Deterrence in Competition Law

This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of the law; 5) independence; and 6) separation of power. We then discuss how to measure deterrence. We review the literature that use surveys to solicit direct information on changes in the behavior of firms due to the threats posed by the enforcement of antitrust rules, and the literature based on the analysis of hard data. We finally argue that the most challenging task, both theoretically and empirically, is how to distinguish between “good” deterrence and “bad” deterrence

Formal certification and compliance for run-time service environments

With the increased awareness of security and safety of services in on-demand distributed service provisioning (such as the recent adoption of Cloud infrastructures), certification and compliance checking of services is becoming a key element for service engineering. Existing certification techniques tend to support mainly design-time checking of service properties and tend not to support the run-time monitoring and progressive certification in the service execution environment. In this paper we discuss an approach which provides both design-time and runtime behavioural compliance checking for a services architecture, through enabling a progressive event-driven model-checking technique. Providing an integrated approach to certification and compliance is a challenge however using analysis and monitoring techniques we present such an approach for on-going compliance checking

Deterrence in Competition Law

This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of the law; 5) independence; and 6) separation of power. We then discuss how to measure deterrence. We review the literature that use surveys to solicit direct information on changes in the behavior of firms due to the threats posed by the enforcement of antitrust rules, and the literature based on the analysis of hard data. We finally argue that the most challenging task, both theoretically and empirically, is how to distinguish between “good†deterrence and “bad†deterrence.Competition Policy; Law Enforcement; Deterrence

Deterrence in Competition Law

This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of the law; 5) independence and 6) separation of power. We then discuss how to measure deterrence. We review the literature that uses surveys to solicit direct information on changes in the behavior of firms due to the threats posed by the enforcement of antitrust rules, and the literature based on the analysis of hard data. We finally argue that the most challenging task, both theoretically and empirically, is how to distinguish between “good” deterrence and “bad” deterrence. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Abschreckung im Wettbewerbsrecht) Dieser Beitrag bietet eine umfassende Diskussion über die Abschreckungseigenschaften eines wettbewerbspolitischen Systems. Auf der Grundlage der ökonomischen Theorie der Rechtsdurchsetzung werden mehrere Faktoren identifizier, welche den Abschreckungsgrad des Systems am ehesten beeinflussen können. Diese sind: 1) Sanktionen und Schadensersatzforderungen, 2) finanzielle Ressourcen und Personal der Wettbewerbsbehörde, 3) die Befugnisse der wettbewerbspolitischen Autorität im Rahmen der Untersuchung, 4) die Qualität des Rechtsrahmens, 5) die Unabhängigkeit der Behörde und 6) die Gewaltenteilung. Anschließend wird diskutiert, wie man den Abschreckungsgrad eines wettbewerbspolitischen Systems empirisch messen kann. Zuerst wird die Literatur besprochen, die auf Befragungen beruht. Die Befragungen sollten Aufschluss darüber geben, wie sich das Unternehmensverhalten angesichts der Durchsetzung von wettbewerbspolitischen Maßnahmen ändert. Dem gegenüber wird die Literatur dargestellt, die "harte" Daten nutzt. Schließlich wird argumentiert, dass die anspruchsvollste Aufgabe sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch darin bestehen wird, zwischen "guter" und "schlechter" Abschreckung durch Wettbewerbspolitik zu unterscheiden.Competition Policy, Law Enforcement, Deterrence

Data Innovation for International Development: An overview of natural language processing for qualitative data analysis

Availability, collection and access to quantitative data, as well as its limitations, often make qualitative data the resource upon which development programs heavily rely. Both traditional interview data and social media analysis can provide rich contextual information and are essential for research, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation. These data may be difficult to process and analyze both systematically and at scale. This, in turn, limits the ability of timely data driven decision-making which is essential in fast evolving complex social systems. In this paper, we discuss the potential of using natural language processing to systematize analysis of qualitative data, and to inform quick decision-making in the development context. We illustrate this with interview data generated in a format of micro-narratives for the UNDP Fragments of Impact project

The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation

Many people are concerned that information about their private life is more readily available and more easily captured on the Internet as compared to offline technologies. Specific concerns include unwanted email, credit card fraud, identity theft, and harassment. This paper analyzes key issues surrounding the protection of online privacy. It makes three important contributions: First, it provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the estimated benefits and costs of regulating online privacy. Second, it provides the most comprehensive evaluation of legislation and legislative proposals in the U.S. aimed at protecting online privacy. Finally, it offers some policy prescriptions for the regulation of online privacy and suggests areas for future research. After analyzing the current debate on online privacy and assessing the potential costs and benefits of proposed regulations, our specific recommendations concerning the government's involvement in protecting online privacy include the following: The government should fund research that evaluates the effectiveness of existing privacy legislation before considering new regulations. The government should not generally regulate matters of privacy differently based on whether an issue arises online or offline. The government should not require a Web site to provide notification of its privacy policy because the vast majority of commercial U.S.-based Web sites already do so. The government should distinguish between how it regulates the use and dissemination of highly sensitive information, such as certain health records or Social Security numbers, versus more general information, such as consumer name and purchasing habits. The government should not require companies to provide consumers broad access to the personal information that is collected online for marketing purposes because the benefits do not appear to be significant and the costs could be quite high. The government should make it easier for the public to obtain information on online privacy and the tools available for consumers to protect their own privacy. The message of this paper is not that online privacy should be unregulated, but rather that policy makers should think through their options carefully, weighing the likely costs and benefits of each proposal.

The Emergence of Law Consultants

In this paper we study a slightly subcritical Choquard problem on a bounded domain A. We prove that the number of positive solutions depends on the topology of the domain. In particular when the exponent of the nonlinearity approaches the critical one, we show the existence of cat (A) + 1 solutions. Here cat (A) denotes the Lusternik–Schnirelmann category

A Survey of Prevent and Detect Access Control Vulnerabilities

Broken access control is one of the most common security vulnerabilities in web applications. These vulnerabilities are the major cause of many data breach incidents, which result in privacy concern and revenue loss. However, preventing and detecting access control vulnerabilities proactively in web applications could be difficult. Currently, these vulnerabilities are actively detected by bug bounty hunters post-deployment, which creates attack windows for malicious access. To solve this problem proactively requires security awareness and expertise from developers, which calls for systematic solutions. This survey targets to provide a structured overview of approaches that tackle access control vulnerabilities. It firstly discusses the unique feature of access control vulnerabilities, then studies the existing works proposed to tackle access control vulnerabilities in web applications, which span the spectrum of software development from software design and implementation, software analysis and testing, and runtime monitoring. At last we discuss the open problem in this field

Litigation in Texas Re: The Edwards Aquifer and Water Rights

18 pages