An Agent-Based Model Framework for Utility-Based Cryptoeconomies

In this paper, we outline a framework for modeling utility-based blockchain-enabled economic systems using Agent Based Modeling (ABM). Our approach is to model the supply dynamics based on metrics of the cryptoeconomy. We then build autonomous agents that make decisions based on those metrics. Those decisions, in turn, impact the metrics in the next time-step, creating a closed loop that models the evolution of cryptoeconomies over time. We apply this framework as a case-study to Filecoin, a decentralized blockchain-based storage network. We perform several experiments that explore the effect of different strategies, capitalization, and external factors to agent rewards, that highlight the efficacy of our approach to modeling blockchain based cryptoeconomies.Comment: 14 pages, 5 figure

Agent-Based Urban Land Markets: Agent's Pricing Behavior, Land Prices and Urban Land Use Change

We present a new bilateral agent-based land market model, which moves beyond previous work by explicitly modeling behavioral drivers of land-market transactions on both the buyer and seller sides; formation of bid prices (of buyers) and ask prices (of sellers); and the relative division of the gains from trade from the market transactions. We analyze model output using a series of macro-scale economic and landscape pattern measures, including land rent gradients estimated using simple regression models. We first demonstrate that our model replicates relevant theoretical results of the traditional Alonso/Von Thünen model (structural validation). We then explore how urban morphology and land rents change as the relative market power of buyers and sellers changes (i.e., we move from a 'sellers' market' to a 'buyers' market'). We demonstrate that these strategic price dynamics have differential effects on land rents, but both lead to increased urban expansion

Evaluation and metrics framework

In this paper a metrics framework for evaluating different scenarios in the CATNETS project is defined. The aim is to use this framework to compare the catallactic scenario against the central auctioneer. --Grid Computing

Introducing Preference Heterogeneity into a Monocentric Urban Model: an Agent-Based Land Market Model

This paper presents an agent-based urban land market model. We first replace the centralized price determination mechanism of the monocentric urban market model with a series of bilateral trades distributed in space and time. We then run the model for agents with heterogeneous preferences for location. Model output is analyzed using a series of macro-scale economic and landscape pattern measures, including land rent gradients estimated using simple regression. We demonstrate that heterogeneity in preference for proximity alone is sufficient to generate urban expansion and that information on agent heterogeneity is needed to fully explain land rent variation over space. Our agent-based land market model serves as computational laboratory that may improve our understanding of the processes generating patterns observed in real-world data

Welfare, Labor Supply and Heterogeneous Preferences: Evidence for Europe and the US

Following the report of the Stiglitz Commission, measuring and comparing well-being across countries has gained renewed interest. Yet, analyses that go beyond income and incorporate non-market dimensions of welfare most often rely on the assumption of identical preferences to avoid the difficulties related to interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, we suggest an international comparison based on individual welfare rankings that fully retain preference heterogeneity. Focusing on the consumption-leisure trade-off, we estimate discrete choice labor supply models using harmonized microdata for 11 European countries and the US. We retrieve preference heterogeneity within and across countries and analyze several welfare criteria which take into account that differences in income are partly due to differences in tastes. The resulting welfare rankings clearly depend on the normative treatment of preference heterogeneity with alternative metrics. We show that these differences can indeed be explained by estimated preference heterogeneity across countries – rather than demographic composition.welfare measures, preference heterogeneity, labor supply, Beyond GDP

Performance Evaluation - Annual Report Year 3

This report describes the work done and results obtained in third year of the CATNETS project. Experiments carried out with the different configurations of the prototype are reported and simulation results are evaluated with the CATNETS metrics framework. The applicability of the Catallactic approach as market model for service and resource allocation in application layer networks is assessed based on the results and experience gained both from the prototype development and simulations. --Grid Computing

Measuring the Welfare Costs of Inflation in a Life-cycle Model

In macroeconomics, life-cycle models are typically used to address exclusively life-cycle issues. This paper shows that modeling the life-cycle may be important when addressing public policy issues, in this case the welfare costs of inflation. In the representative agent model, the optimal inflation rate is characterized by the Friedman rule: deflate at the real interest rate. In the corresponding life-cycle model, the optimal inflation rate is quite high: for the benchmark calibration, it is around 95% per annum. Much of the paper is concerned with understanding this result. Briefly, in the life-cycle model there are distributional consequences of injecting money via lump-sum transfers. The net effect is to transfer income from old, rich agents to young, poor ones. These transfers twist the age-utility profile in a way that agents find desirable from a lifetime utility point of view. A second issue concerns how to assess the costs of inflation in a life-cycle model. Metrics that are equivalent in the representative agent model can give very different answers in a life-cycle model.monetary policy, inflation, welfare costs, life-cycle model

Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-off Between Anarchy and Stability

The price of anarchy and price of stability are three well-studied performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in distributed systems. The distinction between these two performance metrics centers on the equilibria that they focus on: the price of anarchy characterizes the quality of the worst-performing equilibria, while the price of stability characterizes the quality of the best-performing equilibria. While much of the literature focuses on these metrics from an analysis perspective, in this work we consider these performance metrics from a design perspective. Specifically, we focus on the setting where a system operator is tasked with designing local utility functions to optimize these performance metrics in a class of games termed covering games. Our main result characterizes a fundamental trade-off between the price of anarchy and price of stability in the form of a fully explicit Pareto frontier. Within this setup, optimizing the price of anarchy comes directly at the expense of the price of stability (and vice versa). Our second results demonstrates how a system-operator could incorporate an additional piece of system-level information into the design of the agents' utility functions to breach these limitations and improve the system's performance. This valuable piece of system-level information pertains to the performance of worst performing agent in the system.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figure