5,675 research outputs found
TriCheck: Memory Model Verification at the Trisection of Software, Hardware, and ISA
Memory consistency models (MCMs) which govern inter-module interactions in a
shared memory system, are a significant, yet often under-appreciated, aspect of
system design. MCMs are defined at the various layers of the hardware-software
stack, requiring thoroughly verified specifications, compilers, and
implementations at the interfaces between layers. Current verification
techniques evaluate segments of the system stack in isolation, such as proving
compiler mappings from a high-level language (HLL) to an ISA or proving
validity of a microarchitectural implementation of an ISA.
This paper makes a case for full-stack MCM verification and provides a
toolflow, TriCheck, capable of verifying that the HLL, compiler, ISA, and
implementation collectively uphold MCM requirements. The work showcases
TriCheck's ability to evaluate a proposed ISA MCM in order to ensure that each
layer and each mapping is correct and complete. Specifically, we apply TriCheck
to the open source RISC-V ISA, seeking to verify accurate, efficient, and legal
compilations from C11. We uncover under-specifications and potential
inefficiencies in the current RISC-V ISA documentation and identify possible
solutions for each. As an example, we find that a RISC-V-compliant
microarchitecture allows 144 outcomes forbidden by C11 to be observed out of
1,701 litmus tests examined. Overall, this paper demonstrates the necessity of
full-stack verification for detecting MCM-related bugs in the hardware-software
stack.Comment: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Conference on
Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating System
Formal Verification of Security Protocol Implementations: A Survey
Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approac
FunTAL: Reasonably Mixing a Functional Language with Assembly
We present FunTAL, the first multi-language system to formalize safe
interoperability between a high-level functional language and low-level
assembly code while supporting compositional reasoning about the mix. A central
challenge in developing such a multi-language is bridging the gap between
assembly, which is staged into jumps to continuations, and high-level code,
where subterms return a result. We present a compositional stack-based typed
assembly language that supports components, comprised of one or more basic
blocks, that may be embedded in high-level contexts. We also present a logical
relation for FunTAL that supports reasoning about equivalence of high-level
components and their assembly replacements, mixed-language programs with
callbacks between languages, and assembly components comprised of different
numbers of basic blocks.Comment: 15 pages; implementation at https://dbp.io/artifacts/funtal/;
published in PLDI '17, Proceedings of the 38th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on
Programming Language Design and Implementation, June 18 - 23, 2017,
Barcelona, Spai
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