Divorce and the Option Value of Marital Search

This works tests whether or not the introduction of divorce law changes the timing of marital search. Common sense suggests that rational agents should adjust to the divorce risk by increasing the average length of search spell, whereas the option value theory stresses the role played by irreversible investments: in this case, the new exit option available to married partners should result in shorter search spells. Using a dynamic model of marital search, a new dataset of retrospective individual Italian data, and two robust statistical specifications based upon the Before-After estimator, we find strong evidence that the legal innovation actually lowered the age at marriage, thereby worsening the level of marital matching, and possibly reinforcing self-fulfilling prophecies of divorce.Marital Search; Divorce; Marriage

Decision-theoretic control of EUVE telescope scheduling

This paper describes a decision theoretic scheduler (DTS) designed to employ state-of-the-art probabilistic inference technology to speed the search for efficient solutions to constraint-satisfaction problems. Our approach involves assessing the performance of heuristic control strategies that are normally hard-coded into scheduling systems and using probabilistic inference to aggregate this information in light of the features of a given problem. The Bayesian Problem-Solver (BPS) introduced a similar approach to solving single agent and adversarial graph search patterns yielding orders-of-magnitude improvement over traditional techniques. Initial efforts suggest that similar improvements will be realizable when applied to typical constraint-satisfaction scheduling problems

An Agent-Based Simulation of Rental Housing Markets

We simulate a closed rental housing market with search and matching frictions, in which both landlord and tenant agents are imperfectly informed. Homogeneous landlords set rents to maximise revenue, using information on the market to estimate the relationship between posted rent and time-on-the-market (TOM). Tenants, heterogeneous in income, engage in undirected search accepting residences based on their idiosyncratic tastes for housing and a disagreement point derived from information on the distribution of offers. The steady state to which the simulation evolves shows price dispersion, nonzero search times and vacancies.The main results concern the effects of increasing information on either side of the market. When tenants see a greater percentage of the distribution of offers, tenants learn to refuse high rents and so the population rises and tenants' utilities rise as does overall welfare. Conversely, when landlords have less information, their utility can rise as over estimations in best posting rent move the market to higher rents.Real estate; Rental markets; Search; Information; Simulation; Multi-agent systems