7,326 research outputs found
Applications of single-qubit rotations in quantum public-key cryptography
We discuss cryptographic applications of single-qubit rotations from the
perspective of trapdoor one-way functions and public-key encryption. In
particular, we present an asymmetric cryptosystem whose security relies on
fundamental principles of quantum physics. A quantum public key is used for the
encryption of messages while decryption is possible by means of a classical
private key only. The trapdoor one-way function underlying the proposed
cryptosystem maps integer numbers to quantum states of a qubit and its
inversion can be infeasible by virtue of the Holevo's theorem.Comment: to appear in Phys. Rev.
Wave: A New Family of Trapdoor One-Way Preimage Sampleable Functions Based on Codes
We present here a new family of trapdoor one-way Preimage Sampleable
Functions (PSF) based on codes, the Wave-PSF family. The trapdoor function is
one-way under two computational assumptions: the hardness of generic decoding
for high weights and the indistinguishability of generalized -codes.
Our proof follows the GPV strategy [GPV08]. By including rejection sampling, we
ensure the proper distribution for the trapdoor inverse output. The domain
sampling property of our family is ensured by using and proving a variant of
the left-over hash lemma. We instantiate the new Wave-PSF family with ternary
generalized -codes to design a "hash-and-sign" signature scheme which
achieves existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks
(EUF-CMA) in the random oracle model. For 128 bits of classical security,
signature sizes are in the order of 15 thousand bits, the public key size in
the order of 4 megabytes, and the rejection rate is limited to one rejection
every 10 to 12 signatures.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1706.0806
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Many-to-one Trapdoor Functions and Their Relation to Public-Key Cryptosystems
The heart of the task of building public key cryptosystems is viewed as that of "making trapdoors;" in fact, public key cryptosystems and trapdoor functions are often discussed as synonymous. How accurate is this view? In this paper we endeavor to get a better understanding of the nature of "trapdoorness" and its relation to public key cryptosystems, by broadening the scope of the investigation: we look at general trapdoor functions; that is, functions that are not necessarily injective (ie., one-to-one). Our first result is somewhat surprising: we show that non-injective trapdoor functions (with super-polynomial pre-image size) can be constructed from any one-way function (and hence it is unlikely that they suffice for public key encryption). On the other hand, we show that trapdoor functions with polynomial pre-image size are sufficient for public key encryption. Together, these two results indicate that the pre-image size is a fundamental parameter of trapdoor functions. We then turn our attention to the converse, asking what kinds of trapdoor functions can be constructed from public key cryptosystems. We take a first step by showing that in the random-oracle model one can construct injective trapdoor functions from any public key cryptosystem.Engineering and Applied Science
Building Lossy Trapdoor Functions from Lossy Encryption
Injective one-way trapdoor functions are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. In this work we show how to derandomize lossy encryption (with long messages) to obtain lossy trapdoor functions, and hence injective one-way trapdoor functions.
Bellare, Halevi, Sahai and Vadhan (CRYPTO \u2798) showed that if E is an IND-CPA secure cryptosystem, and is a random oracle, then is an injective trapdoor function. In this work, we show that if E is a lossy encryption with messages at least 1-bit longer than randomness, and is a pairwise independent hash function, then is a lossy trapdoor function,
and hence also an injective trapdoor function.
The works of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters and Hemenway, Libert, Ostrovsky and Vergnaud showed that statistically-hiding 2-round Oblivious Transfer (OT) is equivalent to Lossy Encryption.
In their construction, if the sender randomness is shorter than the message in the OT, it will also be shorter than the message in the lossy encryption.
This gives an alternate interpretation of our main result. In this language, we show that any 2-message statistically sender-private semi-honest oblivious transfer (OT) for strings
longer than the sender randomness implies the existence of injective one-way trapdoor functions. This is in contrast to the black box separation of
injective trapdoor functions from many common cryptographic protocols, e.g. IND-CCA encryption
Targeted Lossy Functions and Applications
Lossy trapdoor functions, introduced by Peikert and Waters (STOC \u2708), can be initialized in one of two indistinguishable modes: in injective mode, the function preserves all information about its input, and can be efficiently inverted given a trapdoor, while in lossy mode, the function loses some information about its input. Such functions have found countless applications in cryptography, and can be constructed from a variety of number-theoretic or algebraic ``Cryptomania\u27\u27 assumptions. In this work, we introduce targeted lossy functions (TLFs), which relax lossy trapdoor functions along two orthogonal dimensions. First, they do not require an inversion trapdoor in injective mode. Second, the lossy mode of the function is initialized with some target input, and the function is only required to lose information about this particular target. The injective and lossy modes should be indistinguishable even given the target. We construct TLFs from ``Minicrypt\u27\u27 assumptions, namely, injective pseudorandom generators, or even one-way functions under a natural relaxation of injectivity. We then generalize TLFs to incorporate branches, and construct all-injective-but-one and all-lossy-but-one variants. We show a wide variety of applications of targeted lossy functions. In several cases, we get the first Minicrypt constructions of primitives that were previously only known under Cryptomania assumptions. Our applications include:
-Pseudo-entropy functions from one-way functions.
