Combining theorem proving and narrowing for rewriting-logic specifications

International audienceWe present an approach for verifying dynamic systems specified in rewriting logic, a formal specification language implemented in the Maude system. Our approach is tailored for invariants, i.e., properties that hold on all states reachable from a given class of initial states. The approach consists in encoding invariance properties into inductive properties written in membership equational logic, a sublogic of rewriting logic also implemented in Maude. The invariants can then be verified using an inductive theorem prover available for membership equational logic, possibly in interaction with narrowing-based symbolic analysis tools for rewriting-logic specifications also available in the Maude environment. We show that it is possible, and useful, to automatically test invariants by symbolic analysis before interactively proving them

Singular and Plural Functions for Functional Logic Programming

Functional logic programming (FLP) languages use non-terminating and non-confluent constructor systems (CS's) as programs in order to define non-strict non-determi-nistic functions. Two semantic alternatives have been usually considered for parameter passing with this kind of functions: call-time choice and run-time choice. While the former is the standard choice of modern FLP languages, the latter lacks some properties---mainly compositionality---that have prevented its use in practical FLP systems. Traditionally it has been considered that call-time choice induces a singular denotational semantics, while run-time choice induces a plural semantics. We have discovered that this latter identification is wrong when pattern matching is involved, and thus we propose two novel compositional plural semantics for CS's that are different from run-time choice. We study the basic properties of our plural semantics---compositionality, polarity, monotonicity for substitutions, and a restricted form of the bubbling property for constructor systems---and the relation between them and to previous proposals, concluding that these semantics form a hierarchy in the sense of set inclusion of the set of computed values. We have also identified a class of programs characterized by a syntactic criterion for which the proposed plural semantics behave the same, and a program transformation that can be used to simulate one of them by term rewriting. At the practical level, we study how to use the expressive capabilities of these semantics for improving the declarative flavour of programs. We also propose a language which combines call-time choice and our plural semantics, that we have implemented in Maude. The resulting interpreter is employed to test several significant examples showing the capabilities of the combined semantics. To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP)Comment: 53 pages, 5 figure

State space c-reductions for concurrent systems in rewriting logic

We present c-reductions, a state space reduction technique. The rough idea is to exploit some equivalence relation on states (possibly capturing system regularities) that preserves behavioral properties, and explore the induced quotient system. This is done by means of a canonizer function, which maps each state into a (non necessarily unique) canonical representative of its equivalence class. The approach exploits the expressiveness of rewriting logic and its realization in Maude to enjoy several advantages over similar approaches: exibility and simplicity in the definition of the reductions (supporting not only traditional symmetry reductions, but also name reuse and name abstraction); reasoning support for checking and proving correctness of the reductions; and automatization of the reduction infrastructure via Maude's meta-programming features. The approach has been validated over a set of representative case studies, exhibiting comparable results with respect to other tools

Applications and extensions of context-sensitive rewriting

[EN] Context-sensitive rewriting is a restriction of term rewriting which is obtained by imposing replacement restrictions on the arguments of function symbols. It has proven useful to analyze computational properties of programs written in sophisticated rewriting-based programming languages such asCafeOBJ, Haskell, Maude, OBJ*, etc. Also, a number of extensions(e.g., to conditional rewritingor constrained equational systems) and generalizations(e.g., controlled rewritingor forbidden patterns) of context-sensitive rewriting have been proposed. In this paper, we provide an overview of these applications and related issues. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Partially supported by the EU (FEDER), and projects RTI2018-094403-B-C32 and PROMETEO/2019/098.Lucas Alba, S. (2021). Applications and extensions of context-sensitive rewriting. Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming. 121:1-33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2021.10068013312

Rule-based Methodologies for the Specification and Analysis of Complex Computing Systems

