32,537 research outputs found

    Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle: A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Model for Combatting New Terrorism

    Get PDF
    Terrorism in the new millennium has morphed drastically since the 1970s. The terrorist organizations of today are a hybrid between the insurgent group models of the 1960s and modern terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. This hybrid model has created what has become a transnational insurgency recruited, trained, and led by major terrorist networks such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Even smaller regional groups such as Boko Haram have surpassed merely conducting terrorist attacks. These smaller groups are also focused on controlling territory. Tan (2008) refers to this change as “New Terrorism”. To combat New Terrorism, a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and counterterrorism tactics must be employed. This study will examine the need to define roles and responsibilities for various organization and various echelons through the introduction of a new Special Operations Forces model; Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle. The acronym to be used for this model is D3. This model recommends different tactics, techniques, and procedures for forces not specifically assigned the counterterrorism mission. As new terrorism continues to change, only counterterrorism forces should be tasked with the Find Fix Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) model of targeting (Counterterrorism 2014). All other military and law enforcement elements should disrupt and deny the enemy in support of the counterterrorism effort. This study is based on extensive research and the author’s 23 years of experience serving in U.S. Army Special Forces. Throughout his career, the author interacted with people from various social, economic, and professional backgrounds throughout the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans

    Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Conflict Funding

    Get PDF
    Interdiction of terrorist funds has become a priority for intergovernmental cooperation. Logically, this initiative should affect SDM financing as well as conflict funding more generally - particularly where incumbent states can outlaw such movements. However, multilateral and unilateral attempts to ensure timely reporting of transactions made by targeted individuals or groups, and to deny them access to the international financial system, have had limited success. This is mainly due to economic disincentives for the disclosure of the identity and purpose of transacting agents, particularly those using correspondent banking services, informal money transfer networks and offshore financial centres. Solutions should be based on positive incentives for disclosure, and could include trans-border withholding taxes on transactions with unregulated clients and the provision of affordable transfer systems for emigrants. But this in turn would require a clear and practicable definition of the 'right to self-determination' in terms of international jurisdiction.

    The Global Risks Report 2016, 11th Edition

    Get PDF
    Now in its 11th edition, The Global Risks Report 2016 draws attention to ways that global risks could evolve and interact in the next decade. The year 2016 marks a forceful departure from past findings, as the risks about which the Report has been warning over the past decade are starting to manifest themselves in new, sometimes unexpected ways and harm people, institutions and economies. Warming climate is likely to raise this year's temperature to 1° Celsius above the pre-industrial era, 60 million people, equivalent to the world's 24th largest country and largest number in recent history, are forcibly displaced, and crimes in cyberspace cost the global economy an estimated US$445 billion, higher than many economies' national incomes. In this context, the Reportcalls for action to build resilience – the "resilience imperative" – and identifies practical examples of how it could be done.The Report also steps back and explores how emerging global risks and major trends, such as climate change, the rise of cyber dependence and income and wealth disparity are impacting already-strained societies by highlighting three clusters of risks as Risks in Focus. As resilience building is helped by the ability to analyse global risks from the perspective of specific stakeholders, the Report also analyses the significance of global risks to the business community at a regional and country-level

    The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)

    Get PDF
    This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe.risk, insecurity, survey, terrorism, counter-terrorism, security economics

    The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)

    Get PDF
    This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe.

    Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation

    Get PDF
    Despite recent advances in transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation, significant problems remain. The bombings in Madrid in March 2004 have demonstrated how terrorists and criminals can continue to exploit the limits of hesitant or partial exchange to dangerous effect. Intelligence and security cooperation remain problematic because of the fundamental tension between an increasingly networked world, which is ideal terrain for the new religious terrorism, and highly compartmentalized national intelligence gathering. If cooperation is to improve, we require a better mutual understanding about the relationship between privacy and security to help us decide what sort of intelligence should be shared. This is a higher priority than building elaborate new structures. While most practical problems of intelligence exchange are ultimately resolvable, the challenge of agreeing what the intelligence means in broad terms is even more problematic. The last section of this article argues that shared NATO intelligence estimates would be difficult to achieve and of doubtful value
    • 

    corecore