Digital culture, materiality and Nineteenth-Century studies

The rhetoric of the virtual stubbornly clings to digital culture, even though our experience of working within it is of a resisting medium that only behaves in certain ways. The persistence of the virtual demands attention: why do we cling to such a description even while we quite willingly recognise the interpenetration of the world beyond the monitor and that represented on it? In education we’re encouraged to use Virtual Learning Environments, as if somehow these spaces are not as real as classrooms; we participate (or read about others participating) in virtual worlds such as Second Life or World of Warcraft, places that imitate the real world, providing access to fantasies that are underpinned by very real economics; and we exploit the World Wide Web, believing in its textual metaphors (pages, hypertext) while ignoring its presence as a medium. In my contribution to this forum I want to suggest that our insistence on the immateriality of digital culture enforces an ontological distinction that overdetermines the materiality of the world beyond the monitor while misrecognizing the new things that are displayed upon it. Rather than continue to use the virtual as a category, I would like to argue using an alternative term, the apparition.1 Unlike the virtual, which foregrounds its effect of the real with reality itself present only as absence, apparition has two meanings: the first is an immaterial appearance, a ghostly presence that, like the virtual, can signal an absent materiality; the second is simply the appearance of something, specifically the emergence of something into history. It is this latter meaning, I suggest, that permits materiality to re-enter digital discourse

The \u27New\u27 Exclusionary Rule Debate: From \u27Still Preoccupied with 1985\u27 to \u27Virtual Deterrence\u27

The justices of the Supreme Court have drawn new battle lines over the exclusionary rule. In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), a five-justice majority, over a strong dissent, went out of the way to renew familiar criticisms of the rule. Just this January, in Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009), the justices again divided five to four. This time the dissenters raised the ante, by arguing that the Court\u27s cost-benefit approach to applying the rule is misguided. For the first time since Justice Brennan left the Court, some of the justices appealed to broader justifications for exclusion, including concerns for judicial integrity, judicial review, and long-run and indirect influences on official behavior. This article challenges the majority positions in Hudson and Herring as both normatively mistaken and empirically unsupported. Normatively, the escape of the guilty is a cost of the Fourth Amendment rather than whatever remedies enforce it. The only legitimate cost of exclusion is possible overdeterrence, defined in careful way: discouraging lawful behavior in a pool of cases in which legality is uncertain. The Article then tests the overdeterrence hypothesis against empirical evidence reporting hit rates for different types of searches and seizures. The current mix of Fourth Amendment remedies does not appear to be overdeterring and indeed appears to underdeter certain types of low-cost Fourth Amendment violations. The article also criticizes the Herring dissent\u27s more majestic view of the exclusionary rule, because the dissent\u27s approach (1) cannot account for the law\u27s response to innocent victims of illegal searches and seizures; (2) fails to account for alternative remedies, including a deterrence-based exclusionary rule; (3) conflicts with the good-faith immunity defense to tort actions against the police, thus threatening overdeterrence; and, most fundamentally, (4) mistakes the nature of Fourth Amendment rights as trumps over the application of otherwise valid criminal laws to private behavior, i.e., as a right to commit crimes in secret. Finally, the article presents a proposed improvement on current exclusionary rule practice, the virtual deterrence approach. Under this approach, before suppressing evidence (or admitting tainted evidence under an exception), the court should demand an account of what specific remedial steps, by way of training, discipline, or record-keeping, the department has taken to prevent recurrence of the violation. In typical cases the proposal may not be worth the additional layer of procedural complexity. When, however, the charged offense is exceptionally serious, or when the government exploits an exception to exclusion for fruits of conduct found unconstitutional by the court, virtual deterrence probably would increase compliance by police with constitutional requirements, and reduce both the chances of the guilty escaping and the temptation to distort fact and law to avoid such miscarriages of justice. The government\u27s option to refuse to undertake remedial measures and thereby acquiesce in a suppression order provides a strong safeguard against overdeterrence

The \u27New\u27 Exclusionary Rule Debate: From \u27Still Preoccupied with 1985\u27 to \u27Virtual Deterrence\u27