Desde los orígenes del hardware y el software hasta la época actual, la complejidad de los sistemas de cálculo ha supuesto un problema al cual informáticos, ingenieros y programadores han tenido que enfrentarse. Como resultado de este esfuerzo han surgido y madurado importantes áreas de investigación. En esta disertación abordamos algunas de las líneas de investigación actuales relacionada con el análisis y la verificación de sistemas de computación complejos utilizando métodos formales y lenguajes de dominio específico. En esta tesis nos centramos en los sistemas distribuidos, con un especial interés por los sistemas Web y los sistemas biológicos. La primera parte de la tesis está dedicada a aspectos de seguridad y técnicas relacionadas, concretamente la certificación del software. En primer lugar estudiamos sistemas de control de acceso a recursos y proponemos un lenguaje para especificar políticas de control de acceso que están fuertemente asociadas a bases de conocimiento y que proporcionan una descripción sensible a la semántica de los recursos o elementos a los que se accede. También hemos desarrollado un marco novedoso de trabajo para la Code-Carrying Theory, una metodología para la certificación del software cuyo objetivo es asegurar el envío seguro de código en un entorno distribuido. Nuestro marco de trabajo está basado en un sistema de transformación de teorías de reescritura mediante operaciones de plegado/desplegado. La segunda parte de esta tesis se concentra en el análisis y la verificación de sistemas Web y sistemas biológicos. Proponemos un lenguaje para el filtrado de información que permite la recuperación de informaciones en grandes almacenes de datos. Dicho lenguaje utiliza información semántica obtenida a partir de ontologías remotas para re nar el proceso de filtrado. También estudiamos métodos de validación para comprobar la consistencia de contenidos web con respecto a propiedades sintácticas y semánticas. Otra de nuestras contribuciones es la propuesta de un lenguaje que permite definir y comprobar automáticamente restricciones semánticas y sintácticas en el contenido estático de un sistema Web. Finalmente, también consideramos los sistemas biológicos y nos centramos en un formalismo basado en lógica de reescritura para el modelado y el análisis de aspectos cuantitativos de los procesos biológicos. Para evaluar la efectividad de todas las metodologías propuestas, hemos prestado especial atención al desarrollo de prototipos que se han implementado utilizando lenguajes basados en reglas.Baggi ., M. (2010). Rule-based Methodologies for the Specification and Analysis of Complex Computing Systems [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/8964Palanci

