On the interplay between games, argumentation and dialogues

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents’ behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information

Argumentation as Exogenous Coordination

Formal argumentation is one of the most popular approaches in modern logic and reasoning. The theory of abstract argumentation introduced by Dung in 1995 has shifted the focus from the internal structure of arguments to relations among arguments, and temporal dynamics for abstract argumentation was proposed by Barringer, Gabbay and Woods in 2005. In this tradition, we see arguments as reasoning processes, and the interaction among them as a coordination process.We argue that abstract argumentation can adopt ideas and techniques from formal theories of coordination, and as an example we propose a model of sequential abstract argumentation loosely inspired by Reo’s model of exogenous coordination. We show how the argumentation model can represent the temporal dynamics of the liar paradox and predator-prey like behaviour

On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents' behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information

Two faces of strategic argumentation in the law

In strategic argumentation players exchange arguments to prove or reject a claim. This paper discusses and reports on research about two basic issues regarding the game-theoretic understanding of strategic argumentation games in the law: whether such games can be reasonably modelled as zero-sum games and as games with complete information

Two Faces of Strategic Argumentation in the Law

In strategic argumentation players exchange arguments to prove or reject a claim. This paper discusses and reports on research about two basic issues regarding the game-theoretic understanding of strategic argumentation games in the law: whether such games can be reasonably modelled as zero-sum games and as games with complete information