Matching Heterogeneous Agents with a Linear Search Technology

Steady state equilibria in heterogeneous agent matching models with search frictions have been shown to exist in Shimer and Smith (2000) under the assumption of a quadratic search technology. We extend their analysis to the commonly investigated linear search technology.Search, Matching, Steady State Equilibrium

The Bargaining Trap

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein’s example of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally removes the trap

As good as married : a model of long-term cohabitation, learning and marriage

This paper develops a two-sided search-matching model with imperfectly observed types and learning. Since agents do not observe one another’s type accurately, they first engage in a probationary partnership to learn one another’s true type. Using the metaphor ofpremarital cohabitation and marriage, we demonstrate that long-term cohabiting individuals eventually learn each other’s true type. We also demonstrate that singles ofeither sex are partitioned into classes and are matched in the same class in equilibrium. We show that sequential learning reduces signalling errors so that the Bayes estimator of the true type converges almost surely to true type. As noisy information is filtered over time, the mismatch risk disappears and the aggregate matching pattern based on true types is restored.

Equilibrium Search with Multiple Attributes and the Impact of Equal Opportunities for Women

This paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante heterogeneous agents, vectors of attributes, and idiosyncratic match draws. The analysis applies to a large class of models, from the nontransferable utility case to the collective household model with bargaining, for which transferable utility is a special case. The approach is powerful for it identifies a simple algorithm that, in our numerical application, is found to rapidly converge to equilibrium. Our application explores the impact of equal opportunities for women in the labor market on female match incentives and the timing of marriage

The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models

Most of the literature that studies frictional search-and-matching models with heterogeneous agents and random search investigates steady state equilibria. Steady state equilibrium requires, in particular, that the flows of agents into and out of the population of unmatched agents balance. We investigate the structure of this balance condition, taking agents' matching behavior as given. Building on the "fundamental matching lemma" for quadratic search technologies in Shimer and Smith (2000), we establish existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics properties of the solution to the balance condition for any search technology satisfying minimal regularity conditions. Implications for the existence and structure of steady state equilibria in the Shimer-Smith model and extensions thereof are noted. These reinforce the point that much of the structure of search-and-matching models with quadratic search technologies carries over to more general search technologies

Equilibrium Search and the Impact of Equal Opportunities for Women.

This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where agents have multiple attributes and general payoff functions. The model can be applied to several substantive issues. Here we use it to provide a novel understanding of the separate effects of equal opportunities for women in the labor market and improved contraception on female education, employment, and timing of first births after World War II. We find that the diffusion of the pill might have played an important role in explaining the observed rise in female education and employment since the 1960s. But without equal opportunities, these changes would have not occurred

Plenty of Fish in the Sea: Divorce Choice and the Quality of Singles

In the literature of marriage, divorce choices are usually assumed to not affect the distribution of types in the pool of singles. The scope of the present paper is to overcome this assumption. We analyse divorce choices when separation decision influences the distribution of singles and, thus, their expected quality. We consider a three-period model where heterogeneous individuals may unilaterally experience divorce and return to the marriage market. The choices of individuals are based on the change in the distribution of singles and the cost of waiting and divorcing, taking into consideration the individual’s eligibility in the marriage market. There are two main findings: Firstly, positive assortative matching dissolves with divorce for some intermediate types. Therefore, the endogenous positive assortative matching that usually emerges in models with nontransferable utility is weakened when matches can dissolve. Secondly, the existence of ranges where divorce emerges among individuals with positive assortative matching implies the existence of two disconnected classes of types. If matchings in the first period were to occur between individuals of different classes, such matches would be dissolved later

Opportunities for Women ∗

Economics, University of Essex, for private circulation to interested readers. They often represent preliminary reports on work in progress and should therefore be neither quoted nor referred to in published work without the written consent of the author. Equilibrium Search and the Impact of Equa

Equilibrium Search and the Impact of Equal Opportunities for Women

This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where ex-ante heterogenous individuals have general payoff functions and vectors of attributes. The analysis applies to a large class of models, from the non-transferable utility case to the collective household case with bargaining. The approach is powerful for it identifies a simple algorithm which, in the empirical application, is found to rapidly converge to equilibrium. Using indirect inference, we identify the differential effects of women's ability and charm on female match incentives. We use these results to assess the separate impacts of the arrival of equal opportunities for women in the labor market and the advent of the contraceptive pill on female economic activity and matching