41 research outputs found
Computer-aided proofs for multiparty computation with active security
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a general cryptographic technique
that allows distrusting parties to compute a function of their individual
inputs, while only revealing the output of the function. It has found
applications in areas such as auctioning, email filtering, and secure
teleconference. Given its importance, it is crucial that the protocols are
specified and implemented correctly. In the programming language community it
has become good practice to use computer proof assistants to verify correctness
proofs. In the field of cryptography, EasyCrypt is the state of the art proof
assistant. It provides an embedded language for probabilistic programming,
together with a specialized logic, embedded into an ambient general purpose
higher-order logic. It allows us to conveniently express cryptographic
properties. EasyCrypt has been used successfully on many applications,
including public-key encryption, signatures, garbled circuits and differential
privacy. Here we show for the first time that it can also be used to prove
security of MPC against a malicious adversary. We formalize additive and
replicated secret sharing schemes and apply them to Maurer's MPC protocol for
secure addition and multiplication. Our method extends to general polynomial
functions. We follow the insights from EasyCrypt that security proofs can be
often be reduced to proofs about program equivalence, a topic that is well
understood in the verification of programming languages. In particular, we show
that in the passive case the non-interference-based definition is equivalent to
a standard game-based security definition. For the active case we provide a new
NI definition, which we call input independence
Stronger Lower Bounds for Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
Threshold secret sharing allows a dealer to split a secret into shares, such that any shares allow for reconstructing , but no shares reveal any information about . Leakage-resilient secret sharing requires that the secret remains hidden, even when an adversary additionally obtains a limited amount of leakage from every share.
Benhamouda et al. (CRYPTO\u2718) proved that Shamir\u27s secret sharing scheme is one bit leakage-resilient for reconstruction threshold and conjectured that the same holds for for any constant . Nielsen and Simkin (EUROCRYPT\u2720) showed that this is the best one can hope for by proving that Shamir\u27s scheme is not secure against one-bit leakage when .
In this work, we strengthen the lower bound of Nielsen and Simkin. We consider noisy leakage-resilience, where a random subset of leakages is replaced by uniformly random noise. We prove a lower bound for Shamir\u27s secret sharing, similar to that of Nielsen and Simkin, which holds even when a constant fraction of leakages is replaced by random noise.
To this end, we first prove a lower bound on the share size of any noisy-leakage-resilient sharing scheme. We then use this lower bound to show that there exist universal constants , such that for infinitely many , it holds that Shamir\u27s secret sharing scheme is not noisy-leakage-resilient for , even when a fraction of leakages are replaced by random noise
Lower Bounds for Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
Threshold secret sharing allows a dealer to split a secret into shares such that any authorized subset of cardinality at least of those shares efficiently reveals the secret, while at the same time any unauthorized subset of cardinality less than contains no information about the secret.
Leakage-resilience additionally requires that the secret remains hidden even if one is given a bounded amount of additional leakage from every share.
In this work, we study leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes and prove a lower bound on the share size and the required amount of randomness of any information-theoretically secure scheme.
We prove that for any information-theoretically secure leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme either the amount of randomness across all shares or the share size has to be linear in .
More concretely, for a secret sharing scheme with -bit long shares, -bit leakage per share, where shares uniquely define the remaining shares, it has to hold that
We use this lower bound to gain further insights into a question that was recently posed by Benhamouda et al. (CRYPTO\u2718), who ask to what extend existing regular secret sharing schemes already provide protection against leakage.
The authors proved that Shamir\u27s secret sharing is -bit leakage-resilient for reconstruction thresholds and conjectured that it is also -bit leakage-resilient for any other threshold that is a constant fraction of the total number of shares.
We do not disprove their conjecture, but show that it is the best one could possibly hope for.
Concretely, we show that for large enough and any constant it holds that Shamir\u27s secret sharing scheme is \emph{not} leakage-resilient for .
In contrast to the setting with information-theoretic security, we show that our lower bound does not hold in the computational setting.
That is, we show how to construct a leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme in the random oracle model that is secure against computationally bounded adversaries and violates the lower bound stated above
Topology-Hiding Computation
Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the foundational achievements of modern cryptography,
allowing multiple, distrusting, parties to jointly compute a function of their inputs, while revealing nothing but the
output of the function. Following the seminal works of Yao and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson and Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson,
the study of MPC has expanded to consider a wide variety of questions, including variants in the attack model,
underlying assumptions, complexity and composability of the resulting protocols.