Analysis of the IBM CCA Security API Protocols in Maude-NPA

Standards for cryptographic protocols have long been attractive candidates for formal verification. It is important that such standards be correct, and cryptographic protocols are tricky to design and subject to non-intuitive attacks even when the underlying cryptosystems are secure. Thus a number of general-purpose cryptographic protocol analysis tools have been developed and applied to protocol standards. However, there is one class of standards, security application programming interfaces (security APIs), to which few of these tools have been applied. Instead, most work has concentrated on developing special-purpose tools and algorithms for specific classes of security APIs. However, there can be much advantage gained from having general-purpose tools that could be applied to a wide class of problems, including security APIs. One particular class of APIs that has proven difficult to analyze using general-purpose tools is that involving exclusive-or. In this paper we analyze the IBM 4758 Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) protocol using an advanced automated protocol verification tool with full exclusive-or capabilities, the Maude-NPA tool. This is the first time that API protocols have been satisfactorily specified and analyzed in the Maude-NPA, and the first time XOR-based APIs have been specified and analyzed using a general-purpose unbounded session cryptographic protocol verification tool that provides direct support for AC theories. We describe our results and indicate what further research needs to be done to make such protocol analysis generally effective.Antonio González-Burgueño, Sonia Santiago and Santiago Escobar have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MINECO under grants TIN 2010-21062-C02-02 and TIN 2013-45732-C4-1-P, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. José Meseguer has been partially supported by NSF Grant CNS 13-10109.González Burgueño, A.; Santiago Pinazo, S.; Escobar Román, S.; Meadows, C.; Meseguer, J. (2014). Analysis of the IBM CCA Security API Protocols in Maude-NPA. En Security Standardisation Research. Springer International Publishing. 111-130. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8S111130Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., Fournet, C.: Just fast keying in the pi calculus. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 10(3) (2007)Blanchet, B.: An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules. In: 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW 2014), Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 2001, pp. 82–96. IEEE Computer Society (2014)Bond, M.: Attacks on cryptoprocessor transaction sets. In: Koç, Ç.K., Naccache, D., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2001. LNCS, vol. 2162, pp. 220–234. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)Butler, F., Cervesato, I., Jaggard, A.D., Scedrov, A.: A formal analysis of some properties of kerberos 5 using msr. In: CSFW, pp. 175–1790. IEEE Computer Society (2002)Cachin, C., Chandran, N.: A secure cryptographic token interface. In: Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2009, Port Jefferson, New York, USA, July 8-10, pp. 141–153 (2009)Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR. In: 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, LICS 2003 (2003)Comon-Lundh, H., Shmatikov, V.: Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive-or. In: 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2003), pp. 271–280 (2003)Comon-Lundh, H., Cortier, V.: New decidability results for fragments of first-order logic and application to cryptographic protocols. In: Nieuwenhuis, R. (ed.) RTA 2003. LNCS, vol. 2706, pp. 148–164. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)Cortier, V., Keighren, G., Steel, G.: Automatic analysis of the aecurity of XOR-based key management schemes. In: Grumberg, O., Huth, M. (eds.) TACAS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4424, pp. 538–552. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Cortier, V., Steel, G.: A generic security API for symmetric key management on cryptographic devices. In: Backes, M., Ning, P. (eds.) ESORICS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5789, pp. 605–620. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)Erbatur, S., et al.: Effective Symbolic Protocol Analysis via Equational Irreducibility Conditions. In: Foresti, S., Yung, M., Martinelli, F. (eds.) ESORICS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7459, pp. 73–90. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties. In: Aldini, A., Barthe, G., Gorrieri, R. (eds.) FOSAD 2007/2008/2009. LNCS, vol. 5705, pp. 1–50. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J., Santiago, S.: Sequential Protocol Composition in Maude-NPA. In: Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6345, pp. 303–318. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)Thayer Fabrega, F.J., Herzog, J., Guttman, J.: Strand Spaces: What Makes a Security Protocol Correct? Journal of Computer Security 7, 191–230 (1999)González-Burgueño, A.: Protocol Analysis Modulo Exclusive-Or Theories: A Case study in Maude-NPA. Master’s thesis, Universitat Politècnica de València (March 2014), https://angonbur.webs.upv.es/Previous_work/Master_Thesis.pdfIBM. Comment on Mike’s Bond paper A Chosen Key Difference Attack on Control Vectors (2001), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/CVDif-Response.pdfIBM. CCA basic services reference and guide: CCA basic services reference and guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and IBM 4764 (2001), http://www-03.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pdfs/bs327.pdf.2008Keighren, G.: Model Checking IBM’s Common Cryptographic Architecture API. 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Modeling and Analysis of Advanced Cryptographic Primitives and Security Protocols in Maude-NPA

