Adaptive deterrence sanctions in a normative framework

Normative environments are used to regulate multi-agent interactions. In business encounters, agents representing business entities make contracts including norms that prescribe what agents should do. Agent autonomy, however, gives agents the ability to decide whether they fulfill or violate their commitments. In this paper we present an adaptive mechanism that enables a normative framework to change deterrence sanctions according to an agent population, in order to preclude agents from exploiting potential normative flaws. The system tries to avoid institutional control beyond what is strictly necessary, seeking to maximize agent contracting activity while ensuring a certain commitment compliance level, when agents have unknown risk and social attitudes

On the integration of trust with negotiation, argumentation and semantics

Agreement Technologies are needed for autonomous agents to come to mutually acceptable agreements, typically on behalf of humans. These technologies include trust computing, negotiation, argumentation and semantic alignment. In this paper, we identify a number of open questions regarding the integration of computational models and tools for trust computing with negotiation, argumentation and semantic alignment. We consider these questions in general and in the context of applications in open, distributed settings such as the grid and cloud computing. © 2013 Cambridge University Press.This work was partially supported by the Agreement Technology COST action (IC0801). The authors would like to thank for helpful discussions and comments all participants in the panel on >Trust, Argumentation and Semantics> on 16 December 2009, Agia Napa, CyprusPeer Reviewe