1,135 research outputs found
Truth, Partial Logic and Infinitary Proof Systems
In this paper we apply proof theoretic methods used for classical systems in order to obtain upper bounds for systems in partial logic. We focus on a truth predicate interpreted in a Kripke style way via strong Kleene; whereas the aim is to connect harmoniously the partial version of Kripke-Feferman with its intended semantics. The method we apply is based on infinitary proof systems containing an Ď -rule
Infinitary Tableau for Semantic Truth
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Philip Welch for his assistance and acknowledge the late Greg Hjorth for the time he spent in helping me learn how to use the tools used in the paper. I would also like to thank Hannes Leitgeb for giving me the opportunity to present this material and for providing me with valuable feedback. And I would like to thank Benedict Eastaugh and Marcus Holland for helping make the final sections of this paper more accessible in the way it was intended.Peer reviewedPostprin
Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis
Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are
equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main
philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is
foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for
mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account
of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have
heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this
account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational
approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization
of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended
form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte.
Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be
proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only
-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as
computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some
attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for
foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable
entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not
preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly,
computable entailment is a complete relation, and hence employing it
commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any
foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than
.Comment: Submitted. 41 page
Informal proof, formal proof, formalism
Increases in the use of automated theorem-provers have renewed focus on the relationship between the informal proofs normally found in mathematical research and fully formalised derivations. Whereas some claim that any correct proof will be underwritten by a fully formal proof, sceptics demur. In this paper I look at the relevance of these issues for formalism, construed as an anti-platonistic metaphysical doctrine. I argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that all proofs are fully formalisable, if formal proofs are required to be finitary, but that, on a proper view of the way in which formal proofs idealise actual practice, this restriction is unjustified and formalism is not threatened
Hilbert's Program Then and Now
Hilbert's program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy
and foundations of mathematics. In order to "dispose of the foundational
questions in mathematics once and for all, "Hilbert proposed a two-pronged
approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in
axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, "finitary" means, one should
give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Godel's
incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be
carried out, it had many partial successes, and generated important advances in
logical theory and meta-theory, both at the time and since. The article
discusses the historical background and development of Hilbert's program, its
philosophical underpinnings and consequences, and its subsequent development
and influences since the 1930s.Comment: 43 page
Counting Incompossibles
We often speak as if there are merely possible peopleâfor example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all
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