2,828 research outputs found
The modal logic of set-theoretic potentialism and the potentialist maximality principles
We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural varieties of
set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general
model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leibman
and L\"owe, including the use of buttons, switches, dials and ratchets. Among
the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank potentialism (true in all
larger ); Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism (true in all larger
for inaccessible cardinals ); transitive-set potentialism
(true in all larger transitive sets); forcing potentialism (true in all forcing
extensions); countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger
countable transitive models of ZFC); countable-model potentialism (true in all
larger countable models of ZFC); and others. In each case, we identify lower
bounds for the modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, and
an upper bound of S5, proving in each case that these bounds are optimal. The
validity of S5 in a world is a potentialist maximality principle, an
interesting set-theoretic principle of its own. The results can be viewed as
providing an analysis of the modal commitments of the various set-theoretic
multiverse conceptions corresponding to each potentialist account.Comment: 36 pages. Commentary can be made about this article at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/set-theoretic-potentialism. Minor revisions in v2;
further minor revisions in v
Structural Relativity and Informal Rigour
Informal rigour is the process by which we come to understand particular mathematical structures and then manifest this rigour through axiomatisations. Structural relativity is the idea that the kinds of structures we isolate are dependent upon the logic we employ. We bring together these ideas by considering the level of informal rigour exhibited by our set-theoretic discourse, and argue that different foundational programmes should countenance different underlying logics (intermediate between first- and second-order) for formulating set theory. By bringing considerations of perturbations in modal space to bear on the debate, we will suggest that a promising option for representing current set-theoretic thought is given by formulating set theory using quasi-weak second-order logic. These observations indicate that the usual division of structures into \particular (e.g. the natural number structure) and general (e.g. the group structure) is perhaps too coarse grained; we should also make a distinction between intentionally and unintentionally general structures
Forcing and the Universe of Sets: Must we lose insight?
A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathematics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set theory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Often forcing constructions that add subsets to models are cited as evidence in favour of the latter. This paper informs this debate by analysing ways the Universist might interpret this discourse that seems to necessitate the addition of subsets to . We argue that despite the prima facie incoherence of such talk for the Universist, she nonetheless has reason to try and provide interpretation of this discourse. We analyse extant interpretations of such talk, and argue that while tradeoffs in naturality have to be made, they are not too severe
Is the dream solution to the continuum hypothesis attainable?
The dream solution of the continuum hypothesis (CH) would be a solution by
which we settle the continuum hypothesis on the basis of a newly discovered
fundamental principle of set theory, a missing axiom, widely regarded as true.
Such a dream solution would indeed be a solution, since we would all accept the
new axiom along with its consequences. In this article, however, I argue that
such a dream solution to CH is unattainable.
The article is adapted from and expands upon material in my article, "The
set-theoretic multiverse", to appear in the Review of Symbolic Logic (see
arXiv:1108.4223).Comment: This article is based upon an argument I gave during the course of a
three-lecture tutorial on set-theoretic geology at the summer school "Set
Theory and Higher-Order Logic: Foundational Issues and Mathematical
Developments", at the University of London, Birkbeck in August 201
Forcing and the Universe of Sets: Must we lose insight?
A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathematics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set theory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Often forcing constructions that add subsets to models are cited as evidence in favour of the latter. This paper informs this debate by analysing ways the Universist might interpret this discourse that seems to necessitate the addition of subsets to . We argue that despite the prima facie incoherence of such talk for the Universist, she nonetheless has reason to try and provide interpretation of this discourse. We analyse extant interpretations of such talk, and argue that while tradeoffs in naturality have to be made, they are not too severe
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