an irrelevant scenario with a marginal
probability since France had an incentive to kick two own goals on its last
match against Israel.Comment: 6 page
A csalásbiztosságot sértő szabályok a sportban
Egy sportverseny csalásbiztos, ha nem fordulhat elĹ‘ olyan állapot, ahol egy játĂ©kos jobban jár számára rosszabb (kisebb erĹ‘feszĂtĂ©ssel elĂ©rhetĹ‘) eredmĂ©ny bekövetkezĂ©se esetĂ©n. Az elĹ‘adásban olyan, a gyakorlatbĂłl vett szabályok mellett alkalmazhatĂł manipuláciĂłs stratĂ©giákat tárgyalunk, melyek rĂ©vĂ©n egy versenyzĹ‘ biztosan – tehát nem csak várhatĂł Ă©rtĂ©kben – elĹ‘nyösebb helyzetbe kerĂĽl. Megmutatjuk, hogy az egymást követĹ‘ csoportköröket tartalmazĂł bajnokságok nem teljesĂtik a csalásbiztosság követelmĂ©nyĂ©t, amennyiben a kĂ©sĹ‘bbi csoportkörökben korábban játszott mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©sek eredmĂ©nyei is számĂtanak. BizonyĂtjuk az UEFA Bajnokok Ligája elmĂşlt három szezonban használt kvalifikáciĂłs szabályainak manipulálhatĂłságát. IsmertetĂĽnk egy olyan labdarĂşgĂł-mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©st, ahol mindkĂ©t csapat a döntetlenben volt Ă©rdekelt, kĂĽlönben mindketten kiestek volna. Mindegyik esetben javaslatot teszĂĽnk egy olyan, az eredetihez minĂ©l közelebb állĂł mechanizmusra, mely kizárja a manipuláciĂł lehetĹ‘sĂ©gĂ©t
A note on "Goals, constraints, and transparently fair assignments: A field study of randomization design in the UEFA Champions League''
A paper published in Management Science (Boczo\'n, M. and Wilson, A. J.:
Goals, constraints, and transparently fair assignments: A field study of
randomization design in the UEFA Champions League) on 2 September 2022 contains
substantial omissions and inaccuracies. This note attempts to correct them.Comment: 8 page
Improving the fairness of group draw in sports tournaments
Several sports tournaments establish restrictions on the draw of the group
stage. In this case, the usual mechanism to assign the teams into groups is
unevenly distributed: the valid allocations are not equally likely. We show by
two illustrative examples how the lack of randomisation in the size of the
groups and the inflexible treatment of a sophisticated draw constraint can
increase unfairness. Based on these ideas, the draw of the European Qualifiers
for the 2022 FIFA World Cup could have been closer to uniform distribution
without any negative effects. Our recommendation for a careful relabelling of
the pots from which the teams are drawn has a decent chance to be implemented
in practice.Comment: 10 pages, 1 figure, 3 table
Performance rating in chess, tennis, and other contexts
In this note, I introduce Estimated Performance Rating (PR), a novel
system for evaluating player performance in sports and games. PR addresses
a key limitation of the Tournament Performance Rating (TPR) system, which is
undefined for zero or perfect scores in a series of games. PR is defined as
the rating that solves an optimization problem related to scoring probability,
making it applicable for any performance level. The main theorem establishes
that the PR of a player is equivalent to the TPR whenever the latter is
defined. I then apply this system to historically significant win-streaks in
association football, tennis, and chess. Beyond sports, PR has broad
applicability in domains where Elo ratings are used, from college rankings to
the evaluation of large language models
Preventing collusion created by tie-breaking rules
Games played in the last round of a round-robin tournament inspire
match-fixing or tacit collusion if the two opposing teams can benefit from a
particular result at the expense of other teams. In the case of four teams, the
current study identifies all these situations caused by using head-to-head
records as the primary tie-breaking principle. Simulations based on the 2016
UEFA European Football Championship reveal that the official tie-breaking
policy substantially increases the risk of collusion, but it can be mitigated
by choosing an optimal order of matches. Following the proposed schedule
improves the competitiveness of the two games played in the last round and
requires no reform on the format of the competition.Comment: 12 pages, 1 figure, 5 table
Néhány gondolat a labdarúgás rangsorolási szabályairól a 2018. évi labdarúgó-világbajnokság európai selejtezője kapcsán
A cikk a labdarĂşgásban alkalmazott rangsorolási szabályok problĂ©máit tárgyalja. Bemutatjuk a 2018. Ă©vi labdarĂşgĂł-világbajnokság eurĂłpai selejtezĹ‘jĂ©nek manipulálhatĂłságát: mĂ©g 2017 oktĂłberĂ©ben, a mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©sek nĂ©gyötödĂ©nek lejátszását követĹ‘en is megtörtĂ©nhetett volna, hogy – az összes többi eredmĂ©ny változatlansága mellett – egy csapat az utolsĂł mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©sĂ©n elĂ©rt gyĹ‘zelemmel kiesik, döntetlennel viszont kijuthat a világbajnokságra. AzonosĂtunk további nyolc olyan világbajnoki Ă©s EurĂłpa-bajnoki selejtezĹ‘t, amelyek nem teljesĂtettĂ©k a csalásbiztosság feltĂ©telĂ©t, Ă©s javaslatot teszĂĽnk egy ezen követelmĂ©nyt minden körĂĽlmĂ©nyek között teljesĂtĹ‘ mechanizmus alkalmazására, amely nem áll távol a selejtezĹ‘k törtĂ©nelmileg kialakult elveitĹ‘l. IsmertetĂĽnk egy további kijátszhatĂł szabályt, Ă©s felidĂ©zĂĽnk nĂ©hány vitát generálĂł mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©st a labdarĂşgás törtĂ©netĂ©bĹ‘l. Munkánkkal szeretnĂ©nk felhĂvni a sportvezetĂ©s figyelmĂ©t, hogy a jövĹ‘beli botrányok elkerĂĽlĂ©se Ă©rdekĂ©ben elengedhetetlen a rangsorolás axiomatikus vizsgálata.*
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kĂłd: C44, D71, L83