The justices of the Supreme Court have drawn new battle lines over the exclusionary rule. In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), a five-justice majority, over a strong dissent, went out of the way to renew familiar criticisms of the rule. Just this January, in Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009), the justices again divided five to four. This time the dissenters raised the ante, by arguing that the Court\u27s cost-benefit approach to applying the rule is misguided. For the first time since Justice Brennan left the Court, some of the justices appealed to broader justifications for exclusion, including concerns for judicial integrity, judicial review, and long-run and indirect influences on official behavior. This article challenges the majority positions in Hudson and Herring as both normatively mistaken and empirically unsupported. Normatively, the escape of the guilty is a cost of the Fourth Amendment rather than whatever remedies enforce it. The only legitimate cost of exclusion is possible overdeterrence, defined in careful way: discouraging lawful behavior in a pool of cases in which legality is uncertain. The Article then tests the overdeterrence hypothesis against empirical evidence reporting hit rates for different types of searches and seizures. The current mix of Fourth Amendment remedies does not appear to be overdeterring and indeed appears to underdeter certain types of low-cost Fourth Amendment violations. The article also criticizes the Herring dissent\u27s more majestic view of the exclusionary rule, because the dissent\u27s approach (1) cannot account for the law\u27s response to innocent victims of illegal searches and seizures; (2) fails to account for alternative remedies, including a deterrence-based exclusionary rule; (3) conflicts with the good-faith immunity defense to tort actions against the police, thus threatening overdeterrence; and, most fundamentally, (4) mistakes the nature of Fourth Amendment rights as trumps over the application of otherwise valid criminal laws to private behavior, i.e., as a right to commit crimes in secret. Finally, the article presents a proposed improvement on current exclusionary rule practice, the virtual deterrence approach. Under this approach, before suppressing evidence (or admitting tainted evidence under an exception), the court should demand an account of what specific remedial steps, by way of training, discipline, or record-keeping, the department has taken to prevent recurrence of the violation. In typical cases the proposal may not be worth the additional layer of procedural complexity. When, however, the charged offense is exceptionally serious, or when the government exploits an exception to exclusion for fruits of conduct found unconstitutional by the court, virtual deterrence probably would increase compliance by police with constitutional requirements, and reduce both the chances of the guilty escaping and the temptation to distort fact and law to avoid such miscarriages of justice. The government\u27s option to refuse to undertake remedial measures and thereby acquiesce in a suppression order provides a strong safeguard against overdeterrence

Prim Drift, CopyBots, and Folk Preservation: Three Copyright Parables about Art in the Digital Age

This paper employs a series of case studies from the domains of digital arts and creative/experimental new media to elicit tensions and contradictions in the current state of copyright and intellectual property law. I pay particular attention to the role of the "pirate" as preservationist--rather than taint or corrupt, historically we know that piracy has helped guarantee the survival of important works of literature and art. Throughout, I insist that the humanist is not a dabbler or interloper in these matters; humanistic knowledge, particularly semiotics (the study of sign systems) has the potential to lend consistency and coherence to case law that is currently shot through with loopholes, contradictions, and dead ends. To that end, I also outline the potential of a center devoted to intellectual property law and humanities advocacy

English Bards and Unknown Reviewers: a Stylometric Analysis of Thomas Moore and the Christabel Review

Fraught relations between authors and critics are a commonplace of literary history. The particular case that we discuss in this article, a negative review of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's Christabel (1816), has an additional point of interest beyond the usual mixture of amusement and resentment that surrounds a critical rebuke: the authorship of the review remains, to this day, uncertain. The purpose of this article is to investigate the possible candidacy of Thomas Moore as the author of the provocative review. It seeks to solve a puzzle of almost two hundred years, and in the process clear a valuable scholarly path in Irish Studies, Romanticism, and in our understanding of Moore's role in a prominent literary controversy of the age

Assessing Market Expectations on Exchange Rates and Inflation: A Pilot Forecasting System for Bulgaria

Econometric forecasting models typically perform bad in volatile environments as they are often present in economies in transition. Since forecasts of key macroeconomic variable are inevitable as guidelines for economic policy, one might alternatively make attempts at measuring market participants’ expectations or conduct surveys. However, often financial markets are underdeveloped and regular surveys are unavailable in transition countries. In this paper we propose to conduct experimental stock markets to reveal market participants’ expectations. W? present the results fr?m a series of pilot markets conducted in Bulgaria throughout 2002 indicating that the method could be useful especially for transition countries.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40145/3/wp759.pd