On the relative strengths of fragments of collection

Let $\mathbf{M}$ be the basic set theory that consists of the axioms of extensionality, emptyset, pair, union, powerset, infinity, transitive containment, $\Delta_0$-separation and set foundation. This paper studies the relative strength of set theories obtained by adding fragments of the set-theoretic collection scheme to $\mathbf{M}$. We focus on two common parameterisations of collection: $\Pi_n$-collection, which is the usual collection scheme restricted to $\Pi_n$-formulae, and strong $\Pi_n$-collection, which is equivalent to $\Pi_n$-collection plus $\Sigma_{n+1}$-separation. The main result of this paper shows that for all $n \geq 1$, (1) $\mathbf{M}+\Pi_{n+1}\textrm{-collection}+\Sigma_{n+2}\textrm{-induction on } \omega$ proves the consistency of Zermelo Set Theory plus $\Pi_{n}$-collection, (2) the theory $\mathbf{M}+\Pi_{n+1}\textrm{-collection}$ is $\Pi_{n+3}$-conservative over the theory $\mathbf{M}+\textrm{strong }\Pi_n \textrm{-collection}$. It is also shown that (2) holds for $n=0$ when the Axiom of Choice is included in the base theory. The final section indicates how the proofs of (1) and (2) can be modified to obtain analogues of these results for theories obtained by adding fragments of collection to a base theory (Kripke-Platek Set Theory with Infinity and $V=L$) that does not include the powerset axiom.Comment: 22 page

Topological Semantics and Decidability

It is well-known that the basic modal logic of all topological spaces is $S4$. However, the structure of basic modal and hybrid logics of classes of spaces satisfying various separation axioms was until present unclear. We prove that modal logics of $T_0$, $T_1$ and $T_2$ topological spaces coincide and are S4$. We also examine basic hybrid logics of these classes and prove their decidability; as part of this, we find out that the hybrid logics of$T_1$and T_2$ spaces coincide.Comment: presentation changes, results about concrete structure adde

Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze and G\"odel's Constructible Universe

Frege's Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which defines a model of all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. The proof of this result appeals to G\"odel's constructible universe of sets, which G\"odel famously used to show the relative consistency of the continuum hypothesis. More specifically, our proofs appeal to Kripke and Platek's idea of the projectum within the constructible universe as well as to a weak version of uniformization (which does not involve knowledge of Jensen's fine structure theory). The axioms of the Grundgesetze are examples of abstraction principles, and the other primary aim of this paper is to articulate a sufficient condition for the consistency of abstraction principles with limited amounts of comprehension. As an application, we resolve an analogue of the joint consistency problem in the predicative setting.Comment: Forthcoming in The Journal of Symbolic Logi