Libet's experiment provides no evidence against strong libertarian free will because readiness potentials do not cause our actions

This article argues against Benjamin Libet's claim that his experiment has shown that our actions are caused by brain events which begin before we decide and before we even think about the action. It clarifies what exactly should be meant by the RP causing, initiating, or preparing an action. It argues that Libet's claim is incompatible with strong libertarian free will. It shows why Libet's experiment does not support his claim and why the experiments by Herrmann et al. and by Trevena \& Miller provide evidence against his claim. The empirical evidence is compatible with strong libertarian free will. Neither the readiness potential (RP, Bereitschaftspotential) nor the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) causes our actions

Acting and being aware

One often assumes that we, rational human beings, first think and than act. This paper is an attempt to describe the mental characteristics governing the performance of regular everyday actions; and shows that no mental act has to precede our actions, instead of consciously thinking before we act, we mostly act while simultaneously overseeing our acting. The case of ball juggling is used to underpin the analysis with practical facts

Libet's experiment provides no evidence against strong libertarian free will because it does not investigate voluntary actions

It is widely believed that Libet's experiment has shown that all our actions have preceding unconscious causes. This article argues that Libet's claim that the actions he investigated are voluntary is false. They are urges, and therefore the experiment shows at most that our urges have preceding unconscious causes, which is what also strong libertarianism leads us to expect. Further, Libet's correct observation that we can veto urges undermines his claim that our actions are initiated unconsciously and supports the thesis that we have strong libertarian free will

Business models in health care: Accounting for the sustainability of palliative and end of life care provision by voluntary hospices' in England

This study evaluates the sustainability of palliative and end of life care provision by voluntary hospices in England. Using a mixed methods, inductive approach, we construct a ‘descriptive business model’ for hospices which is grounded in analysis of relevant accounting information, and supported by narratives extracted from interviews with senior clinical and non clinical managers from four large and medium sized hospices. The study reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the hospice business model and evaluates its robustness against forthcoming challenges. Our findings highlight the gradual transition from a basic voluntary sector business model to a complex, highly sophisticated, and institutionalized care establishment, sharing many of the characteristics found in large private and public organizations. The sustainability however of the business model is threatened due to its exposure to a number of contradictory forces. Whilst demand for palliative and end of life care going forward is set to increase, due to both demographic and regulatory factors, hospices' voluntary income is highly volatile. Dependency on sustaining a complex network of stakeholder groups to underwrite income, challenges the hospice business model’s ability to cope with the anticipated challenges

Motor imagery and action execution

What triggers the execution of actions? What happens in that moment when an action is triggered? What mental state is there at the moment of action-execution that was not there a second before? My aim is to highlight the importance of a thus far largely ignored kind of mental state in the discussion of these old and much-debated questions: motor imagery. While there have been a fair amount of research in psychology and neuroscience on motor imagery in the last 30 years or so, it is only recently that we start to understand the important role motor imagery plays in action initiation. And if, as these findings suggest, motor imagery plays an important role in action initiation, we can make progress not only in understanding action initiation in general but also in understanding what goes wrong in akratic actions and in relapse actions. Finally, this new picture of action-initiation also has far-reaching consequences for the relation between motivation and causation in naturalistic action-explanations

Free will, the self and the brain

The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position—which is favored here—since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is. A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the brain. In addition to absence of external and internal compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibilist view is proposed, according to which causal determination is complete when we add events occurring in the I (of which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness potential before the decision to act is no problem here. The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather than illusory. Some consequences of different views about freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed

At the Potter’s Wheel: An Argument for Material Agency

Consider a potter throwing a vessel on the wheel. Think of the complex ways brain, body, wheel and clay relate and interact with one another throughout the different stages of this activity and try to imagine some of the resources (physical, mental or biological) needed for the enaction of this creative process. Focus, for instance, on the first minutes of action when the potter attempts to centre the lump of clay on the wheel. The hands are grasping the clay. The fingers, bent slightly following the surface curvature, sense the clay and exchange vital tactile information necessary for a number of crucial decisions that are about to follow in the next few seconds. What is it that guides\ud the dextrous positioning of the potter’s hands and decides upon the precise amount of forward or downward pressure necessary for centring a lump of clay on the wheel? How do the potter’s fingers come to know the precise force of the\ud appropriate grip? What makes these questions even more fascinating is the ease by which the phenomena which they describe are accomplished. Yet underlying the effortless manner in which the potter’s hand reaches for and gradually\ud shapes the wet clay lies a whole set of conceptual challenges to some of our most deeply entrenched assumptions about what it means to be a human agent