One question that appears to have received very little attention, however, is that of MPC over an
underlying communication network whose structure is, in itself, sensitive information. This question, in addition to being
of pure theoretical interest, arises naturally in many contexts: designing privacy-preserving social-networks, private peer-to-peer computations,
vehicle-to-vehicle networks and the ``internet of things\u27\u27 are some of the examples.
In this paper, we initiate the study of ``topology-hiding computation\u27\u27 in the computational setting. We give formal definitions
in both simulation-based and indistinguishability-based flavors. We show that, even for fail-stop adversaries, there are some strong
impossibility results. Despite this, we show that protocols for topology-hiding computation can be constructed in the semi-honest
and fail-stop models, if we somewhat restrict the set of nodes the adversary may corrupt
Applications of Secure Multiparty Computation
We generate and gather a lot of data about ourselves and others, some of it highly confidential. The collection, storage and use of this data is strictly regulated by laws, but restricting the use of data often limits the benefits which could be obtained from its analysis. Secure multi-party computation (SMC), a cryptographic technology, makes it possible to execute specific programs on confidential data while ensuring that no other sensitive information from the data is leaked. SMC has been the subject of academic study for more than 30 years, but first attempts to use it for actual computations in the early 2000s – although theoretically efficient – were initially not practicable. However, improvements in the situation have made possible the secure solving of even relatively large computational tasks. This book describes how many different computational tasks can be solved securely, yet efficiently. It describes how protocols can be combined to larger applications, and how the security-efficiency trade-offs of different components of an SMC application should be chosen. Many of the results described in this book were achieved as part of the project Usable and Efficient Secure Multi-party Computation (UaESMC), which was funded by the European Commission. The book will be of interest to all those whose work involves the secure analysis of confidential data
Always Have a Backup Plan: Fully Secure Synchronous MPC with Asynchronous Fallback
Protocols for secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) can be classified according to the underlying communication model. Two prominent communication models considered in the literature are the synchronous and asynchronous models, which considerably differ in terms of the achievable security guarantees. Synchronous MPC protocols can achieve the optimal corruption threshold and allow every party to give input, but become completely insecure when synchrony assumptions are violated. On the other hand, asynchronous MPC protocols remain secure under arbitrary network conditions, but can tolerate only corruptions and parties with slow connections unavoidably cannot give input.
A natural question is whether there exists a protocol for MPC that can tolerate up to corruptions under a synchronous network and corruptions even when the network is asynchronous. We answer this question by showing tight feasibility and impossibility results. More specifically, we show that such a protocol exists if and only if and the number of inputs taken into account under an asynchronous network is at most
On Sufficient Oracles for Secure Computation with Identifiable Abort
Identifiable abort is the strongest security guarantee that is achievable for secure multi-party computation in the dishonest majority setting.
Protocols that achieve this level of security ensure that, in case of an abort, all honest parties agree on the identity of at least one corrupt party who can be held accountable for the abort.
It is important to understand what computational primitives must be used to obtain secure computation with identifiable abort.
This can be approached by asking which oracles can be used to build perfectly secure computation with identifiable abort.
Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Zikas (Crypto 2014) show that an oracle that returns correlated randomness to all parties is sufficient; however, they leave open the question of whether oracles that return output to fewer than parties can be used.
In this work, we show that for corruptions, oracles that return output to parties are sufficient to obtain information-theoretically secure computation with identifiable abort.
Using our construction recursively, we see that for and , oracles that return output to parties are sufficient.
For our construction, we introduce a new kind of secret sharing scheme which we call unanimously identifiable secret sharing with public and private shares (UISSwPPS).
In a UISSwPPS scheme, each share holder is given a public and a private shares.
Only the public shares are necessary for reconstruction, and the knowledge of a private share additionally enables the identification of at least one party who provided an incorrect share in case reconstruction fails.
The important new property of UISSwPPS is that, even given all the public shares, an adversary should not be able to come up with a different public share that causes reconstruction of an incorrect message, or that avoids the identification of a cheater if reconstruction fails
Multi-party Quantum Computation
We investigate definitions of and protocols for multi-party quantum computing
in the scenario where the secret data are quantum systems. We work in the
quantum information-theoretic model, where no assumptions are made on the
computational power of the adversary. For the slightly weaker task of
verifiable quantum secret sharing, we give a protocol which tolerates any t <
n/4 cheating parties (out of n). This is shown to be optimal. We use this new
tool to establish that any multi-party quantum computation can be securely
performed as long as the number of dishonest players is less than n/6.Comment: Masters Thesis. Based on Joint work with Claude Crepeau and Daniel
Gottesman. Full version is in preparatio