Tesis por compendio[ES] La herramienta criptográfica Maude-NPA es un verificador de modelos especializado para protocolos de seguridad criptográficos que tienen en cuenta las propiedades algebraicas de un sistema criptográfico. En la literatura, las propiedades criptográficas adicionales han descubierto debilidades de los protocolos de seguridad y, en otros casos, son parte de los supuestos de seguridad del protocolo para funcionar correctamente. Maude-NPA tiene una base teórica en la rewriting logic, la unificación ecuacional y el narrowing para realizar una búsqueda hacia atrás desde un patrón de estado inseguro para determinar si es alcanzable o no. Maude-NPA se puede utilizar para razonar sobre una amplia gama de propiedades criptográficas, incluida la cancelación del cifrado y descifrado, la exponenciación de Diffie-Hellman, el exclusive-or y algunas aproximaciones del cifrado homomórfico. En esta tesis consideramos nuevas propiedades criptográficas, ya sea como parte de protocolos de seguridad o para descubrir nuevos ataques. También hemos modelado diferentes familias de protocolos de seguridad, incluidos los Distance Bounding Protocols or Multi-party key agreement protocolos. Y hemos desarrollado nuevas técnicas de modelado para reducir el coste del análisis en protocolos con tiempo y espacio. Esta tesis contribuye de varias maneras al área de análisis de protocolos criptográficos y muchas de las contribuciones de esta tesis pueden ser útiles para otras herramientas de análisis criptográfico.[CAT] L'eina criptografica Maude-NPA es un verificador de models especialitzats per a protocols de seguretat criptogràfics que tenen en compte les propietats algebraiques d'un sistema criptogràfic. A la literatura, les propietats criptogràfiques addicionals han descobert debilitats dels protocols de seguretat i, en altres casos, formen part dels supòsits de seguretat del protocol per funcionar correctament. Maude-NPA te' una base teòrica a la rewriting lògic, la unificació' equacional i narrowing per realitzar una cerca cap enrere des d'un patró' d'estat insegur per determinar si es accessible o no. Maude-NPA es pot utilitzar per raonar sobre una amplia gamma de propietats criptogràfiques, inclosa la cancel·lació' del xifratge i desxifrat, l'exponenciacio' de Diffie-Hellman, el exclusive-or i algunes aproximacions del xifratge homomòrfic. En aquesta tesi, considerem noves propietats criptogràfiques, ja sigui com a part de protocols de seguretat o per descobrir nous atacs. Tambe' hem modelat diferents famílies de protocols de seguretat, inclosos els Distance Bounding Protocols o Multi-party key agreement protocols. I hem desenvolupat noves tècniques de modelització' de protocols per reduir el cost de l'analisi en protocols amb temps i espai. Aquesta tesi contribueix de diverses maneres a l’àrea de l’anàlisi de protocols criptogràfics i moltes de les contribucions d’aquesta tesi poden ser útils per a altres eines d’anàlisi criptogràfic.[EN] The Maude-NPA crypto tool is a specialized model checker for cryptographic security protocols that take into account the algebraic properties of the cryptosystem. In the literature, additional crypto properties have uncovered weaknesses of security protocols and, in other cases, they are part of the protocol security assumptions in order to function properly. Maude-NPA has a theoretical basis on rewriting logic, equational unification, and narrowing to perform a backwards search from an insecure state pattern to determine whether or not it is reachable. Maude-NPA can be used to reason about a wide range of cryptographic properties, including cancellation of encryption and decryption, Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, exclusive-or, and some approximations of homomorphic encryption. In this thesis, we consider new cryptographic properties, either as part of security protocols or to discover new attacks. We have also modeled different families of security protocols, including Distance Bounding Protocols or Multi-party key agreement protocols. And we have developed new protocol modeling techniques to reduce the time and space analysis effort. This thesis contributes in several ways to the area of cryptographic protocol analysis and many of the contributions of this thesis can be useful for other crypto analysis tools.This thesis would not have been possible without the funding of a set of research projects. The main contributions and derivative works of this thesis have been made in the context of the following projects: - Ministry of Economy and Business of Spain : Project LoBaSS Effective Solutions Based on Logic, Scientific Research under award number TIN2015-69175-C4-1-R, this project was focused on using powerful logic-based technologies to analyze safety-critical systems. - Air Force Office of Scientific Research of United States of America : Project Advanced symbolic methods for the cryptographic protocol analyzer Maude-NPA Scientific Research under award number FA9550-17-1-0286 - State Investigation Agency of Spain : Project FREETech: Formal Reasoning for Enabling and Emerging Technologies Scientific I+D-i Research under award number RTI2018-094403-B-C32Aparicio Sánchez, D. (2022). Modeling and Analysis of Advanced Cryptographic Primitives and Security Protocols in Maude-NPA [Tesis doctoral]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/190915Compendi