Revenue sharing at music streaming platforms

We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from subscriptions to music streaming platforms among content providers. We provide direct, axiomatic and game-theoretical foundations for two focal (and somewhat polar) methods widely used in practice: pro-rata and user-centric. The former rewards artists proportionally to their number of total streams. With the latter, each user's subscription fee is proportionally divided among the artists streamed by that user. We also provide foundations for a family of methods compromising among the previous two, which addresses the rising concern in the music industry to explore new streaming models that better align the interests of artists, fans and streaming services.Comment: 30 page

Bulletin of Information 1969-1970

Annual bulletin with academic calendar, purpose of the school, faculty, administration, register of students, degrees conferred, prizes, curriculum (course of studies & description of courses),tuition costs and fees, requirements for admission & degree, registration, attendance, examinations & grades, bar admission, alumni association, scholarships & student aid, Lincoln Center area maphttps://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/bulletins/1063/thumbnail.jp

Some game theoretic marketing attribution models

In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretic approaches to design attribution mechanisms for multi-channel marketing campaigns. Both approaches are based on a key performance index function that provides the benefit obtained in each of the observed paths to conversion. The first approach considers the problem as a cooperative transferable utility game, and the proposed attribution mechanisms are based on the Shapley value. The second approach models the problem as a bankruptcy problem and the proposed attribution mechanism is based on the constrained equal-losses rule. We also extend the above approaches to deal with the cases in which the position or the repetition of the channels on the paths to conversion are taken into account

1970-1971 Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/lawpublications_bulletin/1055/thumbnail.jp

1970-1971 Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/lawpublications_bulletincmcl/1008/thumbnail.jp

Cooperative games for minimum cost spanning tree problems

Minimum cost spanning tree problems are well known problems in the Operations Research literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by a common supplier. Agents will be served through costly connections. Some part of the literature has focused, mainly, in studying how to allocate the connection cost among the agents. We review the papers that have addressed the allocation problem using cooperative game theory

Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies

This paper considers agglomeration economies. A new firm is planning to open a plant in a country divided into several regions. Each firm receives a positive externality if the new plant is located in its region. In a decentralized mechanism, the plant would be opened in the region where the new firm maximizes its individual benefit. Due to the externalities, it could be the case that the aggregate utility of all firms is maximized in a different region. Thus, the firms in the optimal region could transfer something to the new firm in order to incentivize it to open the plant in that region. We propose two rules that provide two different schemes for transfers between firms already located in the country and the newcomer. The first is based on cooperative game theory. This rule coincides with the $$\tau$$ τ -value, the nucleolus, and the per capita nucleolus of the associated cooperative game. The second is defined directly. We provide axiomatic characterizations for both rules. We characterize the core of the cooperative game. We prove that both rules belong to the core.Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GED431B 2019/34Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. ECO2017-82241-RConsejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología | Ref. 438366Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. PID2020-113440GB-I0