Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment

The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a scalable, flexible name resolution service. Unfortunately, its unauthenticated architecture has become the basis for many security attacks. To address this, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were introduced in 1997. DNSSEC’s deployment requires support from the top-level domain (TLD) registries and registrars, as well as participation by the organization that serves as the DNS operator. Unfortunately, DNSSEC has seen poor deployment thus far: despite being proposed nearly two decades ago, only 1% of .com, .net, and .org domains are properly signed. In this paper, we investigate the underlying reasons why DNSSEC adoption has been remarkably slow. We focus on registrars, as most TLD registries already support DNSSEC and registrars often serve as DNS operators for their customers. Our study uses large-scale, longitudinal DNS measurements to study DNSSEC adoption, coupled with experiences collected by trying to deploy DNSSEC on domains we purchased from leading domain name registrars and resellers. Overall, we find that a select few registrars are responsible for the (small) DNSSEC deployment today, and that many leading registrars do not support DNSSEC at all, or require customers to take cumbersome steps to deploy DNSSEC. Further frustrating deployment, many of the mechanisms for conveying DNSSEC information to registrars are error-prone or present security vulnerabilities. Finally, we find that using DNSSEC with third-party DNS operators such as Cloudflare requires the domain owner to take a number of steps that 40% of domain owners do not complete. Having identified several operational challenges for full DNSSEC deployment, we make recommendations to improve adoption

An analysis of the use of DNS for malicious payload distribution

The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol is a fundamental part of Internet activities that can be abused by cybercriminals to conduct malicious activities. Previous research has shown that cybercriminals use different methods, including the DNS protocol, to distribute malicious content, remain hidden and avoid detection from various technologies that are put in place to detect anomalies. This allows botnets and certain malware families to establish covert communication channels that can be used to send or receive data and also distribute malicious payloads using the DNS queries and responses. Cybercriminals use the DNS to breach highly protected networks, distribute malicious content, and exfiltrate sensitive information without being detected by security controls put in place by embedding certain strings in DNS packets. This research undertaking broadens this research field and fills in the existing research gap by extending the analysis of DNS being used as a payload distribution channel to detection of domains that are used to distribute different malicious payloads. This research undertaking analysed the use of the DNS in detecting domains and channels that are used for distributing malicious payloads. Passive DNS data which replicate DNS queries on name servers to detect anomalies in DNS queries was evaluated and analysed in order to detect malicious payloads. The research characterises the malicious payload distribution channels by analysing passive DNS traffic and modelling the DNS query and response patterns. The research found that it is possible to detect malicious payload distribution channels through the analysis of DNS TXT resource records

Security Implications of Insecure DNS Usage in the Internet

The Domain Name System (DNS) provides domain-to-address lookup-services used by almost all internet applications. Because of this ubiquitous use of the DNS, attacks against the DNS have become more and more critical. However, in the past, studies of DNS security have been mostly conducted against individual protocols and applications. In this thesis, we perform the first comprehensive evaluation of DNS-based attacks against a wide range of internet applications, ranging from time-synchronisation via NTP over internet resource management to security mechanisms. We show how to attack those applications by exploiting various weaknesses in the DNS. These attacks are based on both, already known weaknesses which are adapted to new attacks, as well as previously unknown attack vectors which have been found during the course of this thesis. We evaluate our attacks and provide the first taxonomy of DNS applications, to show how adversaries can systematically develop attacks exploiting the DNS. We analyze the attack surface created by our attacks in the internet and find that a significant number of applications and systems can be attacked. We work together with the developers of the vulnerable applications to develop patches and general countermeasures which can be applied by various parties to block our attacks. We also provide conceptual insights into the root causes allowing our attacks to help with the development of new applications and standards. The findings of this thesis are published in in 4 full-paper publications and 2 posters at international academic conferences. Additionally, we disclose our finding to developers which has lead to the registration of 8 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifiers (CVE IDs) and patches in 10 software implementations. To raise awareness, we also presented our findings at several community meetings and via invited articles

ICTERI 2020: ІКТ в освіті, дослідженнях та промислових застосуваннях. Інтеграція, гармонізація та передача знань 2020: Матеріали 16-ї Міжнародної конференції. Том II: Семінари. Харків, Україна, 06-10 жовтня 2020 р.

This volume represents the proceedings of the Workshops co-located with the 16th International Conference on ICT in Education, Research, and Industrial Applications, held in Kharkiv, Ukraine, in October 2020. It comprises 101 contributed papers that were carefully peer-reviewed and selected from 233 submissions for the five workshops: RMSEBT, TheRMIT, ITER, 3L-Person, CoSinE, MROL. The volume is structured in six parts, each presenting the contributions for a particular workshop. The topical scope of the volume is aligned with the thematic tracks of ICTERI 2020: (I) Advances in ICT Research; (II) Information Systems: Technology and Applications; (III) Academia/Industry ICT Cooperation; and (IV) ICT in Education.Цей збірник представляє матеріали семінарів, які були проведені в рамках 16-ї Міжнародної конференції з ІКТ в освіті, наукових дослідженнях та промислових застосуваннях, що відбулася в Харкові, Україна, у жовтні 2020 року. Він містить 101 доповідь, які були ретельно рецензовані та відібрані з 233 заявок на участь у п'яти воркшопах: RMSEBT, TheRMIT, ITER, 3L-Person, CoSinE, MROL. Збірник складається з шести частин, кожна з яких представляє матеріали для певного семінару. Тематична спрямованість збірника узгоджена з тематичними напрямками ICTERI 2020: (I) Досягнення в галузі досліджень ІКТ; (II) Інформаційні системи: Технології і застосування; (ІІІ) Співпраця в галузі ІКТ між академічними і промисловими колами; і (IV) ІКТ в освіті