Quantifying transport, regulatory and other costs of India–Bangladesh trade

In the globalised world, international borders ought to be mere lines on the map. But recent studies have shown that informal trade barriers still exist, and inhibit trade, particularly so in the developing countries. This can arise due to a host of factors such as complex customs procedures, which sometimes change, and capacity constraints, given limited facilities and/or corruption at the border. However, non-tariff barriers of various sorts and structural impediments are less obvious and perhaps more interesting, but also much more difficult to measure directly. In this context, this paper attempts to quantify the relevant costs resulting from informal barriers that impinge upon trade between India and Bangladesh through the land customs stations (LCSs) at Petrapole (West Bengal) and Benapole (Bangladesh). The study is based on primary data collated through surveys conducted in West Bengal. Our estimates show that the aggregate delay pertaining to all the phases of exports turns out to be approximately four days for a single shipment. It also shows that the additional transaction costs in terms of delays and speed money incurred by the Indian exporters during trading with Bangladesh is about 10 per cent of shipment value. The present study has shown that informal barriers/para-tariff in India-Bangladesh trade are already high and further trade liberalisation without improving the infrastructure would be counterproductive. The paper ends with feasible policy recommendations to make trade between India and Bangladesh more vibrant.

Is re-farming the answer to the spectrum shortage conundrum?

Radio spectrum has become one of the engines of economic growth. However, rapid technological change, ever increasing demands for new wireless services and the nature of spectrum as a scarce resource necessitate an urgent re-examination of issues such as congestion and interference. This paper argues that the traditional administrative spectrum management approach is unlikely to overcome these issues, thereby resulting in growing technical and economic inefficiencies. As countries review their spectrum policies - a process that is generically referred to as radio spectrum policy reform - to counter these inefficiencies, modifications to the radio frequency allocations and assignments are beginning to be implemented by way of radio spectrum re-farming? This phenomenon forms the subject matter of this paper

Efficient and Equitable Airport Slot Allocation

This paper studies slot allocation at congested airports in Europe. First, I discuss the inefficiencies of the current regulation, introduced as part of the liberalisation process of the air transport market. Then, I consider three marked based methods which are suitable to achieve a more efficient allocation of slots to airlines: congestion pricing, auctions and secondary trading. These methods are examined in terms of their ability to improve efficiency and in terms of their implications on the distribution of slots’ scarcity rents. Special attention is drawn to complementarities between slots. Finally, I propose to auction slots periodically, allowing secondary trading well before the first auction takes place. By selling slots before the first auction incumbents can be partially compensated for the subsequent withdrawal of their slots.

Evaluating the impact of average cost based contracts on the industrial sector in the European emission trading scheme

The inception of the Emission Trading System in Europe (EU-ETS) has made power price more expensive. This affects the competitiveness of electricity intensive industrial consumers and may force them to leave Europe. Taking up of a proposal of the industrial sector, we explore the possible application of special contracts, based on the average cost pricing system, which would mitigate the impact of CO2 cost on their electricity price. The model supposes fixed generation capacities. A companion paper treats the case with capacity expansion. We first consider a reference model representing a perfectly competitive market where all consumers (households and industries) are price-takers and buy electricity at the short-run marginal cost. We then change the market design assuming that large industrial consumers pay power either at a single or at a nodal average cost price. The analysis of these problems is conducted with simulation models applied to the Northwestern European market. The equilibrium models developed are implemented in the GAMS environment.average cost pricing, complementarity conditions, EU-ETS, Northwestern Europe market.

Network effects and total economic impact in transport appraisal

It is claimed that transport infrastructure projects have network effects which are not taken into account in the appraisal of these projects. This paper reviews the concept of network effects, relates this to transport appraisal practice, and links to the concept of ‘total economic impact’. The limitations of transport modelling and appraisal in estimating total economic impact are reviewed. Good quality appraisals should be capable of picking up relevant network effects in the transport market, but the state of the art remains limited on the linkages between transport and the wider economy

Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets

This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort.Experimental economics; market design; design economics; electricity auction;