-Deterministic leakage-resilient message-authentication codes and improved leakage-resilient symmetric-key encryption from one-way functions.
-Extractors for extractor-dependent sources from one-way functions.
-Selective-opening secure symmetric-key encryption from one-way functions.
-A new construction of CCA PKE from (exponentially secure) trapdoor functions and injective pseudorandom generators.
We also discuss a fascinating connection to distributed point functions
Perfect Structure on the Edge of Chaos
We construct trapdoor permutations based on (sub-exponential) indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions, thereby providing the first candidate that is not based on the hardness of factoring.
Our construction shows that even highly structured primitives, such as trapdoor permutations, can be potentially based on hardness assumptions with noisy structures such as those used in candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation. It also suggest a possible way to construct trapdoor permutations that resist quantum attacks, and that their hardness may be based on problems outside the complexity class SZK - indeed, while factoring-based candidates do not possess such security, future constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation might.
As a corollary, we eliminate the need to assume trapdoor permutations and injective one-way function in many recent constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation
Injective Trapdoor Functions via Derandomization: How Strong is Rudich’s Black-Box Barrier?
We present a cryptographic primitive satisfying the following properties:
-- Rudich\u27s seminal impossibility result (PhD thesis \u2788) shows that cannot be used in a black-box manner to construct an injective one-way function.
-- can be used in a non-black-box manner to construct an injective one-way function assuming the existence of a hitting-set generator that fools deterministic circuits (such a generator is known to exist based on the worst-case assumption that \mbox{E} = \mbox{DTIME}(2^{O(n)}) has a function of deterministic circuit complexity ).
-- Augmenting with a trapdoor algorithm enables a non-black-box construction of an injective trapdoor function (once again, assuming the existence of a hitting-set generator that fools deterministic circuits), while Rudich\u27s impossibility result still holds.
The primitive and its augmented variant can be constructed based on any injective one-way function and on any injective trapdoor function, respectively, and they are thus unconditionally essential for the existence of such functions. Moreover, can also be constructed based on various known primitives that are secure against related-key attacks, thus enabling to base the strong structural guarantees of injective one-way functions on the strong security guarantees of such primitives.
Our application of derandomization techniques is inspired mainly by the work of Barak, Ong and Vadhan (CRYPTO \u2703), which on one hand relies on any one-way function, but on the other hand only results in a non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment scheme (offering significantly weaker structural guarantees compared to injective one-way functions), and does not seem to enable an extension to public-key primitives.
The key observation underlying our approach is that Rudich\u27s impossibility result applies not only to one-way functions as the underlying primitive, but in fact to a variety of unstructured\u27\u27 primitives. We put forward a condition for identifying such primitives, and then subtly tailor the properties of our primitives such that they are both sufficiently unstructured in order to satisfy this condition, and sufficiently structured in order to yield injective one-way and trapdoor functions. This circumvents the basic approach underlying Rudich\u27s long-standing evidence for the difficulty of constructing injective one-way functions (and, in particular, injective trapdoor functions) based on seemingly weaker or unstructured assumptions
Preimage Selective Trapdoor Function: How to Repair an Easy Problem
Public key cryptosystems are constructed by embedding a trapdoor into a one-way function. So, the one-wayness and the trapdoorness are vital to public key cryptography. In this paper, we propose a novel public key cryptographic primitive called preimage selective trapdoor function. This scenario allows to use exponentially many preimage to hide a plaintext even if the underlying function is not one-way. The compact knapsack problem is used to construct a probabilistic public key cryptosystem, the underlying encryption function of which is proven to be preimage selective trapdoor one-way functions under some linearization attack models. The constructive method can guarantee the noninjectivity of the underlying encryption function and the unique decipherability for ciphertexts simultaneously. It is heuristically argued that the security of the proposal cannot be compromised by a polynomial-time adversary even if the compact knapsack is easy to solve. We failed to provide any provable security results about the proposal; however, heuristic illustrations show that the proposal is secure against some known attacks including brute force attacks, linearization attacks, and key-recovery attacks. The proposal turns out to have acceptable key sizes and performs efficiently and hence is practical
Asymmetric cryptography and trapdoor one-way functions
The asymmetric-key (public-key) encryption scheme is considered to be the most important discovery in the history of cryptography. It is based on the use of two complementary keys generated according to a chosen trapdoor one-way function (TOWF). Since its first implementation, asymmetric encryption has revolutionized our way of communicating as well as the safety of information transfer, and it is now widely used around the world for various purposes, especially in the field of online transaction security. The safety of the asymmetric-key scheme relies on the assumption that any known cryptographic attack using an efficient problem-solving algorithm will not be able to succeed in applying the inverse (decryption) function onto the cryptogram in a polynomial time without additional knowledge (secret information). The most-challenging aspect of creating a new asymmetric cryptographic algorithm is selecting a one-way function for encryption purposes and finding a trapdoor in its inverse. In this paper, the concept of public-key cryptography will be explained using the RSA algorithm as an example. In addition, the review of the most-important functions that are considered to be trapdoor one-way functions will be conducted
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